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How Should Governments
Promote Distributive Justice?:
A Framework for Analyzing the
Optimal Choice of Tax Instruments
DAVID GAMAGE*
I. INTRODUCTION
Inequality has been growing dramatically over the past few de-
cades.' In the United States, the concentration of income controlled
by the top 1% has more than doubled since the 1970's.2 Moreover,
due to factors like technological advancement, many predict that
these trends may continue over the coming years, with the top per-
centage of taxpayers gaining control of an even greater portion of the
economic pie.3
* Assistant Professor, University of California, Berkeley, School of Law. I have
received invaluable help from too many individuals to thank by name since I began
working on this project. I especially owe thanks to Alan Auerbach, Joseph Bankman, Ilan
Benshalom, Eric Biber, Neil Buchanan, Tom Brennan, John Brooks, Raj Chetty, Daniel
Farber, Lilian Faulhaber, Brian Galle, Mark Gergen, Jacob Goldin, David Hasen, Andrew
Hayashi, Mitchell Kane, David Kamin, Louis Kaplow, Sarah Lawsky, Leandra Lederman,
Katerina Linos, Jack McNulty, Susan Morse, Jacob Nussim, Shu-yi Oei, Leigh Osofsky,
Miranda Perry-Fleischer, Shruti Rana, Alex Raskolnikov, Adam Rosenzweig, Emmanuel
Saez, Chris Sanchirico, Emily Satterthwaite, Deborah Schenk, Darien Shanske, Daniel
Shaviro, Joel Slemrod, Ethan Yale, Lawrence Zelenak, and the editorial staff of the Tax
Law Review.
1 Facundo Alvaredo, Anthony B. Atkinson, Thomas Piketty & Emmanuel Saez, The
Top 1 Percent in International and Historical Perspective, J. Econ. Persp., Summer 2013, at
2, 3-7. By "inequality" in this context, I mean intra-nation, income-related inequality.
There are other forms of inequality, and not all of these are growing. But, for the purposes
of this Article, what matters is that there is reason to predict that governments are likely to
remain concerned with raising revenues from the best-off taxpayers (or, more generally,
with distributional equity concerns).
2 Id. at 4; see also David Weisbach, The Pareto Minimal Tax System-A Review of
Fundamental Tax Reform: Issues, Choices, and Implications, 64 Nat'l Tax J. 909, 913-14
(2011) (book review) ("By almost any measure there has been a very large increase in the
share of income going to individuals at the very top of the income distribution. The precise
amounts vary by study but I don't know of a study that disputes the finding that the share
of income going to the top 1 percent has increased dramatically, and that as one narrows
the field to thinner and thinner slices of the distribution, the effect becomes more
pronounced.").
3 E.g., Erik Brynjolfsson & Andrew McAfee, Race Against the Machine: How the Digi-
tal Revolution Is Accelerating Innovation, Driving Productivity, and Irreversibly Trans-
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Some argue that governments should raise the highest income tax
rates in order to combat this growing inequality or to raise revenues to
pay down government debts. 4 Yet the opponents of raising the high-
est income tax rates contend that doing so would induce high-income
taxpayers to respond through economically harmful tax reduction
techniques. 5 There is thus a wide literature analyzing how we might
reform income taxes so as to more efficiently raise revenues and "pro-
mote distributional equity"'6 while causing less economic harm.
Ultimately, however, there are powerful constraints on the extent to
which existing tax systems plausibly might be reformed. Designing tax
systems is fraught with difficult line-drawing problems, with the result
that taxpayers have strong incentives to reorganize their affairs so as
to cross these lines in search of tax benefits. 7 No one seriously sug-
gests that tax avoidance and evasion could be completely eliminated
in real world contexts. Indeed, historical experience with fundamental
tax reform suggests that high-income taxpayers will eventually find
numerous ways to circumvent any plausible real world forms of
taxation.8
For instance, although the 1986 Tax Reform Act appears to have
substantially limited many of the most egregious tax reduction tech-
niques employed by high-income U.S. taxpayers prior to 1986, most
forming Employment and the Economy 33-34 (2011); Tyler Cowen, Average Is Over:
Powering America Beyond the Age of the Great Stagnation 4-5 (2013); Thomas Piketty,
Capital in the Twenty-First Century 1 (2014).
4 E.g., Peter Diamond & Emmanuel Saez, The Case for a Progressive Tax: From Basic
Research to Policy Recommendations, J. Econ. Persp., Fall 2011, at 165, 167-75.
5 E.g., Martin Feldstein, Effects of Taxes on Economic Behavior, 61 Nat'l Tax J. 131, 137
(2008).
6 Throughout this Article, I purposefully refer to "promoting distributive justice" or to
"promoting distributional equity" (or similar terms, all of which I use synonymously),
rather than to "redistribution." As I began to explain in prior work, and as I hope to
elaborate further in future work, I have concluded that the term "redistribution" has inac-
curate and misleading connotations, as the term is commonly used in the academic litera-
ture. See David Gamage & Darien Shanske, Three Essays on Tax Salience: Market
Salience and Political Salience, 65 Tax L. Rev. 19, 79-98 (2011). By using terms like "pro-
moting distributional equity," I mean to refer to government attempts to advance goals
related to distributive justice, and especially to government attempts at combatting income
or wealth inequities or related forms of inequity or inequality, in accordance with the gov-
ernment's social welfare function. For further discussion, see note 71 and accompanying
text.
7 See David A. Weisbach, Line Drawing, Doctrine, and Efficiency in Tax Law, 84 Cor-
nell L. Rev. 1627, 1629-30 (1999).
8 See Ronald A. Pearlman, A Tax Reform Caveat: In the Real World, There is No Per-
fect Tax System, in Toward Fundamental Tax Reform 106, 112 (Alan J. Auerbach and
Kevin A. Hassett eds., 2005) (explaining that real-world tax reform proposals will "be full
of exceptions from a theoretically pure model" and will thus be subject to tax avoidance
and tax evasion).
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scholars have concluded that this was only a temporary victory.9 It
did not take long before high-income U.S. taxpayers switched to using
different tax reduction techniques, such as techniques involving
recharacterizing what might be thought of as economically being "la-
bor income" so that it is treated as a form of capital asset by the in-
come tax system, and then exploiting the realization rules so as to use
these "capital assets" to fund consumption while skirting at least sub-
stantial portions of both the ordinary income and capital gains compo-
nents of the income tax.' 0 Today, there is at least anecdotal evidence
suggesting that many of the highest-income U.S. taxpayers use tech-
niques of this sort so as to dramatically reduce their income tax
liabilities."
There is thus reason to infer that many high-income taxpayers are
able to at least substantially skirt income taxes, and that this will re-
main the case regardless of how existing income taxes might plausibly
be reformed. Therefore, to complement attempts to reform existing
income taxes, this Article argues that governments should potentially
also raise revenues and promote distributional equity through a num-
ber of supplementary policy instruments.
In particular, this Article argues that at least some legal rules should
be designed to promote distributional equity, in contrast to the domi-
nant view in the prior law-and-economics literature that (with limited
exceptions) distributional equity should be promoted exclusively
through the setting of tax rates.' 2 Furthermore, building on this Arti-
cle's analysis, a forthcoming companion Article argues that govern-
ments should potentially: (1) levy both personal labor income taxes
and value-added consumption taxes, (2) tax both capital income and
9 See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Rise and Fall of the Consumption Tax: A Historical
Perspective 3 (Draft of 11/14/14) ("However, the 1986 reform was not to last. By 1990, the
ordinary income rate and the capital gains rate began to diverge, and by 1997 the gap had
widened to pre-1986 dimensions, leading to a new wave of shelters built on converting
ordinary income to capital gains."), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfmabs
tractid=2523941.
10 For further discussion, see Subsection I.C.1.
11 See, e.g., Christopher H. Hanna, Tax Theories and Tax Reform, 59 SMU L. Rev. 435,
437-38 (2006) ("much of the wealth of entrepreneurs and capitalists, such as Bill Gates and
Warren Buffet, the two wealthiest Americans, has never been taxed because, in each case,
the bulk of their wealth is held in stock of corporations that they created or acquired .... In
other words, Gates and Buffet have primarily pretax wealth, while most individuals have
primarily after-tax wealth."); The Nat'l Econ. Council, The Buffet Rule: A Basic Principle
of Tax Fairness 1 (Apr. 2012), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/Buf
fettRuleReport_- Final.pdf ("Some of the richest Americans pay extraordinarily low tax
rates-as they hire tax lawyers and accountants to take particular advantage of loopholes
and tax expenditures.... Many high-income Americans are paying less in taxes than mid-
dle class Americans in taxes.).
12 E.g., Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient Than
the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J. Legal Stud. 667, 669 (1994).
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wealth, and (3) make use of other tax and nontax legal rules for dis-
tributive purposes. 13
This Article's policy prescriptions thus run counter to an influential
set of arguments drawn from modern public finance theory-some-
times called "double-distortion" arguments within the legal litera-
ture. 14 As Professor Daniel Shaviro explains, "the 'double distortion'
literature in legal scholarship. . .draws the conclusion that distribu-
tional objectives should be pursued entirely through a progressive
consumption tax [or a labor income tax] .... This is a legal literature
based on certain economics literature. Economists may be bemused
by how this legal literature treats this economics literature. '1 5
This Article analyzes how the models underlying double-distortion
arguments can be generalized to account for taxpayers engaging in a
diverse variety of tax reduction behaviors, many of which are quite
idiosyncratic and contingent on exploiting the details of how tax sys-
tems are implemented. This Article argues that generalizing double-
distortion models in this fashion implies that governments should po-
tentially make use of a number of policy instruments in order to raise
revenues and to promote distributional equity, contrary to the pre-
scriptions typically drawn from double-distortion models.
Often called "optimal tax theory," the modern structure of public
finance economics was largely engineered around models of labor-to-
leisure distortions. 16 In other words, scholars considered individuals
reducing their work effort in response to taxation to be a central prob-
lem of tax policy. In the 1970's and 1980's, when many of the founda-
tional insights of optimal tax theory were first generated, both the
empirical and theoretical literatures offered reason to infer that labor-
to-leisure distortions should be a first-order concern for tax design
problems. Yet the results from the last two decades of public finance
13 David Gamage, The Case for Taxing (All Of) Labor Income, Consumption, Capital
Income, and Wealth, 68 Tax L. Rev. (forthcoming), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstractid=2465522 (draft of Nov. 10, 2014).
14 The phrase "double-distortion argument" is primarily used in the existing literature to
refer to Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell's analysis of distribution through legal rules. See
Section III.B. But similar arguments are made in a variety of other policy contexts, and for
ease of exposition, I use this phrase to refer to the entire class of policy arguments made
based on similar underlying logic.
15 Daniel Shaviro, NYU Tax Policy Colloquium, Week 13, David Gamage's "A Frame-
work for Analyzing the Optimal Choice of Tax Instruments," pt. 1, Start Making Sense
(Apr. 30, 2014, 11:07 AM), available at http://danshaviro.blogspot.com/2014/04/nyu-tax-pol
icy-colloquium-week-13-david.html.
16 E.g., Louis Kaplow, The Theory of Taxation and Public Economics 317 (2008) ("In-
centive concerns... involving labor effort [are] the focus of most optimal tax analysis.");
James Banks & Peter Diamond, The Base for Direct Taxation, in Dimensions of Tax De-
sign 548, 570 (Stuart Adam, Tim Besley, Richard Blundell, Steve Bond, Robert Chote,
Malcolm Gammie, Paul Johnson, Gareth Myles & James Poterba eds., 2010) ("Standard
modeling assumes perfect observation of capital and labour incomes.").
[Vol. 68:
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research imply that labor-to-leisure distortions may be of only secon-
dary importance for many tax policy questions.
First, the recent empirical literature suggests that taxpayers might
respond to taxation not primarily through labor-to-leisure substitu-
tions,17 but rather through a variety of more idiosyncratic and context-
dependent distortionary behaviors-that I will refer to as "tax gam-
ing" distortions.18 This appears to especially be true with respect to
high-income taxpayers, for whom distributional considerations are
particularly relevant. 19 Indeed, the recent empirical literature finds
essentially no evidence that high-income taxpayers significantly re-
duce their labor effort in response to taxation.20 In contrast, there is a
plethora of evidence documenting that high-income taxpayers re-
spond to taxation through a diverse variety of tax gaming strategies.21
Second, in response to these empirical findings, the recent theoreti-
cal literature has developed better techniques for modeling tax gam-
ing responses. Obstacles to the early analysis of tax gaming included
that gaming is highly contingent on the idiosyncratic design of tax sys-
tems and that the aggregate category of gaming consists of a variety of
distinct tax reduction techniques. It is therefore difficult to produce
17 For discussion and reviews of the empirical literature, see, e.g., Gamage, note 13, at
19-28; Emmanuel Saez, Joel Slemrod & Seth H. Giertz, The Elasticity of Taxable Income
with Respect to Marginal Tax Rates: A Critical Review, 50 J. Econ. Literature 3, 4, 42
(2012) (concluding that "[a]lthough evidence of a substantial compensated labor supply
elasticity has been hard to find, evidence that taxpayers respond to tax system changes
more generally has decidedly not been hard to find .. ", and also concluding that "while
there is compelling U.S. evidence of strong behavioral responses to taxation at the upper
end of the distribution" these responses consist entirely of "timing and avoidance"
transactions).
18 One reason why I use the term "tax gaming" is to skirt the question of whether the
tax reduction behaviors in question are legal (corresponding with the term "tax avoid-
ance") or illegal (corresponding with the term "tax evasion"), as many important real
world tax gaming behaviors are of unclear or borderline legality. For the purposes of this
Article, it is not important to precisely delineate what counts as a "tax gaming" distortion,
so long as it is understood that "tax gaming" refers to the subcategory of distortionary tax
reduction behaviors that tend to be more idiosyncratic and contingent on exploiting the
details of how tax systems are implemented. For further discussion of the nature of tax
gaming, see Subsection III.A.2.
19 Saez et. al., note 17, at 4 ("There is no compelling evidence to date of real responses
of upper income taxpayers to changes in tax rates .. "); Costas Meghir & David Phillips,
Labour Supply and Taxes 47 (Inst. for Fiscal Stud., Working Paper WP08/04, 2008), availa-
ble at http://www.ifs.org.uk/wps/wp0804.pdf ("For highly educated individuals the sensitiv-
ity of both hours of work and participation to work incentives are almost zero.").
20 E.g., Saez et. al., note 17, at 4; Meghir & Phillips, note 19, at 42.
21 E.g., Saez et. al., note 17, at 4, 42; see also Douglas A. Shackelford, The Tax Environ-
ment Facing the Wealthy, in Does Atlas Shrug? The Economic Consequences of Taxing the
Rich 114, 114 (Joel B. Slemrod ed., 2000) (discussing gaming strategies); Jesse Drucker,
How to Pay No Taxes: 10 Strategies Used by the Rich, BusinessWeek (Apr. 17, 2012),
http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2012-04-17/how-to-pay-no-taxes-10-strategies-used-
by-the-rich (same).
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generalizable insights from models of specific tax gaming responses.22
To address these challenges, the recent literature has developed a suf-
ficient-statistics methodology for modeling tax responsiveness. 23 In
contrast to the earlier approaches, which analyzed only specific forms
of tax gaming, the newer sufficient-statistics methodology generates
insights by modeling aggregate categories of gaming responses.
Building on these empirical and theoretical advances, the public fi-
nance literature is currently in the process of greatly expanding our
capacity to analyze tax systems. 24 Yet these insights from the recent
literature have not yet been fully incorporated into an important set of
policy problems that I label as "optimal-choice-of-tax-instruments"
questions.
Following common terminology in the public finance literature, I
use the term "tax instrument" to refer to any policy variable that a
government might adjust in order to raise revenues or to promote dis-
tributional equity.25 I thus use the phrase "the optimal choice of tax
instruments" to refer to a government's decisions about how to raise
revenues or to promote distributional equity, abstracting from the re-
lated questions of how much revenue should be raised or how much
distributional equity should be promoted. Hence, as defined, optimal-
choice-of-tax-instruments questions take as their starting point pre-
specified social welfare weights for balancing distributional equity
against efficiency and a pre-specified amount of revenue to be raised.
In other words, taking as inputs revenue needs and social preferences
regarding the tradeoff between distributional equity and efficiency,
optimal-choice-of-tax-instruments questions ask which policy instru-
ments a government should use for raising revenues or for promoting
22 Raj Chetty, Sufficient Statistics for Welfare Analysis: A Bridge Between Structural
and Reduced-Form Methods, Ann. Rev. Econ., Sept. 2009, at 451, 467.
23 As Raj Chetty has explained, sufficient-statistics methodology allows for making wel-
fare predictions based on high-level estimates of aggregate categories of behavioral re-
sponses, as opposed to modeling only specific behavioral responses. Id. at 452 ("The
central concept of the sufficient-statistic approach ... is to derive formulas for the welfare
consequences of policies that are functions of high-level elasticities rather than deep primi-
tives. Even though there are multiple combinations of primitives that are consistent with
the inputs to the formulas, all such combinations have the same welfare implications.").
24 For an overview of some of this research, see generally Joel Slemrod & Christian
Gillitzer, Tax Systems (2014).
25 "Tax instruments" thus stand in contrast to "regulatory instruments," which are de-
signed for goals other than raising revenues or promoting distributional equity. Some pol-
icy instruments, however, might function both as regulatory instruments and as tax
instruments, insofar as a government can adjust these policy instruments to further either
regulatory or revenue and distributional goals. In other words, legal rules that are de-
signed primarily for regulatory purposes may also function as tax instruments to the extent
that the legal rules can be adjusted so as to promote distributional equity or to raise reve-
nues for the government.
[Vol. 68:
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distributional equity and to what extent the government should rely
on each tax instrument so used. 26
The existing law and economics literature on the optimal choice of
tax instruments is dominated by two different approaches. First, as
mentioned previously, what sometimes is called the double-distortion
approach applies the insights from an important public finance inno-
vation of the 1970's-the Atkinson-Stiglitz model. 27 The double-dis-
tortion approach is based on the intuition that taxing how money is
spent also reduces the returns to work (as opposed to leisure). More-
over, under the assumptions of the Atkinson-Stiglitz model, any reve-
nues raised from taxing how money is spent will induce exactly the
same magnitude of labor-to-leisure distortions as would raising those
revenues from taxing only labor income, in addition to possibly also
distorting taxpayers' choices of how to spend their money.28 There-
fore, differentially taxing how money is spent induces the double dis-
tortion of (1) labor-to-leisure distortions and (2) distortions in how
taxpayers spend the money they earn. For this reason, with limited
exceptions, 29 the advocates of double-distortion arguments typically
conclude that all distributional equity should be promoted either
through a labor income tax or through a comprehensive consumption
tax that levies the same tax rate on all forms of spending.30
Hence, so as not to distort taxpayers' choices of whether to save to
fund future consumption or whether to instead forgo saving so as to
spend in the present (in other words, "saving-to-spending distor-
tions"), double-distortion arguments have led many scholars to con-
clude that governments should not tax either capital income or
wealth-generating what has been called a "pro-consumption tax con-
sensus". 31 More broadly, double-distortion scholarship has concluded
that nearly all tax and nontax legal rules should be designed solely to
promote efficiency, with distributional concerns handled near exclu-
sively through either a labor income tax or a progressive consumption
tax.32 Although not universally accepted, the double-distortion ap-
26 For further discussion, see notes 73-77 and accompanying text.
27 For further discussion, see Subsection II.A.2.
28 Kaplow, note 16, at 122-33.
29 For a discussion of the exceptions in which double-distortion scholarship is in agree-
ment that instruments other than a labor income or consumption tax should be used for
distribution, see Subsection III.A.1.
30 Under the assumptions of double-distortion arguments, these two forms of taxation
are deemed to be essentially equivalent. For further discussion, see Gamage, note 13, at
38.
31 Daniel Shaviro, Beyond the Pro-Consumption Tax Consensus, 60 Stan. L. Rev. 745,
746-47 (2007).
32 E.g., Kaplow & Shavell, note 12, at 669; David A. Weisbach, Should Legal Rules Be
Used to Redistribute Income?, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 439, 439 (2003).
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proach is probably the "dominant position in tax law and policy."'33
The double-distortion approach has also been highly influential as ap-
plied to numerous aspects of social welfare policy and to law and pol-
icy analysis more generally. 34
To understand the central intuition underlying how this Article de-
parts from the double-distortion approach, consider further the mech-
anism through which taxes on how money is spent (such as excise
taxes) induce labor-to-leisure distortions. Labor-to-leisure distortions
operate through taxpayers substituting untaxed leisure consumption
for purchased consumption that is taxed both by labor income taxes
(when the money is earned) and by excise taxes (when the money is
spent).35 Consequently, the incentives that taxation creates to substi-
tute leisure for labor are a direct function of both labor income tax
rates and excise tax rates.
In contrast, consider a taxpayer deciding whether to claim an artifi-
cial or inflated labor income tax deduction. By "artificial" or "in-
flated," I mean that the taxpayer does not claim the deduction directly
as a result of incurring additional real business expenses or by other-
wise expending real resources such that the taxpayer's ability to fund
purchased consumption is reduced dollar for dollar by the amount of
the deduction. Instead, imagine a taxpayer claiming a deduction
through illegal fraud, through aggressive valuation, or through legally
taking advantage of a tax loophole.36 Certainly, this taxpayer may
need to incur costs in order to claim artificial deductions of this sort,
and these costs may reduce the taxpayer's resources for funding pur-
chased consumption.37 Yet as long as the taxpayer incurs less than a
dollar of costs per dollar of labor income tax savings,38 claiming this
deduction will reduce the taxpayer's labor income tax liability in ex-
cess of any reduction to the taxpayer's monetary resources for funding
purchased consumption.
Therefore, taxpayers' incentives to engage in tax gaming techniques
of this sort are a direct function of only the tax rates of the labor
income tax. Unlike with labor-to-leisure distortions, excise tax rates
should have only secondary effects on incentives to engage in these
33 See Chris William Sanchirico, Tax Eclecticism, 64 Tax L. Rev. 149, 224 (2011).
34 For examples of how the double-distortion approach has been applied to numerous
different policy areas, see Kaplow, note 16, at 53-344.
35 A central assumption of double-distortion models is that the government cannot tax
leisure consumption, or alternatively, that there exists some form of utility that the govern-
ment cannot tax that is labeled as "leisure." See Shaviro, note 31, at 759-60.
36 For examples and further discussion, see Subsection II.C.1.
37 Indeed, as discussed further in section II.A, only those forms of tax-responsiveness for
which taxpayers incur costs are directly relevant for analyzing optimal tax mix questions.
38 This generally will be the case except at the margin. See Subsection III.A.2.
[Vol. 68:
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forms of tax gaming responses.39 Importantly, this result holds even
under the controversial assumptions of the Atkinson-Stiglitz model
that taxpayers are homogeneous except in their ability to earn labor
income and that taxpayers' preferences are weakly separable in labor
and consumption. 40 As compared to raising all revenues through a
labor income tax, then, raising some revenues through excise taxes
can reduce taxpayer incentives to engage in forms of tax gaming that
operate like claiming artificial or inflated labor income tax deductions.
There is at least anecdotal evidence in support of the inference that
many important real-world tax gaming techniques involve claiming ar-
tificial or inflated income tax deductions, in the manner discussed
above.41 Moreover, as elaborated further below, there is reason to
infer that many other important tax gaming responses through which
high-income taxpayers currently respond to real world income taxes
operate (in this sense) like claiming artificial or inflated tax
deductions. 42
There is some previous economics research evaluating specific
forms of tax gaming through analyses of this sort.43 This Article's pri-
39 For a simple example as to why: Imagine if a government set the labor income tax
rate at zero, thus raising all revenues through excise taxes. Taxpayers would then have no
incentive to claim artificial labor-income-tax deductions, as doing so would produce no tax
benefit. For further discussion, see notes 157-60 and accompanying text.
40 For elaboration, see Subsection II.A.1.
41 See Mark P. Gergen, Uncertainty and Tax Enforcement: A Case for Moderate Fault-
Based Penalties, 64 Tax L. Rev. 453, 472 (2011) ("there is a great deal of anecdotal evi-
dence that taxpayers are aggressive in valuating uncertain tax items and in exploiting legal
uncertainty"). For examples and further discussion, see Subsection II.C.1.
42 In other words, the example of claiming artificial or inflated tax deductions is chosen
for illustrative purposes. Expanding the discussion to consider other major forms of tax
gaming currently engaged in by high-income taxpayers reveals that the argument above
should also apply more generally. See Subsection II.C.1.
43 Most relevantly, Roger Gordon and Soren Nielsen compare a VAT and a cash-flow
income tax under the assumptions that the VAT can be evaded through cross-border shop-
ping and that the income tax can be evaded through shifting taxable income abroad. Simi-
larly to this Article, Gordon and Nielsen prescribe that both tax instruments should be
used in order to minimize overall distortionary costs. Roger H. Gordon & Soren Bo Niel-
sen, Tax Evasion in an Open Economy: Value-Added vs. Income Taxation, 66 J. Pub.
Econ. 173, 182 (1997). Beyond Gordon and Nielsen's article, a handful of prior papers
have modeled the implications of certain forms of purely illegal tax evasion for optimal-
choice-of-tax-instruments questions. See, e.g., Robin Boadway, Maurice Marchand &
Pierre Pestieau, Towards a Theory of the Direct-Indirect Tax Mix, 55 J. Pub. Econ. 71, 72-
73 (1994); James R. Hines Jr., Might Fundamental Tax Reform Increase Criminal Activ-
ity?, 71 Economica 483, 483 (2004); Jonathan R. Kesselman, Evasion Effects of Changing
the Tax Mix, 69 Econ. Rec. 131, 131 (1993); Wolfram F. Richter & Robin W. Boadway,
Trading Off Tax Distortion and Tax Evasion, 7 J. Pub. Econ. Theory 361, 361 (2005). Also
highly relevant to the project set forth in this Article are a few papers applying optimal tax
theory in developing country contexts, based on the idea that it is not practical to levy a
comprehensive income or consumption tax. See, e.g., Roger Gordon & Wei Li, Tax Struc-
tures in Developing Countries: Many Puzzles and a Possible Explanation, 93 J. Pub. Econ.
855, 856 (2009); M. Shahe Emran & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Equity and Efficiency in Tax Re-
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mary contribution is to generalize this insight about tax gaming into a
theoretical framework capable of analyzing aggregate categories of
tax responsiveness so as to generate prescriptions for real world policy
questions.
Crucially, once we account for tax gaming responses, labor income
and consumption taxes do not necessarily dominate alternative tax in-
struments such as excise taxes44-contrary to the assumptions under-
lying double-distortion arguments. Therefore, to the extent that labor
income and consumption taxes generate tax gaming responses that op-
erate like claiming artificial or inflated tax deductions, we must deter-
mine the optimal choice of tax instruments by examining the marginal
costs of raising revenues through the various possible tax instruments.
To illustrate this point, consider a government that wishes to raise
revenue through some combination of a labor income tax and excise
taxes. Imagine, for the purposes of this example, that the empirical
literature reports that raising any fixed amount of revenue through
the excise taxes would generate approximately twice as much eco-
nomic harm through efficiency costs as would raising that revenue
through the labor income tax. Further imagine that the empirical
literature reports that the economic harm generated by both tax in-
struments primarily results from tax gaming responses that operate
like claiming artificial or inflated tax deductions, rather than from re-
sponses that operate like labor-to-leisure distortions.45
Based on the evidence that excise taxes generate approximately
double the efficiency costs per any fixed about of revenue raised, it
might seem that the government should raise all of its revenue
through the labor income tax. However, that a tax instrument is a
superior mechanism for raising any fixed sum of revenues does not
imply that the tax instrument is superior for raising marginal revenues.
Instead, we need to calculate for each tax instrument the formula for
the relative marginal costs of raising funds.
form in Developing Countries 2-3 (July 2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract=1001269.
44 One tax instrument "dominates" another tax instrument if and only if there are both
no margins of distortionary responses for which the first tax instrument would generate
more costly distortions than the second tax instrument (for any optimal combination of the
tax instruments) and there is at least one margin of distortionary responses for which the
first tax instrument would generate less costly distortions than the second tax instrument.
45 In the terminology developed in Part II, imagine that the distortionary costs from
both tax instruments primarily result from single-instrument responses. Alternatively, this
example works out equivalently if we imagine that-after factoring out multi-instrument
responses-the labor income tax generates approximately twice the magnitude of single-
instrument distortionary costs as the excise taxes for any fixed amount of revenue to be
raised, and that there are not significant instrument-shifting distortionary costs or overhead
costs.
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A basic principle of economic theory suggests that the marginal effi-
ciency costs generated by a tax instrument generally rise approxi-
mately with the square of the relevant tax rates.46 Another basic
principle of economic theory suggests that the revenues generated by
increasing a tax rate rise less than linearly, as increasing a tax rate
induces additional tax-reduction behaviors. 47 Consequently, as a gen-
eral rule of thumb, doubling the amount of revenues to be raised
through a tax instrument is thought to more than quadruple the effi-
ciency costs generated by that tax instrument.
In order to minimize overall efficiency costs, then, we might esti-
mate that a hypothetical government should raise at least a third of its
revenues through its excise taxes and no more than two-thirds of its
revenues through its labor-income tax. 48 That the excise taxes gener-
ate approximately double the efficiency costs per any fixed amount of
revenue to be raised is potentially counteracted by the rule of thumb
that doubling the amount of revenues to be raised through a tax in-
strument more than quadruples the efficiency costs generated by that
tax instrument. Thus, were the government to raise more than twice
as large a portion of its revenues through its labor income tax as
through its excise taxes, the marginal efficiency costs per dollar of rev-
enue raised might be expected to be higher for the labor income tax
than for the excise taxes. 49
This example is oversimplified on a number of dimensions. As ex-
plained further below, a more complete analysis suggests that this ex-
ample probably understates the advantages of levying multiple tax
instruments.50 Nevertheless, this example should suffice to demon-
strate that, when comparing multiple tax instruments, none of which
dominates the others, one must base the analysis on the marginal costs
of raising public funds. Again, that one tax instrument is a superior
mechanism for raising any fixed sum of revenues does not imply that
the instrument is a superior mechanism for raising marginal revenues.
Looking to real world labor income and consumption taxes, many
argue that these two tax instruments are the best available mecha-
46 For further discussion, see Subsections II.A.1 & III.A.2.
47 See Subsection II.C.2.
48 Defining I as the labor income tax rate and e as the excise tax rate, then-based on
the principle that distortionary costs generally rise approximately with the square of the
relevant tax rates-the distortionary costs generated can be estimated as being 2 for the
labor income tax and as 2e2 for the excise taxes. Overall distortionary costs could thus be
minimized by setting the two tax rates such that the derivatives of the distortionary cost
formulas with respect to the tax rates are equal. The derivatives are, respectively, 21 and 4e,
so I should be set as twice e. Of course, these calculations are oversimplified in a number of
respects, as elaborated throughout the remainder of this Article.
49 See note 48.
50 See Subsection II.C.2.
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nisms for raising any fixed sum of revenue or for promoting any fixed
amount of distribution. Yet, even if this is so, it still may be optimal
for governments to employ a variety of supplementary tax instru-
ments. The evidence suggests that many high-income taxpayers find
real world labor income and consumption taxes to be rather porous.51
Consequently, once it is understood that-in light of tax-gaming re-
sponses-real world labor income and consumption taxes do not dom-
inate many alternative tax instruments, it potentially follows that
governments should make use of a number of supplementary tax in-
struments, rather than promoting distribution near exclusively
through either a labor income or consumption tax. Even if the alter-
native tax instruments are more porous with respect to raising any
fixed sum of revenue, these tax instruments may be superior on the
margin for raising significant amounts of revenue or for promoting
significant amounts of distributional equity.
This discussion of the importance of the marginal cost of public
funds (MCPF) relates directly to the second major approach for ana-
lyzing the optimal choice of tax instruments within the existing litera-
ture. Beyond the double-distortion approach, some prior scholars
have also evaluated optimal-choice-of-tax-instruments questions
through MCPF-based approaches.
Economists have long debated how to define the MCPF and related
concepts. 52 In accordance with double-distortion arguments, econo-
mists often model MCPF formulas as being a fixed characteristic of
tax instruments, rather than as varying based on the government's pol-
icy choices with respect to other tax instruments.53 This Article, how-
ever, argues that-in light of tax gaming responses-the MCPF
concept should only be applied to optimal-choice-of-tax-instruments
questions based on the understanding that the MCPF formulas for
each tax instrument are partially a function of the government's
choices with respect to other tax instruments.54
Like this Article, some of the papers in the prior MCPF-based liter-
ature do model the MCPF formulas for specific tax instruments as
51 See Subsection II.C.1. The term "porous" here is used to indicate when tax instru-
ments contain holes that can be exploited through tax gaming responses.
52 See Nathaniel Hendren, The Policy Elasticity 4-5 (Nat'l Bureau Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 19,177, 2013), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w19177.pdf. The
MCPF concept is highly related to the marginal efficiency cost of public funds (MECF)
concept, with the major difference being that the MCPF is understood to potentially in-
clude distributional implications, whereas the MECF does not. See Weisbach, note 2, at 49
n.109.
53 See Hendren, note 52, at 11.
54 See notes 161 and 292; see also Hendren, note 52, at 2-15. For further discussion of
the limits of existing MCPF- and MECF-based approaches, see Alex Raskolnikov, Ac-
cepting the Limits of Tax Law and Economics, 98 Cornell L. Rev. 523, 583-85 (2013).
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being contingent on the government's policy choices with regard to
other tax instruments-such as the work of Chris Sanchirico.55 How-
ever, these prior MCPF-based approaches are too general in construc-
tion to shed much light on most optimal-choice-of-tax-instruments
questions based on the empirical information available to legal schol-
ars.56 As David Weisbach explains, the prescriptions generated by
these approaches "are qualitatively similar to the ones just discussed
in the sense that we do not end up with simple pro-poor commodity
taxes.... In all of the models, the core distributive tool is the labor
income tax [or progressive consumption tax], complemented by vari-
ous taxes or subsidies on goods or factors based on subtle interactions
with the [labor income tax or progressive consumption tax]." 57
For instance, Sanchirico's framework differs from the double-distor-
tion approach primarily by relaxing the assumptions that taxpayers
are homogeneous except in their ability to earn labor income and that
taxpayers' preferences are weakly separable in labor and consump-
tion.58 Accordingly, Sanchirico's framework is based on analyzing (at
a general level) what information a tax instrument is capable of re-
vealing about taxpayers beyond the information elicited by other tax
instruments. 59 The primary implications of Sanchirico's framework
are thus that the government should make use of every tax instrument
that is capable of eliciting unique information and that the govern-
55 Note that Sanchirico expresses his version of the MCPF through the related concept
of the "revenue price of redistribution." Sanchirico, note 33, at 155.
56 Beyond Sanchirico's work, the MCPF framework that is most similar to this Article's
approach is the one developed in a recent (and as-of-yet unpublished) paper by Nathaniel
Hendren, note 52. Hendren's framework requires estimating a unique MCPF for each tax
instrument-an MCPF that is contingent on the status-quo setting for all other government
policies. By comparing these unique MCPFs, Hendren's framework can evaluate whether
an incremental policy change would enhance welfare. But Hendren's framework cannot
be applied without quantitative estimates for the unique MCPFs of every tax instrument
that the government is considering adjusting. Even then, because Hendren's framework
relies on the envelope theorem, it has limited ability to make prescriptions except for infin-
itesimally small changes from the margin, without further assumptions, as discussed in note
228. Consequently, with respect to many (but not necessarily all) optimal-choice-of-tax-
instruments questions, this Article's framework should be better tailored to express its key
parameters in a form either for which empirical information is likely to be available or for
which legal scholars are likely to be able to make predictions based on inductive inferences
derived from experience with real world tax instruments. These conclusions also generally
apply to comparing this Article's framework to Joel Slemrod and Shlomo Yitzhaki's
MCPF-based framework, which is similar to Hendren's framework in key respects. See
Joel Slemrod & Shlomo Yitzhaki, The Costs of Taxation and the Marginal Efficiency Cost
of Funds, 43 IMF Staff Papers 172, 183-89 (1996).
57 David Weisbach, Distributionally-Weighted Cost Benefit Analysis: Welfare Econom-
ics Meets Organizational Design 28-29, U. Chicago, Public Law Working Paper No. 478,
2014), at, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2450142.
58 For further discussion, see Subsection II.A.1.
59 See Sanchirico, note 33, at 209-16.
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ment should make use of each such tax instrument so as to best take
advantage of the unique information that the instrument is capable of
eliciting.60 Yet although these implications are certainly correct on a
general level, Sanchirico's framework is not well suited for analyzing
real world policy questions, except perhaps through the use of large
scale computer models of the sort that are maintained by a few gov-
ernment agencies and think tanks.61 For example, although Sanchir-
ico argues that governments should make use of the information that
can be elicited by including capital income as a tax-base attribute,
Sanchirico acknowledges that his framework cannot prescribe
whether capital income should be taxed or subsidized. 62
More generally, Sanchirico's framework is designed for the purpose
of demonstrating that optimal tax systems should be tailored to take
account of a variety of informational attributes about taxpayers.
Sanchirico is clear that his analyses to date "provides little if any in-
sight into how such attributes should be included" in the design of tax
systems. 63 In other words, Sanchirico's goal is to argue that double-
distortion models should not be relied upon, but Sanchirico does not
proceed to prescribe what approach should be used in place of
double-distortion models. Thus, for instance, although Sanchirico's
framework prescribes that overall distortionary costs could be re-
duced by either positively taxing or subsidizing various luxury com-
modities (such as yachts), Sanchirico's framework does not prescribe
whether yachts or other luxury commodities should be positively
taxed or subsidized in order to reduce overall distortionary costs. 64
In contrast, this Article develops a theoretical framework con-
structed for the purpose of analyzing real world policy questions.65
This Article's framework is more encompassing than are double-dis-
tortion models, as it is designed to incorporate key considerations
needed for meaningful welfare analysis-especially tax gaming distor-
tions and administrative and compliance costs. Yet this Article's
framework is also designed so as to enable legal scholars to make at
least some limited baseline predictions about how tax instruments
should be used, even in the absence of comprehensive empirical infor-
mation about all of the potentially relevant parameters.
60 See id. at 209.
61 See id. at 225. In other words, prescribing that governments should make use of all of
the information that can reasonably be elicited does not in and of itself inform as to how
governments should elicit and make use of information, especially considering that it is
often costly to elicit additional information.
62 Id. at 224.
63 Id. at 158.
64 Id.
65 For further discussion of the connections between this Article and Sanchirico's work,
see Subsection III.A.1.
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It is ultimately difficult to concisely explain the differences between
this Article's approach and other MCPF-based approaches, because
these other approaches are complicated and difficult to explain in
their own right. Nevertheless, the key differences can be summarized
as (1) that this Article's framework specifically focuses on exploring
the implications of tax gaming responses, and (2) that-based on the
implications of tax gaming responses-this Article's approach implies
that overall distortionary costs could be reduced by supplementing a
labor income tax by positively taxing yachts and other luxury
commodities.
To summarize, if the government's only concerns were to raise reve-
nues and to promote distributional equity while minimizing overall
distortionary costs, then:
(1) the double-distortion approach suggests that the government
should neither positively tax nor subsidize most luxury commodities,
based on the assumptions that (first) labor-to-leisure distortions are
the only distortionary response induced by a labor income tax, (sec-
ond) that taxpayers are homogeneous except in their ability to earn
labor income, and (third) that taxpayers' preferences are weakly sepa-
rable in labor and consumption;
(2) Sanchirico's approach suggests that the government should ei-
ther positively tax or subsidize most luxury commodities, based on re-
laxing the second and third of these assumptions; and
(3) this Article's approach suggests as a baseline that governments
should positively tax (and not subsidize) most luxury commodities,
based on relaxing the first of these assumptions.
Of course, a government may have concerns other than minimizing
overall distortionary costs. Accordingly, this Article's framework fur-
ther muddies the waters by also evaluating administrative and compli-
ance costs. Nevertheless, as applied to the question of whether legal
rules should be adjusted so as to promote distribution, this Article's
framework provides a baseline for assessing the direction in which
these adjustments should be made. This is in contrast to Sanchirico's
approach and to other prior MCPF-based approaches, which do not
provide such a baseline.
This Article proceeds in two parts: First, Part II develops a theoret-
ical framework for analyzing optimal-choice-of-tax-instruments ques-
tions. Second, Part III evaluates the implications of relaxing some of
the key assumptions underlying that theoretical framework, and then
applies the theoretical framework to the question of whether legal
rules should be designed to promote distributional equity.
This Article is the first portion of a two-part project. Whereas this
Article analyzes incremental reforms, the forthcoming companion ar-
2014]
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ticle expands the discussion to consider fundamental reforms. To that
end, it builds on this Article's analysis by evaluating the relevant em-
pirical literatures and then by applying this Article's framework to a
number of important tax policy debates-focusing on the use of labor
income taxes, value added taxes, capital income taxes, and wealth
taxes.66
II. DEVELOPING THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
As typically conceived, a fundamental problem of public finance
imagines that the government wishes to transfer resources from high-
ability taxpayers to low-ability taxpayers, but that taxpayers can em-
ploy techniques to conceal their ability from the government. 67 "High
ability" in this context simply refers to those taxpayers from whom the
government wishes to transfer resources-following the pre-specified
social welfare weights-with "low ability" then referring to those tax-
payers to whom the government wishes to transfer resources. 68 One
might thus think of the term "ability" as shorthand for ability to pay.
When taxpayers act to conceal their ability from the government,
the government loses out because less revenue is collected, and the
taxpayers also lose out because they are assumed to incur costs in or-
der to conceal their ability.69 The social welfare losses that result from
taxpayers incurring costs in order to conceal their ability from the gov-
ernment are often called "excess burden," "deadweight loss," or "dis-
tortionary costs."
A government could minimize distortionary costs by levying only
lump sum taxes (sometimes called head taxes)-whereby each tax-
payer would be assessed a fixed tax liability, the amount of which
66 Gamage, note 13.
67 Throughout this Part, I reframe descriptions of basic public finance theorems in terms
that apply to all distortionary taxpayer responses, rather than (as is typically done) focus-
ing exclusively on responses wherein taxpayers substitute leisure for labor or substitute
away from purchasing taxed goods. Later, I evaluate possible ways in which tax gaming
distortionary responses may have different social welfare implications from more tradi-
tional responses (like labor-to-leisure distortions). See Section III.A. In Part II, I simply
assume that tax gaming distortionary responses do not involve significant externalities, sali-
ence effects, or political economy considerations, and that taxpayers have well-behaved
utility and cost functions with respect to tax gaming distortions.
68 In other words, the term "ability" is not meant to convey any notions of desert or
merit.
69 For instance, taxpayers can conceal their ability through labor-to-leisure substitutions,
because the government cannot easily distinguish taxpayers who have less ability to earn
income from taxpayers who choose to earn less income as a result of working less as a
response to taxation. The costs taxpayers incur from labor-to-leisure substitutions arise
because taxpayers are assumed to derive less utility from the leisure than from the pur-
chased consumption forgone in response to taxation.
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would not vary based on any choices made by the taxpayer.70 The
reason governments do not typically levy lump-sum taxes is distribu-
tional equity.71 For instance, it would strike many as unfair for a gov-
ernment to demand a $10,000 tax payment from every citizen, when
some citizens earn only a few thousand dollars a year whereas others
earn millions. Optimal tax theory thus revolves around the question
of how to maximize the trade-off between distributional equity and
efficiency.
To be clear, much of optimal tax theory scholarship analyzes how
governments should raise revenue to fund the provision of public
goods.72 But even here, distributional equity remains a key concern.
Again, for governments unconcerned about distributional equity, opti-
mal tax theory scholarship implies that all revenue should be raised
through lump sum taxes. Thus, questions of how governments should
depart from using lump sum taxes when raising revenue are ultimately
questions about distributional equity-and, more generally, about the
trade-offs among distributional equity, efficiency, and other policy
concerns.
With that background, I proceed to evaluate double-distortion ar-
guments. Much of the foundational work that double-distortion argu-
ments build upon begins by considering the question of whether
luxury goods purchases should be subject to higher tax rates than non-
luxury goods purchases. 73 In other words, should governments pro-
mote distributional equity by levying luxury excise taxes? Or should
distributional equity instead be promoted by taxing labor income at
progressive rates?
Correspondingly, this Part develops a theoretical framework for an-
alyzing optimal-choice-of-tax-instruments questions by focusing on
the problem of whether governments should levy luxury excise taxes.
In doing so, this Part relies on most of the same assumptions that un-
derlie double-distortions models. Thus, this Part does not consider
complications such as taxpayer heterogeneity other than in earning
ability, nonseparable preferences in labor and consumption, non-well-
behaved utility or cost functions, externalities, tax salience effects, po-
70 Real world attempts at head taxes probably would not completely eliminate distortio-
nary costs, as taxpayers might respond (for example) by moving out of the tax jurisdiction.
Nevertheless, there is little doubt that governments could shift to raising revenue through
tax instruments that come much closer to approximating lump sum taxes than do current
tax systems.
71 See Louis Kaplow, Accuracy, Complexity, and the Income Tax, 14 J.L. Econ. & Org.
61, 61 (1998).
72 Kaplow, note 16, at 53.
73 See, e.g., Alan J. Auerbach & James R. Hines Jr., Taxation and Economic Efficiency
54 (Nat'l Bureau Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8181, 2001), available at http://www
.nber.org/papers/w8181.pdf.
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litical economy considerations, cross elasticities, general equilibrium
effects, income effects, nonwelfarist considerations, or other complica-
tions that might result from relaxing the assumptions underlying
double-distortion models or microeconomic analyses more gener-
ally.74 Some of these complications are analyzed later in Section
III.A. For now, however, it is useful to stick as closely as possible to
the assumptions underlying double-distortion models, relaxing these
assumptions only by considering a wider variety of distortionary costs
as well as administrative and compliance costs.
Before proceeding, it is worth emphasizing that before this Article's
framework can be applied, the analyst must first determine which tax
instruments are to be evaluated. 75 Because any policy variable that a
government might adjust to raise revenues or promote distributional
equity can be thought of as a tax instrument, there are potentially an
infinite number of tax instruments that might be analyzed. 76 Yet this
Article's framework is only designed to compare a discrete number of
tax instruments.77 This Part focuses on comparing the setting of tax
rates for labor income taxes and for luxury excise taxes, holding the
tax base calculation rules for each of these forms of taxation constant.
This Article's framework can also be applied to analyze a variety of
other policy problems, and the forthcoming companion article dis-
cusses further some of the issues involved in determining which tax
instruments are to be evaluated.
74 For discussions of these complications, see, e.g., Kaplow, note 16, at 119-20, 135-45
(general equilibrium effects, tax salience effects-called "taxpayer illusion," externalities,
political economy considerations, preferences nonseparable in labor and consumption, tax-
payer heterogeneity); Thomas Piketty & Emmanuel Saez, Optimal Labor Income Taxa-
tion, 5 Handbook Pub. Econ. 391, 393, 459 (Alan J. Auerbach, Raj Chetty, Martin
Feldstein & Emmanuel Saez eds., 2013) (taxpayer heterogeneity and nonwelfarist effects).
75 In a sense, then, what counts as a "tax instrument" for the application of this Article's
framework depends on what policy variables the analyst wishes to evaluate while holding
other aspects of policy constant. Because it is impossible to simultaneously analyze an
infinite number of policy variables, the analyst must choose which variables to evaluate
and which other potential variables to hold constant, for any particular application of this
Article's framework.
76 For ease of exposition, in this Part, I mostly focus on comparing the setting of tax
rates for different forms of taxation (holding the tax base calculation rules of these forms
of taxation constant). But this Article's framework can also be applied to analyze whether
tax base calculation rules should be adjusted so as to raise revenue or promote distribu-
tional equity. The forthcoming companion article discusses these issues further. Gamage,
note 13.
77 More precisely, this Article's framework is only designed to analyze the optimal use
of a discrete number of tax instruments in any single iteration of applying this framework.
Through repeated iterations, the framework potentially can be used to evaluate a variety of
alternative tax reform packages. For further discussion, see id.
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A. Understanding the Foundational Ramsey and
Atkinson-Stiglitz Models
Public finance economists have developed two different founda-
tional models for analyzing optimal-choice-of-tax-instruments ques-
tions: the Ramsey model and the Atkinson-Stiglitz model.78 Based
on the logic of double-distortion arguments, it has become accepted
wisdom in some circles that the Ramsey model does not apply to opti-
mal-choice-of-tax-instruments questions when a government can levy
a labor income tax. 79 I argue in this Section that this accepted wisdom
is partially mistaken. Once we account for the possibility of tax gam-
ing responses, a variation of the Ramsey model becomes relevant
even when governments can levy a labor income tax.
1. The Ramsey Model
The archetypal setting in which the Ramsey model is thought to
apply is when a government cannot levy a labor income tax or a pro-
gressive consumption tax and must instead raise revenue and promote
distributional equity through excise taxes assessed on the purchases of
goods and services.8 0 Thus, even the scholars most associated with
double-distortion arguments acknowledge that a modified form of the
Ramsey model may be applicable in developing countries if it is im-
practical to rely on labor income taxes.8'
Three general prescriptions follow from the basic Ramsey model.8 2
I label these prescriptions as "the elasticity principle," "the tax-
smoothing principle," and "the distribution principle."
The first general prescription-the elasticity principle-implies that
lower tax rates should be assessed on those goods and transactions for
which taxpayers are most likely to alter their behavior in response to
taxation. Elasticities are formulas for measuring the extent to which
taxpayers engage in additional distortionary tax-reduction behaviors
in response to increasing tax rates. All else being equal, the more
elastic the tax-reduction behaviors induced by a tax instrument, the
greater the distortionary costs that will be generated by increasing the
tax rate of the instrument. In order to minimize distortionary costs,
78 More complete expositions of these models can be found at, for example, Kaplow,
note 16, at 122-33, and Auerbach & Hines, note 73, at 15-21.
79 See Kaplow, note 16, at 145 ("[I]t is useful to set forth this conflict and to explain why
the use of Ramsey principles is inappropriate when there is an income tax.").
80 For an excellent and more elaborate discussion of the Ramsey model, written so as to
be accessible to legal scholars, see Weisbach, note 7, at 1655-63.
81 Kaplow, note 16, at 148; see also note 43 (citing the literature on applying optimal tax
theory in developing country contexts).
82 More sophisticated versions of the Ramsey model allow for cross elasticities and
other complications that I assume away in this Part in order to simplify the discussion.
2014]
TAX LAW REVIEW
then, the elasticity principle implies that lower tax rates should be set
for tax instruments that induce more elastic tax-reduction behaviors.
Conversely, the elasticity principle implies that higher tax rates should
be set for tax instruments that induce less elastic tax-reduction behav-
iors. In other words, we should tax more those goods and transactions
for which taxpayers are less likely to alter their behavior in response
to taxation.
The second general prescription-the tax-smoothing principle-im-
plies that it "is better to tax a wide variety of goods at a moderate rate
rather than to tax very few goods at a high rate. '83 As noted earlier, a
basic principle of public finance economics is that the distortionary
costs generated by a tax instrument rise approximately with the
square of the relevant (tax-exclusive) tax rates. 84 This principle fol-
lows from the assumption that utility and cost functions are "well-be-
haved" in the sense that taxpayers are assumed to face continuously
increasing marginal costs to altering their behavior so as to reduce
their tax liabilities8 5 The underlying intuition is that low tax rates
should only induce taxpayers to alter their behavior if the costs of
doing so are low, whereas higher tax rates should induce taxpayers to
alter their behavior even when the costs of doing so are higher-with
taxpayers generally assumed to alter their behavior up to the point
where the marginal costs of doing so equal the relevant tax rates.86
Consequently, increasing tax rates has the effects both of increasing
the quantity of tax-reduction behaviors and of inducing more costly
tax-reduction behaviors at the margin.
If the marginal costs of tax-reduction behaviors rise linearly, then
we can think of the deadweight loss associated with the costs that tax-
payers incur in altering their behavior as the area of a triangle. Be-
cause the tax rate affects both the base of this triangle (by altering the
quantity of tax-reduction behaviors) and the height of this triangle (by
inducing more costly tax reduction behaviors at the margin), and be-
cause the formula for the area of a triangle is 1/2 x base x height, the
83 Jonathan Gruber, Public Finance and Public Policy 603 (4th ed. 2013). Gruber calls
this the "broad base rule." My terminology follows Bernard Salanie, The Economics of
taxation 54-55 (2003).
84 See note 46 and accompanying text.
85 See Subsection III.A.2.
86 This intuition is most commonly expressed in the context of taxpayers substituting
away from purchasing taxed goods, or substituting leisure for labor, with the costs that
taxpayers incur to reduce their tax liabilities thus arising from forgone consumer surplus.
But this intuition also applies to tax gaming behaviors as long as taxpayers decide whether
to engage in these behaviors at least partially based on some form of cost-benefit analysis
and as long as taxpayers first engage in less costly tax-reduction techniques and proceed to
more costly tax-reduction techniques only once the less costly techniques have been ex-
hausted. For further discussion, see Subsection III.A.2.
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distortionary costs of taxation should rise precisely with the square of
the relevant tax rates whenever taxpayers face linearly increasing mar-
ginal costs to tax-reduction behaviors. 87 I call this the "rule-of-thumb
version" of the tax-smoothing principle 88 More generally, as long as
taxpayers' marginal costs of engaging in tax-reduction behaviors rise
continuously, it mathematically follows that distortionary costs rise ex-
ponentially with the relevant tax rates, with the exponent depending
on the curvature of taxpayers' marginal cost functions.89
The tax-smoothing principle provides the primary economic logic
for base-broadening arguments-for the prescriptions that tax systems
should have broad bases and low rates.90 I evaluate the assumption
that taxpayers face continuously increasing marginal costs to engaging
in tax-reduction behaviors further in Subsection III.A.2. For now, I
simply assume that taxpayers' utility and cost functions are well-be-
haved in this sense, such that the tax-smoothing principle follows with
respect to all tax-reduction behaviors.91
Together, the elasticity principle and the tax-smoothing principle
generate what is commonly referred to as the "inverse-elasticity
rule." 92 Whereas the elasticity principle implies that higher tax rates
should be set for tax instruments that induce less elastic tax-reduction
behaviors, the tax-smoothing principle implies that these tax rates
should not be set too much higher because increasing a tax instru-
ment's rates induces exponentially greater distortionary costs. Within
the basic Ramsey model, balancing the implications of these two pre-
scriptions generates the formula that overall distortionary costs can be
minimized by setting each instrument's tax rates proportional to one
divided by the instrument's elasticity.93 No matter how large the elas-
ticity in the denominator, then, dividing a numerator of one by the
87 For illustration, see Gamage, note 13, at 9-14.
88 For discussion of why the case for levying multiple tax instruments generally should
be much stronger than what is implied by the rule-of-thumb version of the tax-smoothing
principle, see Subsection II.C.2.
89 E.g., Harvey S. Rosen & Ted Gayer, Public Finance 332-33 (10th ed. 2014); Auerbach
& Hines, note 73, at 94; John Creedy, The Excess Burden of Taxation and Why it (Approx-
imately) Quadruples When the Tax Rate Doubles 3 (New Zealand Treas., Working Paper
03/29, 2003), available at http://www.treasury.govt.nz/Publications/research-policy/wp/2003/
03-29/twpO3-29.pdf.
90 Creedy, note 89, at 3.
91 This assumption follows from seminal work by Martin Feldstein, which spurred the
development of a literature analyzing taxable-income elasticities and which Raj Chetty has
described as being among the foundational work applying sufficient-statistics methodology
to taxation. For further discussion, see Chetty, note 22, at 467-70; Martin Feldstein, Tax
Avoidance and the Deadweight Loss of the Income Tax, 81 Rev. Econ. & Stat. 674, 674
(1999).
92 Gruber, note 83, at 602-03.
93 See id.
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elasticity always yields a positive tax rate. 94 Extremely large elastici-
ties will yield low tax rates, but the tax rates should always be positive
for all available tax instruments. Therefore, a government following
the basic Ramsey model should make use of every possible tax instru-
ment. Only when the Ramsey model is expanded to incorporate com-
plicating factors such as administrative or compliance costs does the
Ramsey model yield prescriptions wherein a government should not
make use of every available tax instrument. 95
The third general prescription-the distribution principle-implies
that governments should depart from the inverse-elasticity rule by set-
ting higher tax rates for those tax instruments that disproportionately
raise revenues from taxpayers with greater ability. 96 The inverse-elas-
ticity rule prescribes how a government should set tax rates in order to
minimize distortionary costs and thereby maximize efficiency. But if a
government cared only about efficiency, and not distribution, then
lump sum taxes would dominate all taxes assessed on goods and trans-
actions, such that the Ramsey model would not apply.9 7 Distribution
thus must be a key concern when applying the Ramsey model. The
distribution principle reminds us that we need to depart from the effi-
ciency-maximizing prescriptions of the inverse-elasticity rule in order
to promote distributional equity. The extent to which the Ramsey
model prescribes departing from the inverse-elasticity rule in order to
promote distributional equity is determined by the pre-specified social
welfare weights. 98
2. The Atkinson-Stiglitz Model
To the extent that the Ramsey model is applicable, the case for em-
ploying a variety of tax instruments to raise revenue or to promote
distributional equity is relatively straightforward. Although the elas-
ticity and distribution principles imply that tax rates should be set
higher for some tax instruments than for others, the tax-smoothing
94 The exception being if the elasticity is infinite-implying that the tax instrument is not
capable of raising any amount of positive revenue.
95 For a paper that incorporates administrative and compliance costs into the Ramsey
model, see generally Joel Slemrod & Wojciech Kopczuk, The Optimal Elasticity of Taxable
Income, 84 J. Pub. Econ. 91 (2002).
96 See, e.g., Gruber, note 83, at 603.
97 See notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
98 Alternatively, Nathaniel Hendren has demonstrated in a recent paper how the gov-
ernment's distributional goals can be inferred from the state of the existing tax system-
without the need for a social-welfare function-at least with respect to reforms that take
the existing tax system as a starting point. Nathaniel Hendren, The Inequality Deflator:
Interpersonal Comparisons Without a Social Welfare Function 2 n.2, 3 & n.6 (July 2014)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/hendren/files/in
equalitydeflatorvnber.pdf.
[Vol. 68:
DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE
principle still implies that every tax instrument should be levied with a
positive tax rate.99
The Atkinson-Stiglitz model, however, demonstrates that some tax-
reduction behaviors may operate differently from the assumptions of
the Ramsey model.100 The Atkinson-Stiglitz model differs from the
Ramsey model in two key respects. 101 First, the Atkinson-Stiglitz
model introduces a form of consumption-called "leisure"-that is as-
sumed to be exempt from taxation under all possible tax instruments.
Second, the Atkinson-Stiglitz model allows the government to pro-
mote distributional equity by setting progressive tax rates for an in-
strument called "a labor-income tax"-a tax instrument that is
assumed to induce only tax-reduction responses that operate like la-
bor-to-leisure distortions.
Under the assumptions of the Atkinson-Stiglitz model, conducting
distribution through a labor income tax dominates conducting distri-
bution through luxury excise taxes, such that the general prescriptions
of the Ramsey model do not apply. 102 To illustrate, imagine that a
government can levy both a labor income tax and a separate set of
excise taxes. Assume that taxpayers have only two techniques availa-
ble for minimizing their tax liabilities. First, taxpayers can shift from
spending their time earning labor income to enjoying leisure. To the
extent that taxpayers earn labor income, this income will be subject to
the labor income tax when the taxpayers earn the income and will also
be subject to the excise taxes when the taxpayers spend their income.
Hence, by shifting from labor to leisure, taxpayers can minimize their
tax liabilities under both the labor income tax and the excise taxes.
The second technique that taxpayers can use to minimize their tax
liabilities is to shift from purchasing higher-taxed consumer goods to
purchasing lower-taxed consumer goods. This technique is only avail-
able to the extent that the government levies higher taxes on some
consumer goods than on others (as is prescribed by the elasticity and
distribution principles of the Ramsey model).
99 Note that this conclusion depends on the assumptions of this Section, which are re-
laxed in Section III.A.
100 See Kaplow, note 16, at 123-35.
101 Note that there are many variations of the Ramsey model, some of which incorpo-
rate features of the Atkinson-Stiglitz model as discussed above. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow,
Taxation, in 1 Handbook of Law and Economics 647, 676-77 (A. Mitchell Polinsky &
Steven Shavell eds., 2007). The above discussion is intended to explain the basics of the
Atkinson-Stiglitz and Ramsey models to readers who are not already versed in the relevant
economics literatures.
102 Kaplow, note 16, at 123-35.
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In contrast to the Ramsey model, the Atkinson-Stiglitz model
prescribes against taxing the consumer goods at differential rates. 10 3
The intuition underlying this result is that taxing consumer goods at
differential rates generates two distortions, as taxpayers can respond
both by shifting from consuming higher-taxed goods to lower-taxed
goods and by shifting from earning labor income to leisure. Impor-
tantly, under the assumptions of the Atkinson-Stiglitz model, any set
of tax rates levied on consumer goods will generate exactly the same
magnitude of labor-to-leisure distortions as would a labor income tax,
in addition to possibly also distorting taxpayers' choices of which con-
sumer goods to purchase. 10 4 Consequently, instead of taxing goods
that are disproportionately consumed by higher-ability taxpayers at
higher rates, more distributional equity can be achieved at lower effi-
ciency costs by making the labor-income-tax rates more progressive.
For this reason, the Atkinson-Stiglitz model prescribes that all distri-
butional equity should be promoted through the labor income tax.
3. The Distinction between Multi-Instrument and Single-Instrument
Responses
The Atkinson-Stiglitz model is sometimes described as illustrating
the relationship between specific real world tax instruments, such as
between real world labor income taxes and luxury excise taxes. As
this Section attempts to make clear, however, it is a mistake to apply
the Atkinson-Stiglitz model to real world tax instruments without first
evaluating the nature of the distortions generated by the real world
tax instruments.
All real world tax instruments are at least somewhat porous, in the
sense that taxpayers can be expected to respond to all real world tax
instruments through a diverse variety of distortionary tax-reduction
behaviors. 10 5 Some tax-reduction responses allow taxpayers to simul-
taneously reduce their tax liabilities with respect to multiple distinct
tax instruments. I label these distortionary tax-reduction behaviors as
"multi-instrument" responses.10 6 Other tax-reduction responses only
allow taxpayers to reduce their tax liabilities with respect to a single
103 See Louis Kaplow, On the Desirability of Commodity Taxation Even When Income
Taxation Is Not Optimal, 90 J. Pub. Econ. 1235, 1236 (2006).
104 See note 28 and accompanying text. Notably, this result depends on the assumptions
that taxpayers are homogeneous except in their ability to earn labor income and that tax-
payers' preferences are weakly separable in labor and consumption, as discussed in Subsec-
tion III.A.1.
105 See Subsection II.C.1.
106 Alternatively, these responses might be labeled as "common" responses.
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tax instrument. I label these distortionary tax-reduction behaviors as
"single-instrument" responses. 10 7
When comparing two tax instruments, it is important to distinguish
between multi-instrument and single-instrument responses. For in-
stance, under the assumptions of the Atkinson-Stiglitz model, labor-
to-leisure distortions are multi-instrument responses for both a labor
income tax and excise taxes. A taxpayer can simultaneously reduce
her tax liability from both of these tax instruments through substitut-
ing leisure for labor, and the taxpayer's incentive to substitute leisure
for labor is thus a direct function of the tax rates of both of these
instruments. In contrast, as noted earlier, the incentive to claim artifi-
cial or inflated labor income tax deductions is a direct function of only
the tax rates of the labor income tax.10 8 Claiming artificial labor in-
come tax deductions is thus a single-instrument response for the labor
income tax, as compared to excise taxes.
A corollary to the assumption that taxpayers' utility and cost func-
tions are well-behaved is that taxpayers must incur costs in order to
engage in tax-reduction responses, at least at the margin. 10 9 Whether
a tax-reduction response operates as a multi-instrument or as a single-
instrument response thus depends on the nature of the marginal costs
that taxpayers must incur in order to engage in the response.
For multi-instrument responses, taxpayers need only incur one set
of costs in order to reduce their tax liabilities with respect to multiple
tax instruments. In other words, by incurring costs in order to reduce
their liabilities from one tax instrument, taxpayers can also simultane-
ously reduce their tax liabilities from another tax instrument at no
additional cost. For instance, the costs taxpayers incur when engaging
in labor-to-leisure distortions arise from the diminished utility the tax-
payers receive from the leisure consumption as compared to the mar-
ket consumption that the taxpayers would have opted for in the
absence of taxation. Because leisure consumption is assumed to be
exempt from both labor income taxes and excise taxes, incurring the
costs associated with the reduced utility received from the leisure con-
sumption simultaneously enables taxpayers to reduce their labor in-
come tax liabilities and excise tax liabilities at no additional cost.
For single-instrument responses, taxpayers need to incur multiple
sets of costs in order to reduce their tax liabilities from multiple tax
instruments. In other words, taxpayers who incur costs in order to
reduce their tax liabilities from one tax instrument cannot also simul-
taneously reduce their tax liabilities from another tax instrument, un-
107 Alternatively, these responses might be labeled as "unique" responses.
108 See notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
109 For elaboration, see Subsection III.A.2.
2014]
TAX LAW REVIEW
less the taxpayers incur additional costs to do so. For instance,
consider taxpayers who change their behavior at some cost in order to
claim artificial labor income tax deductions, such as by reorganizing
their activities in order to claim home office deductions for rooms in
the taxpayers' houses.110 Assuming that the manner in which the tax-
payers reorganize their activities in order to claim the home office
deductions does not somehow also allow the taxpayers to reduce their
excise tax liabilities at no additional cost, these changes of behavior
would constitute single-instrument responses for the labor income tax.
Certainly, the taxpayers might also change their behavior in other
ways in order to reduce their excise tax liabilities. But doing so would
require the taxpayers to incur additional costs. Nearly every conceiva-
ble tax instrument is likely to induce some single-instrument re-
sponses. But taxpayers must incur separate sets of costs in order to
engage in single-instrument responses with respect to each distinct tax
instrument.
4. The Specification of Distortions in the Atkinson-Stiglitz Model
The reason that labor income taxes dominate excise taxes within the
Atkinson-Stiglitz model is that labor income taxes are assumed to in-
duce only multi-instrument responses whereas excise taxes are as-
sumed to induce both multi-instrument and single-instrument
responses. In other words, as typically conceived, double-distortion
models make the unrealistic assumption that taxpayers can only re-
duce their labor-income-tax liabilities through responses that operate
like labor-to-leisure distortions.
It is illuminating to consider an alternative set of (admittedly un-
realistic) assumptions. Assume that a government wishes to raise ad-
ditional revenue from high-income taxpayers for distributive purposes
and is considering levying either a labor income tax or luxury excise
taxes. Further assume that there are only two techniques available
through which taxpayers can reduce their tax liabilities. First, taxpay-
ers can shift from labor to leisure, which reduces their tax liabilities
under both the labor income tax and the luxury excise taxes. Second,
taxpayers can claim artificial labor income tax deductions, which
reduces their tax liabilities only with respect to the labor income tax
and not with respect to the luxury excise taxes.
Under these assumptions, the labor income tax would generate a
double-distortion whereas the luxury excise taxes would generate only
a single distortion. To the extent the government raises revenues
110 For discussion, see Michael A. Livingston & David S. Gamage, Taxation: Law, Plan-
ning, and Policy 349-66 (2010).
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through the labor income tax, taxpayers could respond both by shift-
ing from labor to leisure and by claiming artificial labor income tax
deductions. In contrast, to the extent the government raises revenue
through the luxury excise taxes, taxpayers could respond only by shift-
ing from labor to leisure. Therefore, as applied to this scenario, the
Atkinson-Stiglitz model potentially implies that all distribution should
be conducted through the luxury excise taxes and not through the la-
bor income tax. Of course, it is completely unrealistic to assume that
taxpayers could not shift away from making luxury purchases so as to
minimize their luxury excise tax liabilities (as this example assumes),
but it is also unrealistic to assume that taxpayers cannot reduce their
labor income tax liabilities through any techniques other than labor-
to-leisure substitutions (as double-distortion arguments assume).
5. A Simple Argument for Levying Multiple Tax Instruments
In real world contexts, it almost certainly will be the case both that
a labor income tax will induce some distortionary responses that
would not be induced by luxury excise taxes and that luxury excise
taxes will induce some distortionary responses that would not be in-
duced by a labor income tax. As compared to using only a labor in-
come tax for distribution, levying luxury excise taxes should avoid
inducing at least some distortionary responses wherein taxpayers
would engage in transactions like claiming artificial or inflated labor
income tax deductions. Yet levying luxury excise taxes should also
induce at least some distortions wherein taxpayers would shift away
from making luxury purchases or would claim artificial or inflated de-
ductions against the luxury excise taxes. In addition, some distortions,
such as labor-to-leisure substitutions, might be induced by both the
luxury excise taxes and the labor income tax. In other words, both
luxury excise taxes and labor income taxes are likely to induce both
multi-instrument and single-instrument responses.
Turning to the question of whether a government should levy a la-
bor income tax, luxury excise taxes, or some mixture of these tax in-
struments: First, based on the logic of the Atkinson-Stiglitz model, we
can factor out labor-to-leisure distortions and any other multi-instru-
ment responses. By definition, multi-instrument responses are equally
induced by all of the available tax instruments. And distortions that
would be induced regardless of which tax instruments are used are not
relevant for determining which tax instruments to use.
Factoring out the multi-instrument responses leaves the single-in-
strument responses. In other words, one must balance the distortions
that would be induced by the labor income tax, but not by the luxury
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excise taxes, against the distortions that would be induced by the lux-
ury excise taxes, but not by the labor income tax.
To analyze these single-instrument responses, one can apply the
three general prescriptions of the Ramsey model. The reason that the
Ramsey model is thought not to apply when a government can levy a
labor income tax is that labor income taxes are thought to dominate
excise taxes. But once we factor out multi-instrument responses, la-
bor income taxes do not dominate excise taxes to the extent that labor
income taxes induce any single-instrument responses.
Remember that the tax-smoothing principle implies that the distor-
tionary costs generated by a tax instrument rise exponentially with the
relevant tax rates. Hence, when comparing multiple tax instruments
each of which induces single-instrument responses, even if raising a
fixed amount of revenue through one of the tax instruments would
generate much lower distortionary costs than if that revenue was
raised through any of the other tax instruments, it may still be optimal
to levy all of the available tax instruments. The reason is that-fol-
lowing the tax-smoothing principle-raising a sufficiently small
amount of revenue from any tax instrument generates trivially small
distortionary costs. As one public finance textbook explains (in the
context of comparing commodity taxes in the Ramsey model),
[I]t is better to tax many commodities at a lower rate than to
tax a few commodities at a higher rate .... This is because
.. as the tax rate increases, excess burden goes up with its
square. Doubling a tax quadruples its excess burden, other
things being the same. Therefore, two relatively small taxes
will have a smaller excess burden than one large tax that
raises the same amount of revenue .... "I
Or, as Alan Auerbach explains: "A key lesson of optimal tax the-
ory is that the economic loss from a tax distortion grows with the
square of the size of the distortion itself, so a lot of small tax wedges
are better than a few large ones."112 Thus, from the starting point of
raising all revenue through only one tax instrument, overall distortion-
ary costs could always be reduced by lowering the tax rate of that
instrument slightly and making up the revenue by levying the other
tax instruments with low rates.
More generally, once we factor out multi-instrument responses, we
can determine the optimal choice of tax instruments by applying the
1I Rosen & Gayer, note 89, at 333.
112 Alan J. Auerbach, Comment, in Taxing Capital Income 83, 86 (Henry J. Aaron, Leo-
nard E. Burman & C. Eugene Steuerle eds., 2007).
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prescriptions of the Ramsey model. 113 Following the elasticity princi-
ple, lower tax rates should be set for the tax instruments that induce
more elastic tax-reduction behaviors. Following the distribution prin-
ciple, higher tax rates should be set for the tax instruments that raise a
larger portion of revenues from higher ability taxpayers. Following
the tax-smoothing principle (and ignoring administrative and compli-
ance costs), it always will be optimal to make use of all available tax
instruments, but how the tax rates should be set depends on the rela-
tive elasticities and distributional impacts of the available tax
instruments.1 14
B. Incorporating Additional Categories of Social Welfare Costs
The previous Section presented a simple version of this Article's
primary contribution. Accounting for tax gaming responses, it will
generally be the case that all available tax instruments will induce
some unique distortionary responses that would not be induced by
other available tax instruments. Ignoring administrative and compli-
ance costs and other complications, then, an optimal tax system
should make use of all available tax instruments and should set the tax
rates in accordance with the three general prescriptions of the Ramsey
model.
I have already introduced the distinction between single-instrument
and multi-instrument responses. This Section expands the analysis to
incorporate administrative and compliance costs (collectively labeled
as "overhead costs") and also an additional category of distortionary
costs related to taxpayers shifting their tax liabilities among tax instru-
ments (labeled as "instrument-shifting" responses). The remainder of
this Section analyzes the implications of these different categories of
social welfare costs, with the goal of developing a theoretical frame-
work capable for incorporating first-order concerns related to opti-
mizing distribution and efficiency.
113 See e.g., Piketty & Saez, note 74, at 420-21.
114 Even if raising x dollars from one tax instrument would generate far larger distortio-
nary costs as compared to raising x dollars from another tax instrument, it would still be
optimal to levy both tax instruments, but with the tax rates set much lower for the first
instrument than for the second tax instrument. Because distortionary costs rise exponen-
tially with the relevant tax rates, whereas revenues raised rise closer to linearly, minimizing
overall distortionary costs always requires levying all available tax instruments with above-
zero rates. Even for extremely distortionary tax instruments, levying such tax instruments
with sufficiently low rates will always produce lower distortionary costs per dollar of tax
revenue raised than would raising all revenue from tax instruments that are less distortion-
ary on average. The only exceptions would be if a tax instrument were incapable of raising
any revenue or would produce infinite average distortionary costs. For further elaboration,
see, for example, Gruber, note 83, at 603. Note that this conclusion depends on the as-
sumptions of this Section. See Subsection lII.A.1.
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1. The Implications of Single-Instrument Responses
A response to a tax instrument is single-instrument to the extent
that the response reduces a taxpayer's tax liability from only the tax
instrument in question, without directly affecting the taxpayer's liabili-
ties from any other tax instruments. Following the Atkinson-Stiglitz
model, for a government deciding between two tax instruments, if
only one of the tax instruments generates single-instrument responses,
and the other does not, then this places weight in favor of relying ex-
clusively on the tax instrument that does not generate single-instru-
ment responses.
The analysis becomes more complicated if all of the available tax
instruments generate single-instrument responses, as generally will be
the case. Yet, as explained earlier, the overall costs from single-instru-
ment responses can be minimized by using all available tax instru-
ments and by setting the tax rates in accordance with the three general
prescriptions of the Ramsey model. There is an expansive literature
analyzing how variations of the Ramsey model can be applied based
on different complicating assumptions. 15 To the extent that the rele-
vant social welfare costs of taxation arise from single-instrument re-
sponses, this literature can be applied to optimal-choice-of-tax-
instruments questions even when the government can levy a labor in-
come tax. More straightforwardly, the three general prescriptions of
the basic Ramsey model can be used to make rule-of-thumb predic-
tions for how to minimize the distortionary costs from single-instru-
ment responses.
2. The Implications of Multi-Instrument Responses
A response to a tax instrument is multi-instrument to the extent
that the response simultaneously reduces a taxpayer's tax liabilities
from multiple distinct tax instruments at no additional cost to the tax-
payer. Following the primary insight of the Atkinson-Stiglitz model,
multi-instrument responses can be factored out when determining the
optimal choice of tax instruments. When comparing two tax instru-
ments, multi-instrument responses by definition will create the same
social welfare costs regardless of which tax instruments are used and
regardless of how the tax rates are set. Consequently, multi-instru-
ment responses are not directly relevant for optimal-choice-of-tax-in-
struments questions.
Many tax-minimization strategies may operate as hybrids between
multi-instrument and single-instrument responses. If taxpayers can al-
115 See, e.g., Daron Acemoglu, Mikhail Golosov & Aleh Tsyvinski, Political Economy of
Ramsey Taxation, 95 J. Pub. Econ. 467 (2011); Slemrod & Kopczuk, note 95.
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ter their behavior in a manner that reduces their tax liabilities with
respect to two separate tax instruments, but that reduces their tax lia-
bilities more with respect to one of the tax instruments than the other,
then this might be considered to represent a hybrid between a single-
instrument and a multi-instrument response. To account for hybrid
techniques of this sort with respect to optimal-choice-of-tax-instru-
ments questions, one needs only consider the extent to which the tech-
niques reduce tax liabilities with respect to one of the tax instruments
more than the other. By factoring out the extent to which a technique
simultaneously reduces tax liabilities with respect to both tax instru-
ments-the extent to which the technique operates as a multi-instru-
ment response-one can model the remaining portion of the
technique as a single-instrument response. Only to the extent that a
tax-minimization technique reduces tax liabilities more with respect to
one tax instrument than another is that technique relevant for opti-
mal-choice-of-tax-instruments questions.
3. The Implications of Instrument-Shifting Responses
A response to a tax instrument is instrument-shifting to the extent
that the response reduces a taxpayer's tax liability from the tax instru-
ment in question while simultaneously increasing the taxpayers' liabil-
ity from a separate tax instrument. A tax instrument should generate
instrument-shifting responses only when the effective tax rate for the
instrument is higher than that of the other tax instrument to which
taxpayers can shift their tax liabilities. In essence, instrument-shifting
responses involve taxpayers altering their behavior so that their re-
sources become subject to a tax instrument with lower effective rates.
Most conceivable tax instruments are likely to generate both single-
instrument and multi-instrument responses with respect to most alter-
native tax instruments. 116 In contrast, the majority of tax instruments
probably do not generate significant instrument-shifting responses.
Yet when comparing tax instruments that do generate significant in-
strument-shifting responses, this may have important policy implica-
tions. For instance, instrument-shifting responses are probably a first-
order concern when considering capital income taxes or corporate in-
come taxes.1 1
7
As a general rule, if setting the tax rate for one tax instrument
higher than that for another tax instrument would generate significant
instrument-shifting responses between the two tax instruments, then
this places weight in favor of keeping the effective tax rates of the two
116 See notes 130-46 and accompanying text.
117 See Saez et al., note 17, at 10-13.
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instruments close to equal.11 8 If instrument-shifting responses are the
only relevant social welfare costs generated by a set of tax instru-
ments, then effective tax rates should be set exactly equal across the
tax instruments. If a set of possible tax instruments also generates
other forms of social welfare costs, and if minimizing these other so-
cial welfare costs requires setting the tax rate for one of the tax instru-
ments higher than that for the other, then the goal of minimizing the
social welfare costs from instrument-shifting responses must be
weighed against the goal of minimizing the other forms of social wel-
fare costs. 119
The magnitude of social welfare costs from instrument-shifting re-
sponses is a function of the gap between the effective tax rates of the
two tax instruments.1 20 Applying the tax-smoothing principle, then,
the distortionary costs from instrument-shifting responses should rise
exponentially with the difference between the two effective tax rates.
Thus, if minimizing other categories of social welfare costs requires
setting one effective tax rate higher than the other, minimizing overall
social welfare costs from both instrument-shifting responses and the
other costs would require setting the tax rates unequally but closer to
equal than they should be set in the absence of instrument-shifting
responses.
4. The Implications of Overhead Costs
In addition to the three types of distortionary costs, a complete
framework for analyzing the optimal choice of tax instruments must
also consider administrative and compliance costs.12 ' Hereinafter, I
use the term "overhead costs" to refer to the aggregate category con-
sisting of the administrative costs the government incurs to enforce
the tax system, the compliance costs taxpayers incur as a result of the
tax system, and all of the other costs associated with raising tax reve-
nues other than distortionary costs.' 2 2
118 For a formal model and related discussion making this point, see Piketty & Saez,
note 73, at 419-21.
119 See id. at 421.
120 See id.
121 For an excellent analysis of administrative and compliance costs, see Joel Slemrod &
Shlomo Yitzhaki, Tax Avoidance, Evasion, and Administration, in 3 Handbook of Public
Economics 1423, 1447-49 (Kenneth J. Arrow & Michael D. Intriligator eds., 2002). For a
prior discussion of possible implications of these costs for double-distortion arguments, see
Tomer Blumkin & Yoram Margalioth, On The Limits of Redistributive Taxation: Estab-
lishing a Case for Equity-Informed Legal Rules, 25 Va. Tax Rev. 1, 11-14 (2005).
122 My terminology follows Daniel N. Shaviro, An Efficiency Analysis of Realization
and Recognition Rules Under the Federal Income Tax, 48 Tax L. Rev. 1, 24 (1992), which
defines "tax overhead costs" as "the amount of resources (including the value of time or
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Unfortunately, the existing literature provides only limited general
guidance for how overhead costs might function with respect to the
optimal choice of tax instruments or the setting of tax rates. For the
most part, the relevance of overhead costs to optimal-choice-of-tax-
instruments questions must be analyzed on a case-by-case basis with
respect to the specific tax instruments being considered. Nevertheless,
the literature does suggest two aspects of overhead costs that may be
generally relevant for optimal-choice-of-tax-instruments questions.
First, there is reason to infer that overhead costs often rise with the
number of tax instruments used, even holding revenue raised con-
stant.123 In other words, there often may be a fixed component to
overhead costs with respect to each tax instrument used. To the ex-
tent that there is a significant fixed component to overhead costs, lev-
ying an additional tax instrument potentially can increase overall
overhead costs even if the tax rates set for the additional tax instru-
ment are trivially small, such that the additional tax instrument would
raise minimal incremental revenues.
This fixed cost component of overhead costs thus may be minimized
by levying fewer tax instruments. This prescription, however, poten-
tially conflicts with the prescription for minimizing the costs from sin-
gle-instrument distortions. Based on the tax-smoothing principle, a
government seeking to minimize the social welfare costs from single-
instrument distortions should levy every possible tax instrument, at
least assuming that each tax instrument would generate non-negligible
single-instrument responses as compared to all of the other tax instru-
ments. Yet levying a large number of tax instruments potentially
could significantly increase overhead costs due to the fixed cost com-
ponent being incurred for each separate tax instrument the govern-
ment levies. Consequently, a government seeking to minimize overall
social welfare costs may need to balance the goal of minimizing the
distortionary costs from single-instrument responses against the goal
of minimizing overhead costs.
The second aspect of overhead costs that may be generally relevant
for optimal-choice-of-tax-instruments questions is that overhead costs
may often rise with the number of people (or other agents) charged
labor) consumed in applying the tax system, through taxpayer or government activities
such as tax planning, compliance, litigation, administration, and law-making."
123 See Slemrod & Yitzhaki, note 121, at 1448 ("There are decreasing average [over-
head] costs because the cost of inspecting a tax base does not depend on the tax rate. ....
"); see also Jonathan Shaw, Joel Slemrod & John Whiting, Administration and Compli-
ance, in Dimensions of Tax Design, note 16, at 1120 ("[A]verage [overhead] costs per
pound of revenue collected are likely to fall as the tax rate increases because the cost of
complying or inspecting a tax base does not depend on the tax rate .... ).
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with tax remittance obligations. 124 Based on this notion Joel Slemrod
has argued that overhead costs often may be reduced by charging em-
ployers or other businesses with tax remittance duties, as opposed to
imposing remittance obligations on the much larger number of indi-
vidual taxpayers. 125 Relatedly, overhead costs may be lower for tax
instruments that collect revenues from a small number of taxpayers
with greater ability to pay, as opposed to collecting revenues from a
larger number of taxpayers with lesser ability to pay. At the extreme,
if a tax instrument is only levied on a small number of extremely well-
off taxpayers, then the overhead costs may be much lower than for tax
instruments levied more broadly.
C. Outlining the Theoretical Framework
Based on the tax-smoothing principle, perhaps the most agreed-
upon advice that tax academics offer to policymakers is that tax sys-
tems should be designed with broad bases and low rates.126 Raising
revenues or conducting distribution through multiple tax instruments
is akin to broadening the base of specific tax systems. In both con-
texts, the larger the number of transactions subject to taxation, the
lower that tax rates need to be set in order to raise any specified
amount of revenue.
Of course, the advocates of double-distortion arguments are well
aware of this implication of the tax-smoothing principle. Indeed, a
major reason why the Atkinson-Stiglitz model is considered to be one
of the most important advances of the last century of public finance
economics is because the Atkinson-Stiglitz model has been used to
argue that the tax-smoothing principle does not apply to questions of
whether to supplement a labor income or consumption tax with addi-
tional tax instruments. 127 Under the assumptions of double-distortion
arguments, a labor income tax does not induce any distortionary re-
sponses that are not also induced by alternative tax instruments such
as excise taxes-in this Article's terminology, a labor income tax does
not induce any single-instrument responses. Therefore, the advocates
of double-distortion arguments contend that the logic behind base-
124 See Slemrod & Gillitzer, note 24, at 70-78; Slemrod & Yitzhaki, note 121, at 1448-49.
125 Joel Slemrod, Does it Matter Who Writes the Check to the Government? The Eco-
nomics of Tax Remittance, 61 Nat'l Tax J. 251, 272-73 (2008); see also Leandra Lederman,
Reducing Information Gaps to Reduce the Tax Gap: When Is Information Reporting
Warranted?, 78 Fordham L. Rev. 1733, 1740 (2010).
126 See note 90 and accompanying text. But see James R. Repetti, The Uneasy Case for
a Comprehensive Tax Base, in Tax Compliance Costs for Companies in an Enlarged Euro-
pean Community 499, 501, 511 (Michael Lang, Christine Obermair, Josef Schuch, Claus
Staringer & Patrick Weninger eds., 2008).
127 See Kaplow, note 16, at 147.
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broadening prescriptions does not apply to optimal-choice-of-tax-in-
struments questions.128
Once tax gaming responses are incorporated, however, it becomes
clear that the base-broadening prescription does in fact apply to opti-
mal-choice-of-tax-instruments questions, at least with respect to sin-
gle-instrument distortions and instrument-shifting distortions. Again,
in the absence of overhead costs, and assuming that all available tax
instruments generate non-negligible single-instrument or instrument-
shifting distortions with respect to all other available tax instruments,
a government should levy every available tax instrument with above
zero rates. The primary reason why governments probably should not
levy every available tax instrument is that doing so could significantly
increase overhead costs. 129
The remainder of this Section (first) further illustrates the distinc-
tion between single-instrument and multi-instrument responses
through several examples so as to discuss the prevalence of single-
instrument responses, then (second) proceeds to explain why the case
for levying multiple tax instruments may be much stronger than what
is implied by the rule-of-thumb version of the tax-smoothing principle,
then (third and finally) concludes by revisiting the question of
whether a government should levy luxury excise taxes to supplement a
labor income tax. The theoretical framework developed through eval-
uating the luxury-excise-tax problem can then be applied to a variety
of other policy questions, as this Article begins to demonstrate in Sec-
tion III.B.
1. On the Prevalence of Single-Instrument Responses
In the Introduction to this Article, I suggested that many of the
most important ways in which high-income taxpayers currently re-
spond to income taxes probably largely constitute single-instrument
distortions when comparing an income tax to excise taxes.130 It is ulti-
mately challenging to analyze the implications of tax gaming re-
128 See id.
129 Note that this logic also applies in the context of broadening the base of specific tax
systems. Thus, despite the importance attached to the base-broadening prescription, there
is general agreement that some forms of psychic income, imputed income, incidental in-
come, and de minimis income should be excluded from the base of the income tax in order
to minimize overhead costs. In other words, the goal of administrability should sometimes
trump the goals of efficiency and equity. See Alice G. Abreu & Richard K. Greenstein,
Defining Income, 11 Fla. Tax Rev. 295, 339-45 (2011) (discussing the exclusion of sources
of value from the income tax base).
Also note that, to the extent that the assumptions of this Section do not hold, there may
be other reasons (beyond overhead costs) why governments should perhaps not levy every
available tax instrument, as discussed in Section III.A.
130 See notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
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sponses because the nature of these responses can change quite
dramatically over time and across different tax environments. As
Douglas Shackelford explains, "[t]he half-life of these plans is short.
They become obsolete as the law changes and as tax innovators, un-
aided by patents and copyrights, are forced to recover their invest-
ments quickly and develop superior avoidance techniques."' 13 1
Nevertheless, there is at least anecdotal evidence in support of the
inference that at least a substantial portion of the most important tax
gaming responses through which the highest-income U.S. taxpayers
currently respond to the income tax consists of single-instrument dis-
tortions when comparing the income tax to excise taxes.
To begin explaining why, it is worth repeating why labor-to-leisure
substitutions may operate as multi-instrument responses when com-
paring income taxes to excise taxes. When taxpayers opt to work less,
they earn less income and thus can afford less market consumption.
Imagine a taxpayer deciding whether to work longer hours so as to
earn the money needed to purchase a yacht or to work fewer hours so
as to instead have more leisure time for enjoying public beaches. Be-
cause enjoying leisure is subject to neither an income tax nor an excise
tax, the extent to which taxation makes labor-funded purchased con-
sumption less attractive as opposed to leisure is a function of the com-
bined rates of both the income tax and the excise tax.
In contrast, as discussed previously, the most straightforward exam-
ples of single-instrument responses when comparing income taxes to
excise taxes involve techniques for creating artificial or inflated in-
come tax losses or deductions. For instance, prior to the Tax Reform
Act of 1986, a very common income tax reduction technique was for
taxpayers to purchase ownership rights in depreciable assets, and then
to take advantage of the generous depreciation rules while typically
using techniques for greatly inflating the assessed value of those assets
in order to claim deductions many times larger than expenses in-
curred. 132 Similarly, common techniques today involve taxpayers in-
flating the value of assets donated to charities for purposes of claiming
charitable contribution deductions, or taxpayers claiming business ex-
pense deductions for what are really personal consumption expendi-
tures. 33 Tax gaming responses of these sorts should largely constitute
131 Shackelford, note 21, at 121-22.
132 See Livingston & Gamage, note 110, at 500-03. Variations of this technique are still
used today, but this technique is now far less common because its tax reduction potential
has been greatly curtailed by anti-abuse rules.
133 See id. at 309-19, 443-45. See also Daniel S. Goldberg, The Death of the Income Tax:
A Progressive Consumption Tax and the Path to Fiscal Reform 25-26 (2013) (discussing tax
gaming responses related to claiming business expense deductions for personal
expenditures).
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single-instrument distortions when comparing an income tax to excise
taxes because these transactions operate by reducing reported taxable
income in excess of any reduction to actual income or consumption.
In other words, the income that taxpayers conceal from the tax au-
thority through these techniques can still be used to finance purchases
subject to excise taxation. Only if taxpayers go completely under-
ground-and use the income they conceal from the tax authority ex-
clusively for making purchases that are concealed from the tax
authority for excise tax purposes-might these techniques constitute
multi-instrument responses. 3 4
Certainly, the taxpayers engaging in these gaming responses for re-
ducing their income tax liabilities might also engage in other single
instrument responses for reducing their excise tax liabilities. But the
taxpayers will need to incur additional costs in order to do so. 135 Un-
like with multi-instrument responses, income tax reduction techniques
that operate through taxpayers reducing their reported taxable in-
comes in excess of any reductions to actual incomes do not simultane-
ously allow taxpayers to reduce their excise tax liabilities in addition
to their income tax liabilities, unless the taxpayers incur additional
costs. Consequently, the incentives that taxpayers face as to whether
to engage in single-instrument responses for reducing their income tax
liabilities depend on the rates of the income tax, and do not directly
depend on the rates of excise taxes.
This analysis also applies more generally to many tax gaming tech-
niques for reducing income tax liabilities other than those involving
the creation of artificial or inflated deductions or losses. For instance,
perhaps the most important tax-reduction strategies employed by
high-income taxpayers today begin with techniques for receiving in-
come in forms that qualify as capital assets. 36 As economists typically
use the terms, "labor income" refers to any income that taxpayers
earn as a result of their ability or effort, and "capital income" refers
only to the time-value returns from saving rather than spending. 37 As
134 And, even then, these techniques should only operate as multi-instrument distortions
if the only way that taxpayers can conceal their labor income from the tax authority is by
also simultaneously concealing their purchases from the tax authority, such that the tax-
payers do not incur any additional costs in order to reduce their excise tax liabilities be-
yond the costs incurred in order to reduce their labor income tax liabilities.
135 As discussed further in Subsections II.C.2 and III.A.2., the costs taxpayers must incur
to engage in single-instrument responses with respect to each tax instrument should grow
exponentially.
136 See Shackelford, note 21, at 121-27 (explaining how taxpayers can avoid being taxed
on capital assets by taking advantage of the realization rules and also explaining a number
of common techniques through which sophisticated taxpayers transform their labor income
into capital assets).
137 See, e.g., Alan Auerbach, The Choice Between Income and Consumption Taxes: A
Primer, in Institutional Foundations of Public Finance 13, 16 (Alan J. Auerbach & Daniel
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such, the economists' definitions would consider as "labor income"
much of the earnings that entrepreneurs gain from investing in their
businesses, the earnings that investors gain from skillfully picking
stocks and other investments, the earnings that executives gain from
being compensated through stock options or other forms of equity,
and the earnings that financiers gain from investing on behalf of cli-
ents. Yet, under the rules of the U.S. income tax, taxpayers have de-
veloped a number of techniques for ensuring that these forms of
earnings are often at least partially governed by the rules for capital
assets rather than the rules for ordinary labor income.138 Even to the
extent that these earnings are eventually taxed at capital gains rates,
then, these techniques enable taxpayers to reduce their income tax
liabilities to the extent of the difference between the ordinary income
and capital gains tax rates. As long as at least some of these earnings
are at some point used to fund consumption subject to excise taxation,
these techniques should thus at least partially constitute single-instru-
ment responses when comparing an income tax to excise taxes.139
Moreover, sophisticated taxpayers often employ further tax-minimi-
zation techniques so that earnings of these sorts become at least par-
tially exempt from even the capital gains tax rates. 140 These
techniques generally involve taking advantage of the realization rules,
and then using strategies such as borrowing against the appreciated
capital assets in order to fund current consumption. Underscoring the
real world importance of these forms of tax gaming, Edward McCaf-
fery calls these techniques "Tax Planning 101, ' ' 141 and Douglas Shack-
elford concludes that through these techniques "the capitalist can
transform the income tax into a somewhat voluntary assessment. '142
Again, as long as at least some of the earnings that taxpayers are able
to exempt from income taxation are used to fund consumption subject
to excise taxation, these techniques should largely constitute single-
instrument responses when comparing an income tax to excise taxes.
N. Shaviro eds., 2008); David A. Weisbach, Implementing Income and Consumption Taxes,
in Institutional Foundations, supra, at 59, 61.
138 See e.g., Shackelford, note 21, at 125-27; David Weisbach, The Taxation of Carried
Interests in Private Equity, 94 Va. L. Rev. 715, 743 (2008).
139 These transactions would constitute instrument-shifting distortions when comparing
the ordinary labor income tax rates and rules to the capital gains tax rates and rules, but
the transactions should constitute single-instrument distortions when comparing the in-
come tax to excise taxes.
140 See, e.g., Edward J. McCaffery, The Oxford Introductions to U.S. Law: Income Tax
Law: Exploring the Capital-Labor Divide 12-17 (2012); Shackelford, note 21, at 126.
141 McCaffery, note 140, at 12.
142 Shackelford, note 22, at 127; see also Edward J. McCaffery, A New Understanding of
Tax, 103 Mich. L. Rev. 807, 886 (2005) ("[Any subsequent taxation on accumulated finan-
cial capital or its yield is easily avoided. Taxes on the yield to capital have become volun-
tary in important ways.").
[Vol. 68:
DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE
Of course, labor-to-leisure substitutions are not the only potential
multi-instrument responses capable of simultaneously reducing both
income tax and excise tax liabilities. Consider a taxpayer deciding
whether to move out of a higher-tax jurisdiction and into a lower-tax
jurisdiction. If the taxpayer would both work in the new jurisdiction
and make all purchases in the new jurisdiction, then moving to the
new jurisdiction should simultaneously allow the taxpayer to avoid
both the original jurisdiction's income and excises taxes, making this
move a multi-instrument response for these forms of taxation. Con-
versely, if the taxpayer would continue to make some purchases in the
original jurisdiction after moving, then moving might partially operate
as a single-instrument response capable of completely skirting the
original jurisdiction's income tax but not fully skirting the original ju-
risdiction's excise taxes.
Overall, then, these examples should suffice to demonstrate that-
when comparing income taxes to excise taxes-at least a significant
portion of the ways in which taxpayers respond to the income tax
probably constitute single-instrument responses. However, it is prob-
ably also the case that at least a significant portion of the ways in
which taxpayers respond to the income tax probably constitute multi-
instrument responses.
Looking beyond specific examples, the empirical economics litera-
ture finds that measured labor-to-leisure responses to the U.S. income
tax are fairly small as compared to the overall measurements for the
various ways in which taxpayers act to reduce their U.S. income tax
liabilities. 143 As three prominent economists explain based on review-
ing the empirical literature, "while there is compelling evidence of
strong behavioral responses to taxation at the upper end of the distri-
bution", these responses consist entirely of "timing and avoidance"
games. 144
What portion of these timing and avoidance games constitutes sin-
gle-instrument responses when comparing the income tax to excise
taxes? Consider how the renowned economists Slemrod and Yitzhaki
assess the empirical literature:
[t]he research has clarified that when the tax structure
changes, people may alter their consumption basket, but
they also may call and give new instructions to their account-
ant, change their reports to the IRS, change the timing of
143 Saez et al., note 17, at 4 & 17-43 (concluding that "[o]verall.. .the compensated elas-
ticity of labor appears to be fairly small" and then reviewing the empirical literature on
taxable-income elasticities to find a range of possible results nearly all of which are much
larger than measured labor-supply elasticities).
144 Id. at 42.
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transactions, and effect a set of other actions that do not di-
rectly involve a change in their consumption basket. In
many cases, particularly for high-income taxpayers, this lat-
ter set of responses has larger revenue and welfare implica-
tions than the real substitution responses, such as labor
supply, that tax analysis has traditionally focused on. 145
To the extent that taxpayers act to reduce their income tax liabilities
without altering their consumption baskets, these behaviors should
generally constitute single-instrument responses when comparing the
income tax to excise taxes. After all, to the extent that taxpayers do
not change their consumption baskets when reducing their income tax
liabilities through tax gaming responses, then these tax gaming re-
sponses should probably not directly affect the taxpayers' excise tax
liabilities.
In summary, there are a number of examples of important tax gam-
ing responses that should primarily constitute single-instrument re-
sponses when comparing an income tax to excise taxes, and the
empirical economics literature can also be read as supporting the in-
ference that single-instrument responses to the income tax have
"larger revenue and welfare implications than the real substitution re-
sponses, such as labor supply, that tax analysis has traditionally fo-
cused on."'1 46
Of course, this is largely anecdotal evidence. Regardless, this evi-
dence does not allow us to precisely estimate what percentage of the
responsiveness to the U.S. income tax constitutes single-instrument
responses as opposed to multi-instrument responses. Nevertheless,
there is at the very least reason to infer that at least a substantial por-
tion of the responsiveness to the existing U.S. income tax probably
constitutes single-instrument responses as compared to excise taxes.
There is certainly no reason to infer that the responsiveness to the U.S
income tax primarily consists of multi-instrument distortions.
For all these reasons, if we need to make a best educated guess as to
what portion of the responsiveness to the existing U.S. income might
constitute single-instrument distortions when comparing the income
tax to excise taxes, I would argue that 50% is a more reasonable ap-
proximation than either 0% or 100%, and especially so with respect to
the highest-income U.S taxpayers. I offer this estimate only based on
the notion that we can probably reject the alternative estimates of ei-
ther close to zero percent or close to one hundred percent, and be-
145 Slemrod & Yitzhaki, note 121, at 63.
146 Id.
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cause we lack persuasive evidence as to whether our best guess
estimate should be higher or lower than 50%.
2. On the Power of the Tax-Smoothing Principle
In light of the tax-smoothing principle, that a tax instrument is a
superior mechanism for raising any fixed sum of revenue does not im-
ply that the instrument is superior for raising marginal revenues. In-
stead, one must analyze the MCPF for each available tax
instrument.147 I began to illustrate the importance of the tax-smooth-
ing principle through an example in the introduction and through the
discussion of the Ramsey model. Yet those discussions did not fully
explain the power of the tax-smoothing principle with respect to opti-
mal-choice-of-tax-instruments analysis. There are at least three rea-
sons why the case for levying additional tax instruments to
supplement a labor income tax may be much stronger than what is
suggested by the rule-of-thumb version of the tax-smoothing
principle. 148
To understand the first reason, consider the numerator of the
MCPF ratio, which measures the distortionary costs generated as a
function of the relevant effective tax rates. The rule-of-thumb version
of the tax-smoothing principle implies that marginal distortionary
costs generally should rise approximately with the square of the rele-
vant (tax-exclusive) tax rates.1 49 Yet labor income tax rates are usu-
ally expressed in tax-inclusive terms,150 and the same is also true for
many forms of progressive consumption taxes.' 5' Thus, as James
Repetti has explained:
147 For simplicity, in the following paragraphs I describe the denominator of the MCPF
ratio in terms of revenue raised. The analysis in these paragraphs also applies for tax
instruments designed to promote distributional equity directly (rather than for raising rev-
enues), but the denominator should then be expressed in terms of the amount of distribu-
tional equity promoted (rather than the amount of revenue raised).
148 For discussion of the rule-of-thumb version of the tax-smoothing principle, see Sub-
section II.A.1.
149 See id.
150 "A tax-exclusive tax rate refers to the amount of tax paid as a proportion of the
pretax value of whatever is taxed; sales tax rates are typically expressed in tax-exclusive
terms. A tax-inclusive rate, conversely, refers to the amount of tax paid as a proportion of
the after-tax value; income tax rates are often expressed in tax-inclusive terms. Thus the
difference between the two definitions is whether or not the tax paid is included in the
denominator when calculating the tax rate." William Gale & Benjamin Harris, National
Retail Sales Tax: What Is the Difference Between a "Tax-Exclusive" and "Tax-Inclusive"
Sales Tax Rate?, Urban-Brookings Tax Pol'y Ctr., http://www.taxpolicycenter.orgbriefing-
book/improve/retail/exclusive-inclusive.cfm (last updated Dec. 14, 2007).
151 For discussion of progressive consumption taxes, see Gamage, note 13, at 50-51.
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At first glance, one might think that doubling the income tax
rate from 25% to 50% will quadruple the excess burden.
But in fact it will increase the excess burden nine fold. To
see this, we first convert the 25% tax-inclusive rate to a 33%
tax-exclusive rate and the 50% tax-inclusive rate to a 100%
tax exclusive rate. Note now that the tax exclusive rate has
tripled.152
The higher that tax-inclusive rates are set, then, the faster the expo-
nential growth of distortionary costs with respect to raising the tax-
inclusive tax rates. Increasing labor income tax rates from (say) 60%
to 90% thus would result in a much larger exponential increase in
distortionary costs than would increasing labor income tax rates from
25% to 50%.153 Translated into tax-exclusive rates, a 60% tax-inclu-
sive rate equals a 150% tax-exclusive rate and a 90% tax-inclusive rate
equals a 900% tax-exclusive rate. Therefore, increasing labor income
tax rates from 60% to 90% is equivalent to increasing tax-exclusive
rates sixfold. Following the rule-of-thumb version of the tax-smooth-
ing principle that distortionary costs rise with square of the relevant
tax-exclusive rates, increasing labor income tax rates from 60% to
90% should approximately generate thirty-six times the magnitude of
distortionary costs.
To understand the second reason why the case for levying addi-
tional tax instruments may be much stronger than what is suggested
by the rule-of-thumb version of the tax-smoothing principle, consider
the denominator of the MCPF ratio. This denominator measures the
revenue raised as a function of the relevant tax rates.
Importantly, increasing a tax rate does not increase revenue raised
in a linear fashion. Instead, the higher the tax rate, the more distortio-
nary behaviors the tax rate induces. Because distortionary behaviors
reduce revenue raised, doubling a tax rate thus generally will not
double revenues. Indeed, most tax instruments are thought to have a
revenue-maximizing point, beyond which increasing the tax rate
reduces revenues rather than increasing revenues. 154 This revenue-
maximizing point sometimes is referred to as the peak of the Laffer
Curve. 55
152 Repetti, note 126, at 509 & n.56 ("The formula for converting the tax inclusive tax
rate to the tax exclusive rate is: Tax-exclusive rate = tax inclusive rate/(1 - tax inclusive
rate.").
153 The numbers 60% and 90% in this example were chosen because they equate to
round-number tax-exclusive rates.
154 See Mathias Trabandt & Harald Uhlig, The Laffer Curve Revisited, 58 J. Monetary
Econ. 305, 306 (2011).
155 See id.
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When tax rates are set well below their revenue-maximizing points,
increasing a tax rate may generate additional revenue in a close to
linear fashion. Yet the closer a tax rate is set to its revenue-maximiz-
ing point, the less additional revenue will be generated by increasing
the tax rate, thus increasing the ratio of marginal distortionary costs
per revenue raised. Indeed, as tax rates are increased close to their
revenue-maximizing points, the ratio of marginal distortionary costs
per revenue raised approaches infinity.156
To understand the third reason why the case for levying additional
tax instruments to supplement a labor income tax may be much
stronger than what is suggested by the rule-of-thumb version of the
tax-smoothing principle, consider again the double-distortion argu-
ment for why excise taxes (and other taxes levied on how money is
spent) induce labor-to-leisure distortions. By reducing the purchasing
power of money earned, excise taxes make leisure more attractive as
compared to working to earn money. 157
For the same reason, excise taxes may diminish the purchasing
power of the tax benefit derived from single-instrument responses for
reducing labor income tax liabilities.158 When a taxpayer acts to re-
duce her reported taxable labor income by a dollar, the taxpayer re-
ceives benefit equal to the effective marginal tax rate of the labor
income tax. But this tax benefit is only valuable because paying less in
labor income taxes leaves the taxpayer with more money to spend on
purchases. Thus, excise taxes diminish the value of the tax benefit
derived from single-instrument responses for reducing labor-income-
tax liabilities.
Even holding the labor income tax rates constant, then, might levy-
ing excise taxes reduce the overall magnitude of single-instrument re-
sponses for the labor income tax? The answer is "yes," but only to the
extent to that the costs taxpayers would need to incur to engage in
single-instrument responses for reducing their labor income tax liabili-
ties would be nonmonetary in nature. 59 In a sense, to the extent that
the costs of engaging in single-instrument responses for reducing labor
income tax liabilities are nonmonetary in nature, engaging in these
responses is akin to working, in that doing so transforms non-mone-
tary costs into monetary benefit. Thus, just as excise taxes decrease
the returns to paid labor by reducing the purchasing power of money,
156 The reason for this is because the denominator of marginal incremental revenue
raised from increasing the tax rate approaches zero.
157 See notes 28-34 and accompanying text.
158 I thank Andrew Hayashi for helping me develop this point.
159 Non-monetary costs might include the need to sacrifice leisure time in order to en-
gage in these tax gaming responses. For further discussion, see Subsection III.A.2.
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excise taxes should also decrease the incentives to incur nonmonetary
costs in order to generate (monetary) labor income tax savings.160
Overall, then, one might think of the rule-of-thumb version of the
tax-smoothing principle-that distortionary costs rise approximately
with the square of the relevant tax rates-as a rough lower bound on
the extent to which raising additional revenues through a tax instru-
ment should exponentially increase the distortionary costs generated
by that tax instrument. 61 The more that a tax instrument is used to
generate revenue, the greater the degree that raising additional reve-
nue through that tax instrument should exponentially increase margi-
nal distortionary costs. And, for tax instruments like labor income
taxes for which we typically evaluate tax rates expressed in tax-inclu-
sive terms, increasing these tax rates should generally increase distor-
tionary costs much faster than with the square of the tax-inclusive
rates. Moreover, to the extent that the costs of engaging in single-
instrument responses for a labor income tax (or for similar tax instru-
ments) would be nonmonetary in nature, levying excise taxes (or simi-
lar tax instruments) should have a negative impact on the incentives to
engage in these responses, even holding the labor income tax rates
constant. For these reasons, the case for levying additional tax instru-
ments to supplement a labor income tax may be much stronger than
what is suggested by the rule-of-thumb version of the tax-smoothing
principle.
160 For comparison, to the extent that the costs of engaging in single-instrument re-
sponses for reducing labor income tax liabilities are monetary in nature, excise tax rates
should not induce any substitution effects with respect to these responses. The reason is
that the impact of excise taxes in reducing the purchasing power of money would discount
both the benefit from these responses and the costs, as both the benefit and the costs
would then be monetary in nature. Instead, excise tax rates should only affect these re-
sponses through income effects (which are directionally ambiguous). Following standard
optimal-tax methodology, this Article's framework factors out income effects, as the impli-
cations of income effects depend on how the government spends the tax revenues raised.
See Gamiage & Shanske, note 6, at 62-63.
161 Relatedly, because the marginal distortionary costs of raising revenue through a tax
instrument generally should rise exponentially with the magnitude of revenue raised
through the tax instrument, a government's choices with respect to one tax instrument can
affect the MCPF of other tax instruments. This is perhaps easiest to see with respect to
multi-instrument responses. To the extent that two tax instruments induce multi-instru-
ment responses, the more revenue a government raises through one of these tax instru-
ments, the greater the marginal distortionary costs from the multi-instrument responses of
raising revenue through the other tax instrument. Therefore, the marginal costs of raising
an additional dollar of revenue through any particular tax instrument is a function of both
the amount of revenue raised through that tax instrument and of the government's choices
with respect to other tax instruments.
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3. The Theoretical Framework as Applied to Luxury Excise Taxes
I have now developed the basic building blocks of this Article's the-
oretical framework for analyzing optimal-choice-of-tax-instruments
questions. To the extent that the assumptions of this Section hold,162
the primary empirical parameters for which estimates should be
needed to analyze optimal-choice-of-tax-instruments questions are:
(1) the marginal single-instrument distortions that would be generated
by adjusting the tax rates of each tax instrument to be evaluated; (2)
the marginal instrument-shifting distortions that would be generated
by adjusting the gaps between the effective tax rates of each set of tax
instruments to be evaluated; (3) the distributional implications of ad-
justing the tax rates of each tax instrument to be evaluated; and (4)
the marginal overhead costs that would be generated by levying each
tax instrument and by adjusting the rates of each tax instrument to be
evaluated. 16 3
These four sets of empirical parameters might potentially function
as sufficient statistics for answering optimal-choice-of-tax-instruments
questions. 164 In contrast to approaches that rely on modeling only
specific forms of tax-reduction behaviors (like double-distortion argu-
ments), a properly developed sufficient-statistics approach potentially
alleviates the need for analyzing specific techniques through which
162 Note that in addition to the explicitly stated assumptions, there are numerous addi-
tional assumptions implicit in the analysis. Both with formal mathematical modeling and
with less-formal modeling expressed linguistically, it is impossible to explicitly state every
assumption on which the model is based, and so there must always be additional assump-
tions implicit in the analysis. Nevertheless, I follow Chetty's terminology in describing this
Article's framework as being based on "sufficient-statistics" methodology. Chetty, note 22,
at 452-54.
163 In addition to these four sets of parameters, just before the final revisions on this
Article were due, both Alvin Warren and Thomas Brennan suggested to me that there
might also be another category of distortionary responses whereby the ways in which dif-
ferent tax instruments might be integrated could open up holes that could be exploited
through tax gaming that would not be available under only any one of these tax instru-
ments separately. It is not clear to me whether this possible additional category of distor-
tionary responses is actually of any real practical importance. But I note here the
possibility that this form of distortionary response might be important and could poten-
tially weaken the case for levying multiple tax instruments.
164 With estimates for all of these parameters, and based on the pre-specified revenue
needs and social welfare weights for trading off between distribution and efficiency, one
could potentially determine the optimal use of each of the tax instruments to be evaluated
(to the extent that the assumptions of this Section hold, including both the explicitly stated
assumptions and the assumptions implicit in the analysis; see note 162). [DG: check] Of
course, we often will not have complete empirical estimates for all four of these key sets of
parameters. Yet as the remainder of this Article and its forthcoming companion article
demonstrate, one can apply this Article's framework to generate rough partial answers to
many optimal-choice-of-tax-instruments questions, even in the absence of comprehensive
empirical information.
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taxpayers might reduce their tax liabilities. 165 Instead, sufficient-sta-
tistics approaches can generate policy prescriptions based on elasticity
estimates for aggregate categories of tax-reduction behaviors.166 Ac-
cordingly, the four sets of key empirical parameters explained in this
Section are designed to express the various ways in which adjusting
the mixture of tax instruments levied might alter either the distortion-
ary costs or the overhead costs generated by the overall mixture of tax
instruments.
To illustrate, consider once again a government deciding whether to
levy a new luxury excise tax to supplement its existing income tax.
For simplicity, continue to treat the base-calculation rules of both tax
instruments as fixed, and ignore the possibility of the government lev-
ying other tax instruments, such that the government's only options
for raising revenue are either to adjust the rates of the income tax or
to levy and adjust the rates of the luxury excise tax.
If the government opts to levy the new luxury excise tax, the reve-
nue so raised can be used to reduce the rates of the existing income
tax, thereby holding overall tax revenue constant. The question then
becomes whether the government can promote more distribution at
less efficiency cost by relying exclusively on the income tax or by sup-
plementing the income tax with the new luxury excise tax.167 Based
on the analysis of this Part, a preliminary answer can be reached by
asking four questions:
First, to what extent (if any) would the responsiveness to the new
luxury excise tax be meaningfully different from the responsiveness to
the existing labor income tax? In other words, what are the marginal
single-instrument distortions from either adjusting the tax rates of the
existing income tax or levying and adjusting the tax rates of the new
luxury excise tax?
Second, to what extent (if any) would the responsiveness to the ex-
isting labor income tax involve techniques for shifting tax liabilities to
the base of the new luxury excise tax, and vice-versa? In other words,
what are the marginal instrument-shifting distortions for adjusting the
gap between the effective tax rates of the existing labor income tax
and the new luxury excise tax?
Third, what would be the distributional impact of levying the new
luxury excise tax and of adjusting the rates of both tax instruments?
165 See Chetty, note 22, at 452-56.
166 Note, however, that it is important to test and refine sufficient-statistics approaches
through structural evaluation of some of the specific behaviors that constitute the aggre-
gate categories that are used as sufficient statistics. See id. at 466-67.
167 Alternatively, the government might hold distribution constant, thus making the
question which mix of policy instruments is capable of raising more revenue at lower effi-
ciency costs.
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In other words, what is the incidence of the new luxury excise tax as
compared to that of the existing labor-income tax and what are the
distributional implications of that incidence?
Fourth, to what extent (if any) would levying the new luxury excise
tax and adjusting the rates of both tax instruments affect overall over-
head costs?
By answering these four questions, one can potentially evaluate
whether levying the new luxury excise tax could reduce distortionary
costs by enough to offset any (possible) increase in overhead costs. In
essence, this approach starts by estimating the potential for levying
the new luxury excise tax to reduce distortionary costs through ques-
tions one and two, then adjusts for distributional impact through ques-
tion three, and finally compares the social welfare benefit from
reducing distortionary costs to any social welfare harm from increas-
ing overhead costs that might result from levying the new luxury ex-
cise tax-as estimated through question four.
In light of the tax-smoothing principle, to the extent that the income
tax induces any single-instrument or instrument-shifting distortions as
compared to the luxury excise tax, levying both tax instruments should
reduce overall distortionary costs. Nevertheless, if levying both tax
instruments would significantly increase overall overhead costs, then
one cannot determine whether it is optimal to levy both tax instru-
ments without some estimates for the key empirical parameters. 168
Thus, as this discussion should make clear, one cannot usually answer
optimal-choice-of-tax-instruments questions based on theory alone.
Instead, we typically need at least rough estimates for the key empiri-
cal parameters. If reliable estimates for these key parameters cannot
be obtained from empirical studies, then one must use as inputs one's
best inductive inferences about the plausible bounds of these empiri-
cal parameters.
It is worth emphasizing that this Part's demonstration that optimal-
choice-of-tax-instruments questions cannot usually be answered based
on theory alone is an important contribution to the academic litera-
ture in its own right. Double-distortion scholarship often suggests that
prescriptions can be generated for optimal-choice-of-tax-instruments
questions based on deductive theoretical analysis.' 69 Because double-
168 For instance, imagine if the luxury excise tax was extremely easy to game. Overall
distortionary costs might then be minimized by levying the luxury excise tax at a very low
rate, such that there would be only minimal potential for reducing distortionary costs by
levying the luxury excise tax instead of relying exclusively on the income tax. If levying the
luxury excise tax would substantially increase overhead costs, it thus might be optimal to
levy only the income tax.
169 Of course, sophisticated scholars advocating double-distortion arguments recognize
the importance of administrative and implementation concerns and that double-distortion
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distortion models assume that labor income taxes do not generate any
single-instrument distortions and because these models generally do
not incorporate overhead costs, double-distortion arguments generally
conclude that all distribution should be conducted through a labor in-
come or a progressive consumption tax, with only limited excep-
tions.170 In contrast, this Part demonstrates that it may be optimal to
conduct distribution through additional tax instruments to supplement
a labor income or a progressive consumption tax, and that optimal-
choice-of-tax-instruments questions cannot be answered without ei-
ther estimates for the key empirical parameters or at least inductive
inferences about the plausible settings of these parameters.
Moreover, even in the absence of comprehensive empirical infor-
mation, this Article's framework can generate rough policy prescrip-
tions for at least some optimal-choice-of-tax-instruments questions.
For instance, as discussed further below, when analyzing whether legal
rules should be designed to promote distribution, there often will not
be any particular reason to expect that doing so would increase over-
head costs. Thus, this Article's framework suggests that it is probably
optimal to use at least some of these legal rules to promote distribu-
tional equity.
Fully demonstrating the usefulness of this Article's framework re-
quires first more fully evaluating the relevant empirical literatures-a
task taken up by the forthcoming companion article. 171 Nevertheless,
considering the dominance of the double-distortion approach within
the existing law and economics literature, it is important to thoroughly
develop the theoretical underpinnings of this Article's framework
before applying the framework to real-world policy problems. To that
end, the next Part analyzes whether this Article's framework is robust
to relaxing its assumptions and then proceeds to the application of
whether legal rules should be designed to promote distribution.
models do not capture everything relevant for answering optimal-choice-of-tax-instru-
ments question. Nevertheless, these scholars often suggest that the prescriptions generated
by double-distortion models should inform real world policy in a manner contrary to the
implications of this Article's framework.
See, e.g., Joseph Bankman & David Weisbach, The Superiority of an Ideal Consumption
Tax over an Ideal Income Tax, 58 Stan. L. Rev. 1413, 1415 (2006) (concluding based on a
double-distortion model that an "ideal" consumption tax is superior to an "ideal" income
tax, and that an imperfect consumption tax is thus likely to be superior to an imperfect
income tax).
170 See, e.g., id. at 1414-17.
171 Gamage, note 13, at 19-28.
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III. Expanding and Applying the Theoretical Framework
Many sophisticated advocates of double-distortion arguments have
noted the importance of evaluating what they sometimes label as "ad-
ministrative" or "implementation" issues when analyzing optimal-
choice-of-tax instruments questions. 172 Yet most of the prior litera-
ture on these questions, nonetheless, has either operated at such a
high level of abstraction that these "administrative" issues are com-
pletely left out of the analysis, or at such a level of detailed application
that it becomes difficult to reach any generalizable conclusions. 17 3
The previous Part developed a theoretical framework for analyzing
optimal-choice-of-tax-instruments questions, with the goal of connect-
ing generalizable theory to key concerns of administrative practicality.
In doing so, the previous Part emphasized the importance of analyzing
tax gaming responses through a framework informed by the tax-
smoothing principle.
It is common in the prior theoretical literature to consider optimal-
choice-of-tax-instruments questions through the lens of what informa-
tion the government can elicit about taxpayers' ability through the use
of different possible tax instruments. Conceived of in this fashion,
double-distortion arguments are based on the notion that levying a
labor income tax provides a government with information on labor
income. Then, once a government has information on labor income,
double-distortion arguments imply that there is only limited potential
for supplementary tax instruments to provide information about tax-
payers' ability beyond what was already contained in the information
on labor income.
Yet real world labor income taxes only provide information on mea-
sured labor income. Because taxpayers engage in a variety of tax gam-
ing responses, measured labor income is likely to depart substantially
from actual labor income. Because of this, the previous Part demon-
strated that supplementary tax instruments can elicit substantial infor-
mation about taxpayers' ability beyond what the government can
obtain from real world labor income taxes. In other words, supple-
mentary tax instruments can elicit information about the portions of
actual labor income that are not encompassed in the measured labor
income elicited by real world labor income taxes. For instance, to the
extent that tax gaming responses allow a taxpayer to circumvent labor
172 E.g., Kaplow, note 16, at 90-94, 411 ("The centrality of administrative and enforce-
ment concerns is difficult to overstate .. "); Bankman & Weisbach, note 169, at 1414-15;
David Weisbach, The (Non)Taxation of Risk, 58 Tax L. Rev. 1, 25 (2004).
173 See David Gamage, A Way Forward for Tax Law and Economics? A Response to
Osofsky's "Frictions, Screening, and Tax Law Design," 61 Buffalo L. Rev. 189, 189 (2014);
see also nikov, note 54, at 529-66.
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income taxes while still earning actual labor income that is used to
finance consumption subject to excise taxes, the excise taxes will pro-
vide information on both actual labor income and ability that was not
provided by the labor income taxes.
The previous Part explained its analysis in terms of taxpayer re-
sponses rather than in terms of the information elicited by the govern-
ment. Because tax gaming responses serve to conceal information
that the government seeks to elicit, analysis of distortionary responses
can be explained in terms of the implications for the information
available to the government, and vice versa. But describing this Arti-
cle's framework in terms of taxpayer responses makes it easier to ap-
ply the framework based on what the literature suggests about how
taxpayers respond to real world tax instruments.
Building on the previous Part's analysis, this Part first expands this
Article's framework by considering a number of complicating factors.
This Part then considers the application of this framework to the ques-
tion of whether legal rules should be designed to promote distribu-
tional equity.
A. Expanding the Framework by Relaxing Simplifying Assumptions
The analysis in the previous Part was based on following most of the
assumptions underlying double-distortion models, generalizing only
by incorporating a wider variety of distortionary and overhead costs.
Because one of this Article's goals is to demonstrate how the policy
conclusions reached by double-distortion arguments should be ad-
justed in light of tax gaming responses, the exposition was made sim-
pler by following the assumptions of the double-distortion approach
as closely as possible. Thus, as noted earlier, the previous Part did not
consider potential complications such as (1) taxpayer heterogeneity
other than in earning ability, (2) nonseparable preferences in labor
and consumption, (3) non-well-behaved utility or cost functions, (4)
externalities, (5) tax salience effects, (6) political economy considera-
tions, (7) cross elasticities, (8) general equilibrium effects, income ef-
fects, or (9) nonwelfarist considerations.
This Section evaluates potential complications related to the first six
of these.174 The first two of these complications have received the
most attention in the previous economics-oriented literature, and in
particular, are the subject of an extended debate between Chris
Sanchirico and several prominent advocates of double-distortion argu-
174 Space and scope constraints prevent me from evaluating the implications of relaxing
the other assumptions underlying this Article's framework, double-distortion models, or
optimal tax theory more generally. I hope that future work will explore the implications
for this Article's policy prescriptions of relaxing these other assumptions.
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ments. 175 The third, fourth, and fifth of these complications relate to
the question of whether tax gaming distortions might somehow be
fundamentally less costly than are labor-to-leisure distortions, from a
social welfare perspective. The sixth of these complications is perhaps
the most important respect in which this Article's framework abstracts
from important concerns related to real world tax policy.
In evaluating the implications of relaxing assumptions, it should be
kept in mind that the key question is not whether these assumptions
reflect true facts about the real world.1 76 Remember that optimal tax
theory is premised on governments having limited information about
taxpayers.1 77 Therefore, the question should be whether these as-
sumptions bias the prescriptions generated in an unwarranted
direction.
For instance, consider the assumption that taxpayers face continu-
ously increasing marginal costs to reducing their tax liabilities. This
assumption is a driving force behind the prescriptions generated by
this Article's framework. Accordingly, I argue that this assumption is
a warranted inference about a general tendency of the real world. 178
Certainly, this assumption may not always hold in all real world con-
texts. Thus, to the extent that governments can obtain usable infor-
mation about the contexts in which this assumption does not hold,
governments should potentially adjust the prescriptions generated by
this Article's framework to account for that information. Yet, in the
absence of such information, I argue that relying on this assumption
drives the prescriptions generated in a warranted direction.
In contrast, I argue that there is no general reason for inferring that
relaxing the other assumptions of this Article's framework should bias
the prescriptions generated in any particular direction. Again, to the
extent that governments can obtain usable information about the im-
plications of relaxing these assumptions, governments should poten-
tially adjust the prescriptions generated by this Article's framework to
account for that information. Yet, in the absence of such information,
I argue that there are no warranted inferences that can be made about
the general implications of relaxing these assumptions.
Overall, then, the policy prescriptions generated by this Article's
framework should have persuasive force for anyone interested in opti-
mizing distribution and efficiency, at least as baselines. These pre-
175 See notes 188-96 and accompanying text.
176 For a general discussion the role of assumptions in modeling tax policy problems, see
Sarah Lawsky, How Tax Models Work, 53 B.C. L. Rev. 1657, 1660-66 (2012).
177 If governments had perfect information about taxpayers, then governments could
simply assign a tax liability to each taxpayer, thereby eliminating most distortionary costs.
See notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
178 See Subsection III.A.2.
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scriptions potentially should be modified in any policy contexts in
which governments can obtain usable information about the implica-
tions of relaxing the assumptions of this Article's framework. But
even then, this Article's arguments about the potential implications of
tax gaming responses should probably play at least a part in the over-
all analysis.
1. Taxpayer Heterogeneity and Nonseparable Preferences
Much of the existing economics-oriented literature challenging
double-distortion arguments has focused on the implications of re-
laxing two assumptions related to taxpayer heterogeneity and non-
separable preferences. The first of these assumptions-that taxpayers
are homogeneous except in their ability to earn labor income-im-
plies that the ability to earn labor income is the only characteristic of
taxpayers relevant for distribution. The second of these assump-
tions-that preferences are weakly separable between labor and con-
sumption-"implies that, for a given level of after-income-tax income,
individuals will allocate their disposable income among commodities
in the same manner regardless of the level of labor effort required to
generate that level of income."'1 79
It is because I have been following these two assumptions of
double-distortion arguments that, until now, I have stated that labor-
to-leisure responses are multi-instrument responses for purposes of
comparing a labor income tax to most other possible tax instruments.
Relaxing these assumptions, labor-to-leisure responses sometimes
may operate at least partially as single-instrument responses. Indeed,
there is general agreement that it is optimal to tax at higher rates any
goods or transactions that are complements to leisure. 180 So, for in-
stance, if movie tickets are leisure complements, then by levying an
extra excise tax on movie tickets, we can disincentivize labor-to-lei-
sure responses. When comparing the labor income tax to an excise
tax on movie tickets, then, labor-to-leisure substitutions would oper-
ate at least partially as single-instrument distortions affecting only the
labor income tax.
Relatedly, if the government can identify characteristics of taxpay-
ers that are correlated with ability-controlling for labor income
earned-then there is general agreement that it is optimal for the gov-
ernment to levy higher taxes on taxpayers with these characteristics.'18
The literature sometimes describes the practice of adjusting tax rates
179 Kaplow, note 16, at 127.
180 See id. at 102, 137-41.
181 See id. at 139-40.
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based on these characteristics as "tagging for ability."'1 82 As with lei-
sure complements, when comparing a labor income tax to alternative
tax instruments that tag for ability, labor-to-leisure responses operate
at least partially as single-instrument distortions.
If we know which goods and transactions are leisure complements
or are correlated with tags for ability, then it is relatively straightfor-
ward to make the proper adjustments when applying either double-
distortion models or this Article's framework.18 3 For this Article's
framework, to the extent that labor-to-leisure substitutions operate as
single-instrument responses when comparing the labor income tax to
another tax instrument, this places weight toward relying more on any
tax instruments that burden leisure complements or tag for ability.184
As with any other single-instrument distortions, determining the opti-
mal choice of tax instruments requires balancing the goal of minimiz-
ing the single-instrument component of labor-to-leisure distortions
against any competing social welfare concerns, such as minimizing
other distortionary or overhead costs. The framework presented in
Part II can thus accommodate relaxing the assumptions that taxpayers
are homogeneous except in their earning ability and that preferences
are weakly separable between labor and consumption. Relaxing these
assumptions has implications for assessing the relevant empirical pa-
rameters-as labor-to-leisure substitutions may not fully operate as
multi-instrument responses-but the framework then can be applied
based on best estimates for the relevant empirical parameters, ac-
counting for the implications of leisure complements and tags for
ability.1 85
182 Some of the literature defines "tagging for ability" solely with respect to the govern-
ment adjusting tax rates based on immutable taxpayer characteristics. But the logic behind
tagging for ability can apply even if characteristics are somewhat mutable. See id. at 140
("The relevant question is whether, assuming two individuals were to earn the same in-
come, the higher-ability person would, relative to the other, prefer a different mix of com-
modities. If so, by taxing what higher-ability individuals prefer relative to what low-ability
individuals prefer, one can accomplish additional redistribution without causing as much
distortion of labor supply.").
183 See id. at 137-41.
184 Conversely, if a tax instrument burdens labor complements, this places weight to-
ward relying less on this tax instrument or even assessing the tax instrument at a negative
rate (so that it becomes a subsidy).
185 A virtue of this Article's proposed sufficient-statistics-based approach is that empiri-
cal studies can potentially estimate the aggregate category of the elasticity of single-instru-
ment responses, without necessarily needing to analyze the distinct structural components
of this category. For instance, an empirical study examining how sales tax revenues react
to legislated changes to labor income tax rates could potentially estimate the extent to
which responsiveness to the labor income tax is single-instrument or multi-instrument as
compared to the sales taxes, without the need for knowing the extent to which the single-
instrument portions of this responsiveness result because of labor income tax gaming or
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To the extent that tax instruments other than a labor income tax can
be designed to elicit relevant information about leisure complements
or tags for ability, double-distortion scholarship generally agrees that
these tax instruments should be used for distributive purposes. 186 Yet
the advocates of double-distortion arguments contend that govern-
ments generally lack the information needed to design tax instruments
other than a labor income tax so as to meaningfully elicit this informa-
tion, except for in a few limited contexts that should be considered
exceptions to the general rule. 187 Much of the debate surrounding
double-distortion arguments in the previous literature thus focuses on
whether and how tax instruments might be designed so as to elicit
information about leisure complements or tags for ability.
In a series of articles, Sanchirico has offered a deeper critique of the
reliance on the assumptions of taxpayers being homogeneous except
in earning ability and of weak separability between labor and con-
sumption by scholars advocating double-distortion arguments, such as
Joseph Bankman, David Weisbach, and Louis Kaplow. 188 Again,
these scholars agree that, in theory, tax instruments other than a labor
income tax should be used for distribution to the extent that meaning-
ful information can be elicited about leisure complements or tags for
ability. 189 But, for most important debates, such as whether capital
income should be taxed, or only labor income, these scholars argue
that we do not know how to design tax instruments other than a labor
income tax so as to elicit meaningful information and that we do not
even know whether capital income should be taxed or subsidized.1 90
These scholars thus argue for relying on the results of double-distor-
tion models as a baseline, such that analysts should start with the pre-
sumption that all distribution should be conducted through the labor
income tax, with adjustments then made to account for any informa-
tion we can elicit about which goods and transactions operate as lei-
sure complements or tags for ability. 191
In response to this position, Sanchirico rejects the baseline that all
distribution should be conducted through the labor income tax.
Sanchirico agrees that we have limited information on what goods and
because the sales tax somehow burdens leisure complements or tags for ability. For further
discussion, see Gamage, note 13, at 28-29.
186 See Kaplow, note 16, at 136-41; Bankman & Weisbach, note 169, at 1451-55.
187 See, e.g., Kaplow, note 16, at 136; Bankman & Weisbach, note 169, at 1455.
188 E.g., Sanchirico, note 33, at 204-07; Chris William Sanchirico, A Counter-Reply to
Professors Bankman and Weisbach, 64 Tax L. Rev. 551, 553-61 (2011); Chris William
Sanchirico, Deconstructing the New Efficiency Rationale, 86 Cornell L. Rev. 1003, 1031-48
(2001).
189 Kaplow, note 16, at 136-41; Bankman & Weisbach, note 169, at 1451-55.
190 Bankman & Weisbach, note 169169, at 1455.
191 E.g., Kaplow, note 16, at 136-41; Bankman & Weisbach, note 169, at 1416-23.
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transactions are leisure complements or tags for ability, and that, for
instance, we lack the information needed to determine whether capi-
tal income should be taxed or subsidized.192 But Sanchirico argues
that we are essentially equally as clueless about how much we should
rely on a labor income tax.193 Sanchirico thus concludes that the best
we can do is to build models based on all available information, and
that there is no justification for defaulting to a baseline of only using
the labor income tax for distribution.1 94
In a sense, this debate is about where the burden of proof should
lie. Scholars making double-distortion arguments contend that be-
cause a labor income or consumption tax is (so they argue) the best
instrument for raising any fixed sum of revenue for distributive pur-
poses, the burden of proof should be on those who advocate using
other distributive instruments to supplement a labor income or con-
sumption tax.1 95 In contrast, Sanchirico contends that conducting dis-
tribution through a labor income or consumption tax should be
subject to the same burden of proof as applied to alternative instru-
ments; because it is unclear which instruments are optimal for distri-
bution on the margin, Sanchirico argues that we should not make any
presumptions. 196
The approach developed in this Article should satisfy both sides of
this debate (I hope). This Article focuses on the implications of tax
gaming rather than on taxpayer heterogeneity or nonseparable prefer-
ences, and the framework developed in this Article thus holds even
under the assumptions that taxpayers are homogeneous except in
their ability to earn labor income and that preferences are weakly sep-
arable in labor and consumption. This Article's framework can read-
ily incorporate any available information about the implications of
relaxing these assumptions, but the policy prescriptions offered are
not based on the implications of relaxing these assumptions. Hence,
in accordance with the double-distortion position, this Article's frame-
work is designed to make concrete recommendations about ways in
which additional distributive instruments can be used to supplement a
labor income or consumption tax. Moreover, in accordance with
Sanchirico's position, this Article's framework is designed to incorpo-
rate all available information about tax responsiveness;197 the policy
192 Sanchirico, note 33, at 224.
193 Chris William Sanchirico, Optimal Tax Policy and Symmetries of Ignorance, 66 Tax
L. Rev. 1, 62 (2012).
194 Id.
195 See Kaplow, note 16, at 147.
196 Sanchirico, note 193, at 37.
197 This Article does rely on simplifying assumptions in order to keep the analysis tracta-
ble, but an analyst wishing to build, for instance, a full general equilibrium model (for
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prescriptions developed below and in the companion piece are thus
offered as attempts at best estimates based on the available empirical
evidence and on inductive inferences about the relevant empirical
parameters.
2. The Tax-Smoothing Principle
Microeconomic analyses generally assume that utility and cost func-
tions are "well-behaved" in certain respects, although there is no uni-
versal definition of what it means for a function to be well behaved. 198
Up to now, I have assumed that taxpayers face continuously increas-
ing marginal costs to reducing their tax liabilities. The tax-smoothing
principle follows from these assumptions.199 This Subsection argues
that these assumptions should generally hold, although there may be
exceptions in particular contexts. For now, I continue to assume that
taxpayers act in an economically rational fashion such that there are
no salience effects-that taxpayers perfectly optimize based on the in-
centives that they face.200
To begin with, at least near the margin, taxpayers must incur costs
in order to reduce their tax liabilities through distortionary behav-
iors.20 ' To see why, imagine if a taxpayer could reduce her tax liability
costlessly and without limits. Why should this taxpayer then pay any
taxes?
Conceivably, some costless tax-reduction techniques might have
built-in limits on the extent to which they can be used to reduce tax
liabilities. Yet the use of these techniques should always be in-
framarginal with respect to the tax rate, making these techniques irrel-
evant for most optimal-choice-of-tax-instruments questions. 20 2
computer simulation) could generalize this Article's framework by relaxing these simplify-
ing assumptions while still preserving this Article's insights about the implications of the
different types of distortionary and overhead costs. Importantly, the implications of this
Article's analysis of tax gaming responses are not driven by restrictive assumptions about
taxpayer heterogeneity.
198 Economists frequently consider functions to be "well behaved" if the functions are
twice differentiable. E.g., Jean-Marie Huriot & Jacques-Francois Thisse, Economics of Cit-
ies: Theoretical Perspectives 348 (2000).
199 See notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
200 I evaluate the implications of relaxing this assumption in Subsection III.A.4.
201 By "costs," I mean any factor that might prevent a taxpayer from acting to reduce tax
liabilities. So, for instance, both social norms and taxpayers' internal motivations to follow
the law or to act in a pro-social fashion constitute "costs" under my definition, to the
extent that these factors might prevent taxpayers from acting to reduce their tax liabilities.
202 For instance, if a taxpayer considers it costless to contribute to a tax-favored pension
account up to the legal limits, then it follows that the taxpayer should make such contribu-
tions up to the legal limits (or up to the point of completely eliminating all tax liability).
For this taxpayer, this tax reduction strategy is inframarginal with respect to the tax rate,
because the taxpayer should use this strategy up to the legal limits, regardless of the setting
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Regardless of the tax rate, taxpayers should make use of any costless
tax-reduction techniques either up to the point where the taxpayers
completely eliminate their tax liabilities or up to point of any built-in
limits on the use of these techniques.
The same logic applies to most tax-reduction techniques for which
the marginal costs to the taxpayer of reducing a dollar of tax liability
are less than a dollar. For this reason, one can infer that taxpayers
generally face increasing marginal costs to engaging in distortionary
tax-reduction behaviors. In the absence of increasing marginal costs,
taxpayers would either completely eliminate their tax liabilities or else
engage in no tax-reduction techniques whatsoever, depending on
whether the (nonincreasing) marginal costs of tax-reduction behaviors
were respectively less than or greater than their marginal tax rates.
Because we can observe that many real world taxpayers engage in
some tax-reduction techniques without completely eliminating their
tax liabilities, it follows that there must be increasing costs to the tax-
reduction techniques used by these taxpayers, at least near the mar-
gin. As Chetty explains:
Does the efficiency cost of taxation depend on whether the
taxable income elasticity is driven by avoidance and evasion
rather than changes in labor supply? Existing studies . . .
suggest that the answer is no, as long as there are no changes
in tax revenue from other tax bases.... The intuition under-
lying this conclusion is straightforward. An optimizing agent
equates the marginal cost of sheltering $1 of income from
taxation with the net marginal cost of reducing earnings by
$1, so the reason that reported taxable income falls does not
matter for efficiency calculations. 20 3
At least near the margin then, taxpayers' costs of engaging in addi-
tional tax-reduction behaviors must approximately equal the relevant
effective marginal tax rates, regardless of the extent to which taxpay-
ers' marginal distortionary behaviors consist of labor-to-leisure substi-
of the tax rate. For further discussion of the implications of tax-reduction techniques that
are inframarginal with respect to the tax rate, see Slemrod & Yitzhaki, note 121, at 63 ("A
critical aspect of this technology is whether the avoidance is inframarginal, in which case
only income effects are involved, or whether its cost depends on other aspects of
behavior.").
203 Raj Chetty, Is the Taxable Income Elasticity Sufficient to Calculate Deadweight
Loss? The Implications of Evasion and Avoidance, 1 Am. Econ. J.: Econ. Pol'y, Aug.
2009, at 31, 32. Chetty proceeds to analyze limitations to this result based on the possibility
of externalities or salience effects, complications that I discuss below. Id. at 43-44.
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tutions, tax avoidance, tax evasion, or any other tax-reduction
techniques. 20 4
To extend this analysis to taxpayers' cost and utility functions away
from the margin, it is useful to inquire further into the nature of the
costs that taxpayers incur when reducing their tax liabilities through
distortionary behaviors. To this end, the costs that taxpayers incur to
engage in distortionary behaviors can be divided into two broad cate-
gories-friction costs and sanction costs. "Friction costs" refer to
when taxpayers receive less utility from the choices they make in or-
der to reduce their tax liabilities than they would have received from
the choices they would have made in the absence of taxation.205
"Sanction costs" refer to when taxpayers' expected utility is lower on
account of the possibility of the taxpayers facing penalties as a result
of tax enforcement agencies' responses to the choices the taxpayers
make to reduce their tax liabilities.20 6
Taxpayers thus incur friction costs when engaging in labor-to-leisure
distortions and in most other distortionary behaviors that are less con-
tingent on the details of the tax system, as these behaviors involve
taxpayers altering their behavior in a manner that creates deadweight
loss. Perhaps less intuitively, most forms of tax avoidance and tax
evasion also involve friction costs, especially for the techniques fre-
quently employed by high-income taxpayers. 20 7 Consider that tax
lawyers are taught that the goal of tax planning is to understand cli-
ents' preferences and to recommend how clients might restructure
their affairs so as to pay less in taxes while interfering with the clients'
nontax preferences as little as possible.208 Inherent in this maxim is
the notion that clients should first engage in tax-minimization tech-
niques that require the least sacrifice of nontax preferences, proceed-
ing to techniques that require greater sacrifice of nontax preferences
204 This point was first developed in seminal work by Martin Feldstein. See Martin Feld-
stein, Tax Avoidance and the Deadweight Loss of the Income Tax, 81 Rev. of Econ. & Stat.
674 (1999); Martin Feldstein, The Effect of Marginal Tax Rates on Taxable Income: A
Panel Study of the 1986 Tax Reform Act, 103 J. Pol. Econ. 551 (1995). For further discus-
sion, see Chetty, note 22, at 467-70.
205 The term "friction" is used to emphasize that taxpayers incur costs as a result of
changing their behaviors-that substitutions are costly.
206 These penalties can be legal (for example, fines), social (for example, shame), or
psychological (for example, guilt) in nature, or a mixture of all of these.
207 I thus avoid the common parlance of describing labor-to-leisure substitutions and
other distortionary behaviors that are less contingent on the details of the tax system as
"real responses." See Joel Slemrod, The Consequences of Taxation, 23 Soc. Phil. & Pol'y
73, 73 (2006).
208 See, e.g., Livingston & Gamage, note 110, at 654 (explaining that tax planning for
choice of entities "comes down to a balancing of tax and business factors or-what
amounts to the same thing-to trying to reduce taxes without sacrificing any practical goals
that one or more parties is unwilling to compromise").
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only once the less costly techniques are exhausted, and stopping at the
point where the marginal cost from sacrificing nontax preferences ex-
ceeds the marginal tax benefit.
Common frictions include taxpayers' preferences regarding risk
bearing, accounting conventions, timing, control, location, and other
aspects of work environment or lifestyle. 209 Some frictions operate by
reducing the resources taxpayers have to fund market consumption,
such as by making business activities less profitable. Other frictions
operate by reducing the utility taxpayers derive from sources other
than market consumption, such as by reducing leisure or by reducing
the psychic income aspects of the work environment. And, of course,
some frictions operate on both of these dimensions.
All of these friction costs require taxpayers to sacrifice their nontax
preferences in order to reduce their tax liabilities.210 Thus, to the ex-
tent that taxpayers opt to incur friction costs in order to reduce their
tax liabilities, all of these friction costs create deadweight loss. 211
Again, taxpayers generally can be expected to first engage in those
tax-minimization techniques that require the least sacrifice of non-tax
preferences, proceeding to techniques that involve greater friction
costs only once the less costly techniques have been exhausted.
Therefore, taxpayers generally should experience increasing marginal
friction costs from engaging in tax-minimization behaviors. 212
The second category-sanction costs-includes taxpayers' expected
utility losses from fines, imprisonment, social stigma, legal expenses,
and the other potential consequences of the tax authority's enforce-
ment actions. Sanction costs are primarily relevant for tax-evasion be-
haviors. But remember that it is often impossible to draw a clear ex
ante distinction between (legal) tax avoidance transactions and (ille-
gal) tax evasion transactions. Hence, another maxim of tax planning
is that "pigs get rich, but hogs get slaughtered. '213 The lesson is that
moderately aggressive tax planning techniques often pay off, but that
being overly aggressive is likely to result in the tax authority taking
enforcement actions. In addition to numerous other anti-abuse rules,
209 For discussion of types of frictions, see, e.g., Myron Scholes, Mark Wolfson, Merle
Erickson, Edward Maydew & Terry Shevlin, Taxes and Business Strategy: A Planning Ap-
proach 92-93 (2d ed. 2002); David M. Schizer, Frictions as Constraints on Tax Planning, 101
Colum. L. Rev. 1312, 1316-33 (2001).
210 See, e.g., Scholes et. al., note 209, at 127 ("We cannot emphasize too strongly the
importance of these nontax costs in forging efficient tax plans.").
211 See Leigh Osofsky, Who's Naughty and Who's Nice? Frictions, Screening, and Tax
Law Design, 61 Buff. L. Rev. 1057, 1064-65 (2013).
212 Of course, there may be exceptions to this general rule in particular policy contexts.
213 Calvin H. Johnson, Play Money Basis: When Is Nonrecourse Liability a Valid Cost?,
11 Va. Tax Rev. 631, 633 n. 10 (1992). I convey this idea to my students with the alternative
phrasing of "cows get fed, but pigs get slaughtered."
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U.S. tax law is governed by economic substance and related doctrines
whereby the tax authority can argue that a transaction should be taxed
based on its underlying economic substance rather than its form.214
Consequently, it is often difficult to predict ex ante whether the tax
authority will challenge a transaction, and much of the art of practic-
ing tax law involves attempting to determine how much aggressiveness
taxpayers can get away with.
A common approach for modeling tax evasion behavior within the
economics literature builds on the foundational Allingham-Sandmo
model.215 Important parameters affecting the extent to which taxpay-
ers engage in tax evasion, under this model, are the level of sanctions
and the probability of sanctions being imposed. 216 However, analysts
employing the Allingham-Sandmo approach sometimes use the audit
rate as a proxy for the probability of sanctions being imposed, model-
ing the audit rate as exogenous to taxpayers' choices.217 In my view,
this is mistaken for at least two reasons. 218 First, the Service and other
tax authorities do not select which taxpayers to audit completely ran-
domly, but rather are more likely to audit taxpayers engaging in suspi-
cious behaviors. Second, selecting a taxpayer for audit does not
necessarily enable the tax authority to detect any tax evasion engaged
in by that taxpayer; instead, the probability of tax evasion being de-
tected upon audit is partially a function of the aggressiveness of the
taxpayer's tax evasion behaviors.
Controlling for the characteristics of a taxpayer, then, the greater
the percentage of taxable income concealed from the tax authority
through tax evasion, the more likely that the tax authority will audit
214 For discussion, see, e.g., James S. Halpern, Putting the Cart Before the Horse: De-
termining the Economic Substance Independent of the Language of the Code, 30 Va. Tax
Rev. 327 (2010). The questions of whether these doctrines should be considered as sepa-
rate doctrines or as variations on the same doctrine, and of how the recent codification
affects these doctrines, are tangential for this Article's purposes.
215 For discussion, see, e.g., Agnar Sandmo, The Theory of Tax Evasion: A Retrospec-
tive View, 58 Nat'l Tax J. 643, 646-48 (2005).
216 Id. at 646-48.
217 Id. at 648-49. The more sophisticated recent literature on tax compliance often does
treat the audit rate as endogenous. See, e.g., Leandra Lederman & Ted Sichelman, En-
forcement as Substance in Tax Compliance, 70 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1679, 1693 (2013).
Nevertheless, scholars writing on the relationship between tax evasion and tax rates some-
times continue to base their work on simplistic versions of the Allingham-Sandmo model
that treat the audit rate as exogenous. E.g., Amedeo Piolatto & Matthew D. Rablen, Pros-
pect Theory and Tax Evasion: A Reconsideration of the Yitzhaki Puzzle 1 (Inst. for the
Study of Labor, IZA Discussion Paper No. 7760, 2013), available at http://ftp.iza.org/dp77
60.pdf. As the above discussion should clarify, properly treating the audit rate as exoge-
nous reveals that tax evasion behavior generally should increase with the relevant effective
tax rates.
218 See also James Andreoni, Brian Erard & Jonathan Feinstein, Tax Compliance, 36 J.
Econ. Literature 818, 824-25 (1998); Lederman & Sichelman, note 217, at 1693.
DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE
and detect the tax evasion and levy sanctions. Consider a few illustra-
tive examples. First, a strategy many tax authorities use to identify
whether taxpayers are failing to report income is to compare a taxpay-
ers' reported income to her expenditures. 219 Thus, the greater the gap
between the expenditures that the tax authority can measure and the
income reported to the tax authority, the more likely that the tax au-
thority will suspect that a taxpayer is concealing income. Second, for
tax evasion techniques that involve inflating the value of deductions
or exclusions or understating the value of taxable goods received, the
more aggressive a taxpayer is when reporting valuations, the more
likely that the tax authority will challenge the valuations and levy
sanctions. 220 Finally, when tax authorities suspect that a taxpayer is
engaging in a tax evasion transaction, the tax authorities may then
scrutinize other components of the taxpayer's returns for both the tax
year in question and also for prior and future tax years.221 Therefore,
a taxpayer who has already engaged in some level of tax evasion, and
is considering whether to evade further, should consider that addi-
tional tax evasion behavior could draw attention to the tax evasion
already engaged in.222
For all these reasons, the magnitude of expected sanction costs gen-
erally should increase with the aggressiveness of a taxpayer's tax eva-
sion behavior. As with friction costs, then, taxpayers generally should
first engage in less aggressive tax-minimization behaviors, proceeding
to tax-minimization behaviors that involve larger expected sanction
costs only once the less costly behaviors have been exhausted. 223 As a
result, taxpayers should generally experience increasing marginal ex-
pected sanction costs. 224
Combining friction costs and sanction costs, taxpayers frequently
take steps to reduce the probability of their tax-evasion behaviors be-
219 Taxpayers whose income is subject to reporting often will find it difficult to conceal
this income from the tax authority, but taxpayers operating in the cash economy often have
substantial scope for concealing income.
220 See Mark P. Gergen, Uncertainty and Tax Enforcement: A Case For Moderate
Fault-Based Penalties, 64 Tax L. Rev 453, 459-61 (2011).
221 See Eduardo M.R.A. Engel & James R. Hines, Understanding Tax Evasion Dynam-
ics 1-2 (Nat'l Bureau Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 6903, 1999), available at http://
www.nber.org/w6903.
222 Id.
223 "Aggressiveness" is implicitly being defined here as the expected magnitude of mar-
ginal sanction costs per marginal dollar concealed from the taxpayer's tax base. The margi-
nal tax benefit from tax evasion behaviors equals the marginal dollar concealed from the
taxpayer's tax base multiplied by the relevant effective marginal tax rate. Increasing the
effective marginal tax rate should thus induce both a greater magnitude of tax evasion
behaviors and more costly tax evasion behaviors at the margin, as discussed (more gener-
ally) in notes 86-89 and accompanying text.
224 Again, there may be exceptions to this general rule in particular policy contexts.
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ing detected. For instance, taxpayers engaging in aggressive tax shel-
ter transactions often use excessively complicated organization forms
or otherwise convolute their transactions so as to make it more diffi-
cult for the tax authority to understand that the transactions are tax
motivated. 225 Taxpayers may thus be able to reduce expected sanction
costs by incurring friction costs. But, again, taxpayers generally
should start with those tax-reduction behaviors that involve less over-
all cost, proceeding to more costly tax-reduction behaviors only once
the less costly behaviors have been exhausted.
Overall, then, examining the nature of both friction costs and sanc-
tion costs lends further support to the conclusion that taxpayers gen-
erally face increasing marginal costs to engaging in tax-reduction
behaviors, including for techniques that might be characterized as tax
avoidance or tax evasion. As explained earlier, because taxpayers
face increasing marginal costs to engaging in tax-reduction behaviors,
one can infer that distortionary costs rise exponentially with the rele-
vant marginal tax rates. 226 For these reasons, examining the nature of
distortionary costs further demonstrates that the tax-smoothing princi-
ple generally should apply for tax-avoidance and tax-evasion
behaviors.
Of course, that taxpayers generally face increasing marginal costs to
engaging in tax-reduction behaviors does not necessarily imply that
these cost functions are continuous or even monotonic. With respect
to individual taxpayers, we might expect cost functions to often be
lumpy and irregular. Many of the basic prescriptions of optimal tax
theory potentially need to be qualified to the extent that taxpayers'
cost or utility functions may be non-well-behaved in these respects.227
The standard response is that while an individual taxpayer's cost and
utility functions may be lumpy or irregular, these forms of lumpiness
and irregularity should largely smooth out when we examine the ag-
gregate cost or utility functions of larger populations of taxpayers. In
most contexts, we can thus expect the aggregate utility and cost func-
tions of large populations of taxpayers to be approximately continu-
ous and otherwise well-behaved. Certainly, there may be exceptions
to this general rule in particular contexts, and the prescriptions gener-
ated by both standard optimal tax models and this Article's frame-
work may need to be qualified within those particular contexts.
Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to infer that, as a general matter,
taxpayers' marginal costs to engaging in tax-reduction behaviors
should mostly rise in an approximately continuous fashion, such that
225 See Livingston & Gamage, note 110, at 672.
226 See notes 86-89 and accompanying text.
227 For a sample discussion, see Kaplow, note 16, at 73-74.
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the tax-smoothing principle generally should apply in most policy
contexts.2
28
Overall then, the assumptions needed for the tax-smoothing princi-
ple to generally hold are rather modest.22 9 For the reasons discussed,
taxpayers should generally engage in less costly tax-reduction behav-
iors before engaging in more costly tax-reduction behaviors. And tax-
payers should generally engage in tax-reduction behaviors up to the
point where the marginal costs of engaging in additional tax-reduction
behaviors would exceed the marginal benefits from tax savings. Con-
sequently, taxpayers generally should face increasing marginal costs to
engaging in additional tax-reduction behaviors, and this is all that is
needed for the tax-smoothing principle to generally apply.230
3. Externalities
Most economic analyses assume that the private costs of individual
actions equal the social costs. The term "externalities" is used to indi-
cate when social costs differ from private costs, with the term "nega-
tive externalities" used when social costs exceed private costs and the
term "positive externalities" used when private costs exceed social
costs. It is generally understood that tax system design should take
account of externalities, with the general prescription being that deci-
sions producing negative externalities should be subject to higher
228 It may be worth noting here that sophisticated economic modeling rarely makes use
of the tax-smoothing principle. Instead, sophisticated economic models typically rely on a
related concept, which is sometimes called the "envelope theorem." See, e.g., Hendren,
note 52, at 3; Sanchirico, note 33, at 215-16. The basic intuition underlying the envelope
theorem is that levying infinitesimally small taxes generates zero distortionary costs but
can raise positive revenue (albeit, infinitesimally small amounts of positive revenue). The
envelope theorem relies on fewer assumptions and is easier to apply in formal mathemati-
cal modeling, as compared to the tax-smoothing principle. Nevertheless, I rely on the tax-
smoothing principle in this Article because the envelope theorem has limited ability to
make prescriptions except for infinitesimally small changes near the margin. For this Arti-
cle's purposes, it is important to be able to evaluate the implications of larger policy
changes, which requires making assumptions about taxpayers' utility and cost functions
away from the margin. For instance, Kyle Logue and Ronen Avraham dismiss Sanchirico's
analysis based on a version of the envelope theorem for precisely this reason-that the
envelope theorem cannot be used to meaningful evaluate the implications of policy
changes that are not infinitesimally small. Kyle Logue & Ronen Avraham, Redistributing
Optimally: Of Tax Rules, Legal Rules, and Insurance, 56 Tax L. Rev. 157, 203-06 (2003).
Logue and Avraham's critique thus does not apply to this Article's analysis, which is based
on the tax-smoothing principle rather than the envelope theorem.
229 The tax-smoothing principle does rely on stronger assumptions than does the envel-
ope theorem, see note 228, but these assumptions are nevertheless modest in that there is
strong reason to infer that the tax-smoothing principle should generally apply in most pol-
icy contexts, as discussed above.
230 See notes 86-89 and accompanying text.
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levels of taxation and that decisions producing positive externalities
should be subject to lower levels of taxation (or even subsidized).231
Several scholars have contended that tax-gaming distortions may in
some instances involve significant externalities. 232 Perhaps most im-
portantly, some tax-reduction techniques involve taking advantage of
tax incentives purposefully designed by the government-such as the
charitable contribution deduction. To the extent that taxpayers'
claiming charitable contribution deductions encourages socially valua-
ble donations to charities, these tax-reduction techniques may involve
positive externalities.
Note, however, that many tax-reduction techniques involve inflating
the deductions claimed for charitable contributions or otherwise tak-
ing deductions for charitable contributions of dubious social value.233
One should thus not assume that all charitable contribution deduc-
tions generate significant positive externalities. The same is even
truer for most other tax incentives purposefully created by the govern-
ment-often called tax expenditures.234 For instance, much of the
literature on the home-mortgage-interest deduction questions
whether the behaviors induced by this deduction produce any mean-
ingful positive externalities. 235
In addition to classical externalities like those associated with chari-
table contributions, scholars have noted that some of the costs taxpay-
ers incur when engaging in tax-reduction techniques may represent
transfers to the government or to other parties.236 These transfers are
sometimes referred to as "fiscal externalities. 2 37 For instance, mone-
tary fines collected for tax evasion represent private costs to the tax-
payers, but not social costs, because the money paid by taxpayers is
received by the government.2 38 But note that it is not at all clear
whether monetary fines transferred to the government are an espe-
cially important factor in deterring tax-evasion behavior, as compared
to (for example) the psychic costs and time lost from being engaged in
231 David Gamage, Taxing Political Donations: The Case for Corrective Taxes in Cam-
paign Finance, 113 Yale L.J. 1283, 1292 (2004).
232 See e.g., Saez et al., note 17, at 15-16.
233 See Livingston & Gamage, note 110, at 442-45 (describing tax-gaming transactions
based on exploiting the rules for charitable contribution deductions).
234 For discussion, see, e.g., Edward D. Kleinbard, The Congress Within the Congress,
How Tax Expenditures Distort Our Budget and Our Political Process, Woodworth Memo-
rial Lecture (May 7, 2009), in 36 Ohio N.U. L. Rev. 1, 12-18 (2010).
235 See Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., The Accidental Deduction: A History and Critique of the
Tax Subsidy for Mortgage Interest, 73 L. & Contemp. Probs. 233, 278 (2010) ("The eco-
nomic case against the [home mortgage interest deduction], strengthening over fifty years,
is indisputable.").
236 Saez et al., note 17, at 10-11.
237 Id.
238 Chetty, note 203, at 36.
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disputes with the tax authority, the risk-bearing costs borne by risk-
averse taxpayers, and social stigma.2 39
Also, it may be that the private costs to taxpayers from certain tax-
reduction behaviors may exceed the social welfare costs that result
from these behaviors to the extent that the behaviors provide infor-
mation to the government that can improve the accuracy of the tax
system at measuring factors relevant for distribution. 240 Some schol-
ars have also suggested that portions of the costs affecting taxpayers'
decisions about whether to engage in tax-evasion behaviors should be
discounted from a social welfare perspective, on account of these be-
haviors being illegal or antisocial.241
Importantly, tax-reduction behaviors may also produce negative ex-
ternalities, of both the "classical" and the "fiscal" varieties. For in-
stance, the more that taxpayers engage in tax evasion behaviors, the
higher the administrative costs the government may need to incur in
order to enforce the tax system. Taxpayers' decisionmaking should
factor in the extent to which engaging in tax evasion increases taxpay-
ers' private compliance costs, but to the extent that tax evasion behav-
ior increases the government's enforcement costs, this represents a
negative fiscal externality.242
Probably more importantly, the literature suggests that taxpayers
engaging in tax-avoidance or tax-evasion behaviors can undermine tax
morale and thereby decrease other taxpayers' compliance levels.243
239 See, e.g., William A. Drennan, Strict Liability and Tax Penalties, 62 Okla. L. Rev. 1,
6, 32-35 (2009).
240 For instance, if raising tax rates increases taxpayers' incentives to incur costs in order
to document actual business expenses, the information provided to the government
through this documentation can be thought of as a positive externality offsetting the pri-
vate costs incurred by the taxpayers. For further discussion, see Kaplow, note 72, at 77-79;
Daniel Shaviro, Gamage, Framework for Optimal Choice of Tax Instruments, part 2, Start
Making Sense (Apr. 30, 2014, 3:08 PM), http://danshaviro.blogspot.com/2014/04/gamage-
framework-for-optimal-choice-of.html. I thank both Daniel Shaviro and Louis Kaplow for
bringing this point to my attention.
241 See Frank Cowell, Cheating the Government: The Economics of Evasion 136 (1990);
Joel Slemrod, Cheating Ourselves: The Economics of Tax Evasion, J. Econ. Persp. Sum-
mer, 2007, at 25, 44. I thank David Kamin for reminding me of this point.
242 Similar to prior scholars labeling fines and tax penalties as positive fiscal externali-
ties, for example, Saez et al. note 17, at 10, any effect of taxpayers' evasion behaviors on
increasing the government's enforcement costs can be considered a negative fiscal exter-
nality, in the same fashion as driving vehicles can be considered to create negative fiscal
externalities through wear and tear on roads that must be maintained at the government's
expense. In all of these cases, the social costs of taxpayers' decisions exceeds the private
costs.
243 See Leandra Lederman, The Interplay Between Norms and Enforcement in Tax
Compliance, 64 Ohio St. L.J. 1453, 1508-14 (2003); Susan Cleary Morse, Stewart Karlinsky
& Joseph Bankman, Cash Businesses and Tax Evasion, 20 Stanford L. & Pol'y Rev. 37, 40-
41, 65-66 (2009); see also Jan Schnellenbach, Tax Morale and the Legitimacy of Economic
Policy, 24 Homo Oeconomicus 21, 23 (2007) ("Reviewing the evidence, it thus appears to
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Taxpayers engaging in gaming behaviors may also foster an industry
for advising and facilitating aggressive tax-gaming transactions, which
can lower other taxpayers' costs to engaging in tax gaming.244 All fac-
tors considered, it is thus unclear whether the positive externalities or
the negative externalities from tax-avoidance and tax-evasion behav-
iors are larger on the margin.
In any case, if we have information suggesting that any category of
distortionary behaviors creates either overall positive or negative ex-
ternalities, it is relatively straightforward to incorporate these exter-
nalities into optimal-choice-of-tax-instruments analysis, either when
applying the double-distortion approach or when applying this Arti-
cle's framework. 245 With respect to this Article's framework, it should
be kept in mind that the goal is to minimize the social welfare costs
from distortionary behaviors and from overhead costs, not taxpayers'
private costs. In estimating social welfare costs, then, we should ac-
count for any significant externalities.2 46 Based on the existing empir-
ical and theoretical literatures, I see no convincing reason for inferring
that as a general rule either positive or negative externalities are likely
to strongly dominate at the margin with respect to any specific cate-
gory of social welfare costs. 247 But the prescriptions generated by this
be safe to state that tax morale is an empirical regularity, and that it depends systematically
on the institutional environment as well as on the policy parameters chosen by the
government.").
244 See generally John Braithwaite, Markets in Vice, Markets in Virtue 52-57 (2005).
245 Chetty has developed one approach for adjusting the information from taxable in-
come elasticities to account for externalities. Chetty, note 203, at 44-45.
246 In essence, we should scale up our estimates for distortionary costs to account for
negative externalities or scale down these estimates to account for positive externalities.
See id.
247 Were I to hazard a guess, I probably would predict that the potential for tax-avoid-
ance and tax-evasion behaviors to undermine tax morale and social norms favoring compli-
ance might outweigh competing factors, suggesting that tax-gaming behaviors probably
both (1) generate larger negative externalities than positive externalities, and (2) generate
larger negative externalities than do labor-to-leisure distortions. But I do not have much
confidence in this prediction. I am not aware of any research in the prior literature that
comprehensively evaluates the various potential forms of externalities so as to analyze
whether the overall externalities associated with tax avoidance or tax-evasion behaviors
are likely to be positive or negative.
Further note that labor-to-leisure responses may also generate significant externalities.
For instance, if higher tax rates induce some law school graduates to forgo higher-paying
private sector firm jobs in favor of public interest jobs that require fewer work hours, then
this might well involve positive externalities. And variations of this example might apply
with respect to numerous groups of high-skill taxpayers. Conversely, I have previously
argued (based on the work of Edmund Phelps) that when fiscal policies affecting low-
income taxpayers cause these taxpayers to forgo formal sector work, this may generate
significant negative externalities. David Gamage, Perverse Incentives Arising from the
Tax Provisions of Healthcare Reform: Why Further Reforms Are Needed to Prevent
Avoidable Costs to Low- and Moderate-Income Workers, 65 Tax L. Rev. 669, 704-05
(2012). Externalities are thus potentially important with respect to all forms of taxpayer
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Article's framework can readily be adjusted to account for different
inferences or for future empirical evidence suggesting otherwise. In
any contexts in which we have reason to infer that either overall posi-
tive or negative externalities are significant, this information should
be incorporated into optimal-choice-of-tax-instruments analysis. 248
4. Salience Effects
Most economic analyses assume that individuals perfectly optimize
in response to the incentives created by taxation.249 Yet the recent
empirical literature suggests that taxpayers sometimes act based on
miscalculations of their incentives-that some tax incentives may be
less than fully salient and others more than fully salient.250
Based on evidence suggesting that taxpayers may perceive the fines
assessed for tax evasion as higher than they actually are, Chetty has
suggested that these fines may be more than fully salient with respect
to decisions to engage in tax evasion.251 Consequently, Chetty con-
tends that tax-evasion responses may be less socially costly than are
labor-to-leisure responses, as taxpayers may only perceive the margi-
nal costs of tax-evasion responses as being equal to their marginal tax
rate, when the actual marginal costs may be much lower.252
Chetty's argument is provocative, but considering that it is ques-
tionable whether monetary fines are an especially important compo-
responsiveness. Yet further work is needed before one can predict with any confidence the
contexts in which negative or positive externalities are likely to dominate for specific cate-
gories of distortionary responses.
248 For instance, scholars evaluating reforms to the rules governing charitable contribu-
tion deductions should probably incorporate the possibility of these deductions creating
positive externalities into their analysis.
249 Raj Chetty, Adam Looney & Kory Kroft, Salience and Taxation: Theory and Evi-
dence, 99 Am. Econ. Rev. 1145, 1145 (2009).
250 For a review and discussion of this literature, see Gamage & Shanske, note 6, at 26-
59.
Note that all of the salience effects discussed in this Subsection relate to market salience,
as defined in Gamage & Shanske, note 6, at 24. Political salience effects may also be
important for optimal-choice-of-tax-instruments questions, especially if the analysis is ex-
panded to incorporate political economy concerns, as discussed in the next Subsection.
This Article mostly follows the standard optimal-tax methodology of prescribing what a
government should do, rather than evaluating what governments are likely to do. See
Subsection III.A.5. Considering the latter, designing tax systems in different ways is likely
to affect how voters perceive the tax system, with possible consequences for voters' prefer-
ences regarding distribution and other aspects of tax policy. I hope to evaluate some of
these aspects of optimal-choice-of-tax-instruments questions further in future work. For an
example of my prior work along these lines, see David Gamage, Preventing State Budget
Crises: Managing the Fiscal Volatility Problem, 98 Cal. L. Rev. 749, 792-801 (2010).
251 Chetty, note 203, at 39-41.
252 Id.
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nent of the costs of engaging in tax evasion, 253 I am skeptical as to
whether Chetty's argument has first-order real world significance. 254
More generally, I do not think the literature on tax salience is as of yet
sufficiently developed for us to predict with any confidence the overall
implications of tax salience effects for most optimal-choice-of-tax-in-
struments questions. 255 Nevertheless, as with externalities, there may
be exceptions in particular policy contexts, or others' inferences or
future empirical work might suggest more generalizable inferences
about the implications of salience effects. To the extent such general-
izable inferences are available, it is relatively straightforward to incor-
porate salience effects into optimal-choice-of-tax-instruments analysis,
either when employing the double-distortion approach or this Arti-
cle's framework. Chetty has demonstrated how social welfare calcula-
tions can be adjusted to account for salience effects, in a similar
fashion to how adjustments can be made to account for
externalities. 256
As an aside, it is perhaps worth noting an aspect of salience effects
that may strengthen the case for employing multiple tax instruments
rather than relying exclusively on a labor income or consumption tax
for distribution. There is evidence suggesting that the market-incen-
tive effects of taxation may be less salient when multiple tax instru-
ments are used as compared to when only a single tax instrument is
levied with higher rates. 257 To the extent this is so, all tax-reduction
behaviors might function at least partially as single-instrument distor-
tions. In other words, levying multiple tax instruments might make
taxpayers less likely to engage in distortionary responses even for
those distortionary responses that would be capable of reducing tax
liabilities under all of the tax instruments. However, because the liter-
ature has not yet developed to a point where we can confidently pre-
dict the circumstances under which this salience effect is likely to
manifest,258 I do not incorporate the implications of this phenomenon
into the policy prescriptions offered below or in the companion arti-
cle. In contexts where this salience effect is relevant, the case for em-
253 See note 239 and accompanying text.
254 Fully discussing this point is beyond the scope of this Article, but it may be worth
briefly mentioning that my tentative suspicion is that taxpayers overestimate monetary
fines because the taxpayers understand on some level that the overall sanction costs for
tax-evasion may be high but that these costs are largely nonmonetary in nature.
255 See David Gamage, On the Future of Tax Salience Scholarship: Operative Mecha-
nisms and Limiting Factors, 41 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 173, 174 (2013) (discussing the limits of
existing tax salience scholarship).
256 See Chetty, note 203, at 39-47.
257 See Gamage & Shanske, note 6, at 27-31.
258 See Gamage, note 255, at 174, 181-82.
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ploying multiple tax instruments may thus be even stronger than my
analysis suggests. 259
5. Political Economy Considerations
Perhaps the most important respect in which this Article abstracts
from key concerns of real world tax policy is by assuming away politi-
cal economy considerations. In other words, this Article focuses on
what governments should do, without fully evaluating what govern-
ments are likely to do.
It is a common approach in the public finance and tax policy litera-
tures to abstract away from political economy considerations.260 Nev-
ertheless, for this Article's project, it is important to consider why
governments do not simply reform their existing tax systems to pre-
vent tax-gaming responses. For instance, why do governments not
close all "loopholes" and ramp up enforcement so as to detect and
deter most illegal tax evasion?
A standard technique in the optimal-tax-theory literature is to as-
sume that it is not administratively feasible for governments to pre-
vent taxpayers from engaging in labor-to leisure responses.26 1
Similarly, it stands to reason that administrative practicality obstructs
governments from preventing numerous other tax gaming responses,
including the more idiosyncratic gaming techniques that are more
likely to represent single-instrument responses. 262 "Income" is an in-
herently nebulous concept and modern income taxes are thus plagued
by numerous line-drawing and valuation problems that lack easy reso-
lutions.263 Thus, just as governments find it administratively impracti-
259 Conversely, to the extent that Chetty's argument about the salience of penalties for
tax evasion has first-order real world significance, the case for employing multiple tax in-
struments may be weaker than my analysis suggests. Based on the current state of the tax
salience literature, it is difficult to predict how these potentially competing effects might
balance out.
260 See, e.g., Bankman & Weisbach, note 169, at 1414-15 (focusing on the idealized ver-
sions of income and consumption taxes while abstracting away from the political economy
considerations).
261 See Slemrod & Yitzhaki, note 121, at 1454-55 ("With some exceptions, optimal tax
theory has dealt with the issue of administering a tax by making extreme assumptions
about what kinds of taxes are available to the policymaker . . . . Extreme assumptions
about the feasibility of tax instruments are analytically convenient, but incorrect. Ability
can be measured, although with some expense and error. On the other hand, income can-
not be measured perfectly, and the degree of accuracy in income measurement depends on
the resources expended toward this goal.").
262 Browsing any casebook on taxation reveals numerous tax-gaming transactions that
governments do not prevent due to the limits of tax administration. See, e.g., Joseph Bank-
man, Daniel N. Shaviro & Kirk J. Stark, Federal Income Taxation 515-45 (16th ed. 2012)
(discussing tax reduction strategies and the government's responses).
263 See generally Weisbach, note 7.
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cal to completely deter labor-to-leisure responses, it is also likely to be
administratively impractical to completely deter many other tax-gam-
ing responses.
Although many tax-gaming responses arise from the difficulties of
administering tax systems in the modern world economy, other tax-
gaming responses arise because governments purposefully write spe-
cial provisions into tax laws in order to benefit interest groups. 264 For
these forms of tax-gaming responses, then, even if a government could
reduce the social welfare costs from the responses by levying multiple
tax instruments, one might wonder whether governments in practice
would just build the same special interest giveaways into any new,
supplemental tax instruments levied. 265
To the extent that a government would build the same special inter-
est provisions into any tax instruments levied, or to the extent that a
government would increase the magnitude of the special interest pro-
visions in existing tax instruments in order to compensate those spe-
cial interests for the use of supplementary tax instruments, there may
be less potential to improve social welfare through the levying of mul-
tiple tax instruments. However, even when considering special inter-
est provisions that governments purposefully write into their tax laws,
it often may be that different tax instruments are more or less suscep-
tible to different types of special interest provisions. For instance,
governments frequently exempt food purchases from VATs and sales
taxes, but governments do not similarly generally grant deductions or
credits for food purchases within income taxes. What special interest
provisions get written into tax legislation may thus depend signifi-
cantly on the framing of different tax instruments-on what forms of
special provisions strike political actors as acceptable within different
tax instruments.266
264 See, e.g., IRC § 170(1).
265 I thank Louis Kaplow for bringing this concern to my attention.
266 For instance, because the U.S. income tax rules for capitalization, depreciation, and
amortization involve numerous line-drawing problems, interest groups have been able to
develop and maintain massive tax preferences within these rules. It seems unlikely that, if
the United States were to wholly or partially replace its income tax with another tax system
that would not need these sorts of rules, these interest groups would be able to lobby
Congress to build equivalent special interest preferences into the new tax system. In other
words, there is reason to think that the extent to which interest groups succeed in getting
special interest provisions written into a tax instrument's base-calculation rules is to a large
extent a function of the nature of those base-calculation rules.
Of course, this observation does not in and of itself allow for predicting how levying
supplementary tax instruments might affect the overall social welfare costs from special
interest tax provisions purposefully created by the government. Instead, I only mean to
argue here that political economy considerations are complicated and context dependent,
such that it is difficult to usefully generalize. This Article's framework is thus probably
better tailored for analyzing tax-gaming distortions that result from the limits of tax admin-
istration than those that result from special interest provisions purposefully created by the
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Overall, then, it is worth noting that this Article's conclusions about
the potential benefits of governments levying multiple tax instruments
may not fully hold in practice to the extent that governments might
purposefully write the same special interest provisions into any tax
instruments levied.267 However, considering that a large portion of
tax-gaming responses likely result from the limits of tax administra-
tion, this caveat should probably not dramatically undermine this Ar-
ticle's arguments as to the potential social welfare benefits of levying
multiple tax instruments. As Ronald Pearlman explains: "Every tax
system has Achilles' heels .... Moreover, in the real world, every tax
system is vulnerable to tax avoidance and tax evasion, much of it un-
anticipated during the legislative process. ' 268 Similarly, as Joseph
Bankman and Michael Schler explain: "Generally it is the specific
statutory language that creates loopholes. The real test comes only
after the drafting is complete .... The biggest dangers of a [tax re-
form] are the flaws not yet identified, or even existing until the spe-
cific statutory language is in place. ' 269 Accordingly, to think that most
tax-gaming responses arise from special interest provisions purpose-
fully created by the legislature is probably to misunderstand the na-
ture of both tax administration and tax lawmaking. 270
It is ultimately difficult to usefully generalize about the implications
of political economy considerations, which is why the standard ap-
proach in the optimal tax theory literature is to abstract from these
government. However, as discussed above, there is reason to infer that many (in my view,
probably most) tax-gaming distortions arise more because of the limits of tax administra-
tion than because of special provisions purposefully created by the government.
267 Yet I am skeptical that this caveat is likely to be a first-order consideration in many
policy contexts, even with respect to special interest provisions purposeful created by the
government. (But see note 266, recognizing that it is difficult to generalize). For instance,
looking ahead to the next Section, imagine a government adjusting patent protections to
promote marginal distribution while reducing the highest marginal income tax rates.
Would the interest groups benefitting from special income tax provisions then be able to
lobby for further special provisions based on the argument that shifting to using patent
protections to promote marginal distribution resulted in a reduction in the magnitude of
the special provisions that previously benefitted these interest groups? It seems rather
unlikely to me that arguments of this sort could form the basis for successful lobbying. Of
course, interest groups might lobby for different special provisions to be built into the
patent protections, but then the tax-smoothing principle should potentially apply.
268 Ronald A. Pearlman, Fresh from the River Styx: The Achilles' Heels of Tax Reform
Proposals, 51 Nat'l Tax J. 569, 569 (1998).
269 Joseph Bankman & Michael Schler, Tax Planning Under the Flat Tax, in Taxing Cap-
ital Income 247 (Henry J. Aaron, Leonard E. Burman & C. Eugene Steuerle eds., 2007).
270 It is important to distinguish here between: (1) tax-gaming opportunities that the
legislature purposefully creates at the time of initial tax lawmaking and (2) tax-gaming
opportunities that taxpayers develop after initial tax lawmaking and that the legislature
fails to shut down due to political pressures. It is typically much easier for special interest
lobbying to prevent legislative reforms than to induce a legislature to purposefully write
new special interest provisions.
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considerations. Political economy considerations are undoubtedly im-
portant for analyzing real world tax policy. But, for the most part, the
implications of these considerations probably must be evaluated on a
case-by-case basis with respect to particular policy contexts.
B. Applying the Framework to Analyze the Use of Legal Rules for
Promoting Distributional Equity
As the previous Section explained, the theoretical framework devel-
oped in Part II generally should be robust to relaxing its simplifying
assumptions. To the extent that governments can obtain useful infor-
mation about the implications of relaxing these assumptions, it may be
necessary to adjust the policy prescriptions generated by the frame-
work within particular policy contexts. But the prescriptions gener-
ated by this Article's framework should still be relevant for anyone
interested in optimizing the trade-off between efficiency and distribu-
tional equity, at least as baselines.
This Article's framework is easiest to apply when evaluating incre-
mental reforms, rather than fundamental reforms.271 It is thus useful
to start with the question of whether legal rules should be designed to
promote distributional equity. For this question, it makes sense to
hold the structure of the tax system constant, at least as an analytical
starting point. Thus, we can ask whether it is optimal for a govern-
ment to design a legal rule so as to promote a marginal amount of
distributional equity, or whether the government instead should pro-
mote that distribution through the setting of income tax rates.
For instance, consider a government deciding how to set the dura-
tion of patent protections. Patent protections are primarily a regula-
tory instrument, in that the duration typically is set primarily for the
purpose of balancing the goal of incentivizing research and discovery
against the goal of not overly restricting use.272 Yet the setting of the
duration of patent protections may also have significant distributional
implications, and thus may also function partially as a tax instru-
ment.273 Consequently, one can ask: Is it optimal to set the duration
of patent protections at the level that most efficiently achieves the
government's regulatory goals? Or, instead, is it optimal for the gov-
271 See notes 320-25 and accompanying text.
272 See, e.g., Suzanne Scotchmer, Innovation and Incentives 98-99 (2004); Amy
Kapczynski & Talha Syed, The Continuum of Excludability and the Limits of Patents, 122
Yale L.J. 1900, 1904 (2013).
273 See, e.g., Angus C. Chu & Shin-Kun Peng, International Intellectual Property Rights:
Effects on Growth, Welfare and Income Inequality, 33 J. Macroeconomics 276, 281-86
(2011); Amy Kapczynski, The Cost of Price: Why and How To Get Beyond Intellectual
Property Internalism, 59 UCLA L. Rev. 970, 993-1006 (2012).
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ernment to also consider distribution in setting the duration of patent
protections?
Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell have argued that (with limited
exceptions) governments should set legal rules at the levels that most
efficiently achieve the governments' regulatory goals.274 In other
words, Kaplow and Shavell argue that governments should not con-
sider distribution in the design of legal rules. Their support for this
position is an extension of the double-distortion argument against the
use of luxury excise taxes (as discussed in Part II). Designing a legal
rule to promote distributional equity by definition will create dead-
weight loss to the extent that the rule departs from its efficiency-maxi
mizing settings. Moreover, as Kaplow and Shavell explain, "if legal
rules disadvantage high-income individuals and help low-income indi-
viduals, that will tend to discourage work effort in the same manner
and to the same extent as making the income tax system more redis-
tributive." 275 Therefore, Kaplow and Shavell argue that designing le-
gal rules to promote distributional equity induces the double-
distortion of both labor-to-leisure substitutions and of "the cost di-
rectly associated with the inefficiency of the legal rules".2 76 They thus
conclude that it is strictly superior to conduct distributional equity
through the setting of tax rates,2 77 because they assume that doing so
would only induce labor-to-leisure distortions.
As applied to the setting of the duration of patent protections, then,
Kaplow and Shavell's position implies that the government should set
the duration at the level that most efficiently balances research and
discovery against not overly restricting use. Departing from this set-
ting in order to further distributional equity would generate dead-
weight loss both by failing to maximize the government's regulatory
goals and by inducing labor-to-leisure distortions.
The existing economics-oriented literature challenging Kaplow and
Shavell's position has mostly focused on the implications of taxpayer
274 Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient Than the
Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J. Legal Stud. 667, 677 (1994) (developing their
argument for setting legal rules to efficiently achieve regulatory goals); Louis Kaplow &
Steven Shavell, Should Legal Rules Favor the Poor? Clarifying the Role of Legal Rules
and the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 29 J. Legal Stud. 821, 834-35 (2000) [herein-
after Clarifying] (responding to the criticisms of their argument for setting legal rules to
efficiently achieve regulatory goals).
This argument also applies to the use of tax-base calculation rules to promote distribu-
tional equity, as Kaplow's and Shavell's argument implies that distribution should be exclu-
sively promoted through the setting of tax rates (again, with, limited exceptions). See
Weisbach, note 7, at 1676-79.
275 See Kaplow & Shavell, Clarifying, note 274, at 823.
276 Id. at 824.
277 Id. at 826, 834.
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heterogeneity and nonseparable preferences.278 If legal rules can be
designed to elicit meaningful information about ways in which taxpay-
ers differ beyond in their ability to earn income, then Kaplow and
Shavell would agree that legal rules should be designed so as to take
advantage of this information to promote distributional equity.279 Yet
Kaplow and Shavell argue that although "it is possible that certain
adjustments to legal rules would enhance the efficiency of the income
tax in redistributing income .... there is no priori reason to expect the
called-for modifications of legal rules to be pro-poor-the adjust-
ments could just as easily be pro-rich." 280
Other scholars have, of course, made a variety of nonwelfarist argu-
ments against Kaplow and Shavell's position.2 1 Also, within a
welfarist framework, Christine Jolls has questioned on salience
grounds whether promoting distributional equity through legal rules
really induces the same labor-to-leisure distortions as doing so
through a labor income tax.282 Nevertheless, Kaplow and Shavell's
position "has become the new conventional wisdom," 2 3 at least
among law and economics scholars.
In contrast to this conventional wisdom-and even factoring out
nonwelfarist considerations, taxpayer heterogeneity, nonseparable
preferences, and salience effects-this Article's framework suggests
that at least some legal rules should be designed to promote distribu-
tional equity. Much of the tax-gaming responsiveness through which
taxpayers reduce their tax liabilities almost certainly operates as sin-
gle-instrument distortions with respect to designing legal rules to pro-
mote distributional equity, just as with respect to luxury excise
278 E.g., Ronen Avraham, David Fortus & Kyle Logue, Revisiting the Roles of Legal
Rules and Tax Rules in Income Redistribution: A Response to Kaplow & Shavell, 89 Iowa
L. Rev. 1125, 1152 (2004); Chris William Sanchirico, Exchange: Should Legal Rules be
Used to Redistribute Wealth?, Taxes Versus Legal Rules as Instruments for Equity: A
More Equitable View, 29 J. Legal Stud. 797, 814-19 (2000); see Subsection III.A.1.
279 See Kaplow & Shavell, Clarifying, note 274, at 825-26.
280 Id. For further discussion of this topic and of Sanchirico's critique of Kaplow and
Shavell, see Subsection III.A.1; see also Zachary Liscow, Note, Reducing Inequality on the
Cheap: When Legal Rule Design Should Incorporate Equity as Well as Efficiency, 123
Yale L.J. 2478, 2509-510 (2014) (arguing that there are situations in which both equity and
efficiency may favor redistribution through legal rules rather than taxes).
281 For discussion, see, e.g., Richard S. Markovits, Why Kaplow and Shavell's "Double-
Distortion Argument" Articles Are Wrong, 13 Geo. Mason. L. Rev. 511, 613-19 (2005).
2s2 Christine Jolls, Behavioral Economics Analysis of Redistributive Legal Rules, 51
Vand. L. Rev. 1653, 1676-77 (1998). Logue and Avraham have also argued that there may
be limited circumstances in which taxpayer heterogeneity or salience effects may justify
designing legal rules to promote distributional equity, although they conclude that the tax
system probably has a "comparative advantage" at promoting most forms of distribution.
Logue & Avraham, note 228, at 165-206.
283 See Avraham et al., note 278, at 1126.
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taxes.284 For instance, adjusting the duration of patent protections so
as to promote distributional equity should not directly incentivize tax-
payers to conceal their incomes from the tax authority or to engage in
many other forms of tax-gaming responses that rely on exploiting the
idiosyncratic design of the tax system's base-calculation rules. Adjust-
ing patent protections to benefit poorer taxpayers at the expense of
richer taxpayers may well reduce work incentives, but should not di-
rectly incentivize the claiming of artificial or inflated deductions or
exclusions or many other forms of tax gaming such as those that were
previously discussed in Subsection II.C.1.285
Consequently, designing legal rules so as to promote marginal
amounts of distributional equity, rather than relying exclusively on the
setting of tax rates, should reduce the overall magnitude of distortion-
ary costs.2 86 To the extent that the responsiveness to the tax system
consists of single-instrument distortions as compared to designing a
legal rule to promote distributional equity, calibrating that legal rule
to promote at least some amount of distributional equity should be
relatively more efficient in terms of distortionary costs.
What about overhead costs? Remember that many legal rules are
adopted primarily for regulatory purposes, not distributional pur-
poses. Thus, the government will need to establish these legal rules
regardless of whether the rules are designed purely based on effi-
ciency or whether the rules are calibrated so as to promote distribu-
tional equity. Even if these rules are not used to promote
distributional equity, then, the government will need to incur adminis-
284 As long as a legal rule does not directly make use of taxpayers' reported taxable
incomes, many of the tax-gaming techniques through which taxpayers reduce their income
tax liabilities should constitute single-instrument distortions with respect to using the legal
rule to promote distributional equity. For instance, consider designing legal rules to favor
workers over executives, to favor the residents of poorer communities over the residents of
wealthier communities, or to favor historically disadvantaged minorities over advantaged
majorities. None of these rules should directly affect taxpayers' incentives to conceal
earned income from the tax authority or to engage in many other common tax gaming
transactions. In contrast, consider a proposal to adjust tort remedies or civil fines so that
taxpayers who report higher incomes to the tax authority are subject to higher sanctions.
With respect to this proposal, much of the tax-gaming responsiveness to the income tax
might plausibly constitute multi-instrument distortions. Conditioning sanctions on re-
ported taxable income could directly increase taxpayers' incentives to engage in tax gaming
to reduce their reported taxable incomes. Yet most proposals for promoting distribution
through legal rules do not depend on taxpayers' reported taxable incomes in this fashion.
285 Moreover, the secondary effects of adjusting legal rules to promote distributional
equity probably should serve to decrease taxpayers' incentives to engage in many forms of
tax gaming responses for reducing income tax liabilities, insofar as doing so would decrease
the purchasing power of money. See notes 157-60 and accompanying text.
286 In light of the tax-smoothing principle, the question must be whether adjusting the
tax system or the design of legal rules is relatively more efficient at promoting marginal
amounts of distribution.
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trative costs to enforce these rules and private parties will need to
incur compliance costs. The reason why we might expect the use of
multiple tax instruments to increase overhead costs thus does not ap-
ply to the question of whether legal rules (that are established for reg-
ulatory purposes) should be adjusted so as to promote marginal
amounts of distributional equity.287 Any fixed costs associated with
establishing these legal rules will need to be incurred in order to pro-
mote the government's regulatory goals, regardless of whether or not
the rules are calibrated to promote distributional equity.
For example, imagine that the empirical literature reports that the
efficiency-maximizing setting for a form of patent protection is to set
the duration of the patent at ten years. Further imagine that the em-
pirical literature reports that reducing the duration of that patent pro-
tection would promote distributional equity. Would reducing the
duration of the patent protection to nine years increase overhead
costs, as compared to setting the duration at the efficiency-maximizing
setting of ten years? Perhaps so, but it seems equally likely that re-
ducing the duration of the patent protection would decrease overall
overhead costs.
Examining the four key sets of empirical parameters for applying
this Article's framework, there is thus no particular reason to infer
that either relying on the tax system or on the design of legal rules to
promote marginal amounts of distributional equity should generate
larger marginal overhead costs. 288 Instead, the relevance of overhead
costs must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis with respect to the
questions of whether specific legal rules should be adjusted to pro-
mote distributional equity. For many such questions, marginal over-
head costs may not be a first-order concern.
The same conclusion probably also holds for instrument-shifting
distortions. When comparing tax instruments such as labor income
taxes, capital income taxes, and corporate income taxes, there is evi-
dence that instrument-shifting distortions have first-order implications
for the extent to which these tax instruments should be used. 289 But I
am not aware of any similar evidence or other reasons for inferring
that instrument-shifting distortions are likely to have first-order impli-
cations for the question of whether legal rules should be designed to
promote distributional equity, as compared to relying on tax rates.
For simplicity, then, assume (as seems plausible) that neither over-
head costs nor instrument-shifting distortions present first-order con-
287 See Subsection II.B.4.
288 For the remainder of this Section, I limit my discussion to legal rules that are prima-
rily designed for regulatory purposes and that the government will thus establish regardless
of whether the legal rules are used to promote distributional equity.
289 See Saez et al., note 17, at 10-13.
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cerns for the question of whether a government should consider
distribution in the design of legal rules.2 90 With respect to considering
whether a particular legal rule should be designed to promote distri-
butional equity, this Article's framework thus boils down to two
questions:291
First, what are the marginal single-instrument distortions for adjust-
ing tax rates and for adjusting the setting of the legal rule?
Second, what is the distributional impact (or incidence) of adjusting
tax rates and of adjusting the setting of the legal rule?
In combination, these two questions evaluate the relative marginal
efficiency costs of promoting distributional equity, either through the
setting of income tax rates or through adjusting the setting of the legal
rule.29
2
By definition, the optimal government policy is that which maxi-
mizes the trade-off between distributional equity and efficiency by
promoting distributional equity at the lowest possible efficiency
costs. 293 The tax system can be used to promote marginal amounts of
distributional equity by adjusting the tax rates so as to raise incremen-
tal revenues from higher-income taxpayers and then transferring
those revenues to lower-income taxpayers. Legal rules similarly can
be used to promote distributional equity by adjusting the setting of the
legal rules so as to benefit lower-income taxpayers at the expense of
higher-income taxpayers. For each of these tax instruments, the mar-
ginal efficiency costs of promoting distributional equity can be ex-
pected to rise exponentially with the amount of distributional equity
promoted.294 Consequently, the optimal government policy is to ad-
just the use of each tax instrument until the marginal efficiency costs
of promoting further distributional equity are equal for all of the tax
instruments levied.
In their review of the empirical literature on taxpayer responsive-
ness, the economists Emmanuel Saez, Joel Slemrod, and Seth Giertz
290 In contexts in which there is evidence that these factors push in one direction or the
other, the baseline prescriptions discussed in this Section should be modified to account for
this evidence.
291 The other two questions elaborated in Subsection II.C.3. can be factored out based
on the assumptions that neither marginal overhead costs nor instrument-shifting distor-
tions are first-order concerns.
292 The marginal efficiency costs of promoting distribution is an expression for the
MCPF, when the goal is to promote distributional equity, rather than to raise revenue. The
overall MCPF of each tax instrument is thus partly a function of the government's use of
other tax instruments. As this Article's framework demonstrates, the relative MCPF (or
the relative marginal efficiency costs of promoting distribution) of each tax instrument
depends on the elasticities of single-instrument distortions for each of the tax instruments
to be evaluated as compared to the other tax instruments to be evaluated.
293 See notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
294 See notes 83-94, 161, and accompanying text.
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estimate that the overall marginal distortionary costs of raising reve-
nues through the U.S. income tax are around 20% of the marginal
dollar of revenue raised through an across-the-board tax increase.295
They further estimate that the overall marginal distortionary costs of
raising revenues from the top 1% of income earners are around 34%
of the marginal dollar of revenues raised from these taxpayers. 296
What portion of these estimates might arise from single-instrument
distortions when comparing the use of the income tax for promoting
distribution to instead promoting that distribution through the design
of legal rules? Based on discussion of several important real-world
examples of tax gaming responses and on assessment of the empirical
economics literature, I earlier suggested that a best educated guess
might be that perhaps 50% of the distortionary responses to the in-
come tax might constitute single-instrument responses when compar-
ing the U.S. income tax to excise taxes.297 This inference should also
be reasonable as a best educated guess for comparing promoting a
marginal amount of distribution through the U.S. income tax to in-
stead promoting that distribution through the design of legal rules.
After all, Kaplow and Shavell's argument against promoting distribu-
tion through legal rules is based on an extension of the double-distor-
tion argument against the use of luxury excise taxes.298
I offer this "best educated guess" only to suggest that 50% seems
like a more reasonable estimate based on the limited anecdotal evi-
dence we have available than does either close to 0% or close to a
100%. Certainly, a wide range of other possibilities between (say per-
haps) ten percent and ninety percent might also be plausible. Ulti-
mately, all that can be said with even minimal confidence is that there
is reason to infer that at least a significant portion of the responsive-
ness to the income tax probably consists of single-instrument distor-
tions, and also that at least a significant portion probably consists of
multi-instrument distortions. Accordingly, we lack evidence as to
whether the better estimate would be above or below my best guess of
50%.
With that giant caveat, I will proceed to use 50% as my very very
rough, best-educated guess estimate for what portion of the measured
responsiveness to the U.S. income tax might constitute single-instru-
ment responses when comparing promoting distribution through the
income tax to alternatively promoting distribution through the design
295 Saez et al., note 17, at 42 (estimating that "the marginal excess burden per dollar of
federal income tax revenue raised is $0.195 for an across-the-board proportional increase,
and $ 0.339 for a tax increase focused on the top 1 percent of income earners").
296 Id.
297 Subsection II.C.1.
298 See notes 257-59.
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of legal rules. The next step is to combine that best guess estimate
with the economists' measures for the overall marginal distortionary
costs of raising revenues through the U.S. income tax (as discussed
above): 20% of the marginal dollar for an across-the-board tax in-
crease, and 34% of the marginal dollar for raising revenues from the
top 1% of income earners.299
One can thus very very roughly approximate the optimal extent to
which legal rules should be used to promote distributional equity. Im-
agine a legal rule that can be adjusted to benefit the lowest-income
taxpayers at the expense of middle-income taxpayers. We might esti-
mate that this legal rule should be adjusted to promote incremental
distributional equity until the relative marginal efficiency costs of pro-
moting further distributional equity exceed 10% of the marginal dol-
lar-equivalent of resources transferred (that is, 50% of the
economists' 20% measurement). Similarly, for a legal rule that can be
adjusted to benefit the lowest-income taxpayers at the expense of the
top 1% of income earners, we might estimate that the legal rule
should be adjusted to promote incremental distributional equity until
the relative marginal efficiency costs of promoting further distribu-
tional equity exceed 17% percent of the marginal dollar-equivalent of
resources transferred (that is, 50% of the economists' 34% measure-
ment). More generally, we can say that it should be optimal to adjust
legal rules so as to promote incremental distributional equity until the
relative marginal efficiency costs of promoting further distributional
equity grow to equal the relative marginal efficiency costs of instead
promoting that distribution through the tax system. 300
This result is offered only as a baseline. There are numerous com-
plications that might suggest adjusting this baseline prescription in
particular policy contexts.301 For instance, nonwelfarist considerations
might imply that certain legal rules should be adjusted so as to depart
in some direction or another from the baseline prescriptions gener-
ated by this Article's framework.30 2 Similarly, institutional considera-
tions related to the proper scope of the relevant decisionmaker's
discretion might suggest departing from the baselines prescriptions
generated by this framework in certain policy contexts.30 3 Also, it
299 See notes 295-96.
300 In other words, it should be optimal to adjust legal rules so as to promote incremen-
tal distribution until the marginal single-instrument distortions that would be induced by
doing so grow to equal the marginal single-instrument distortions that would be induced by
instead promoting that distribution through the tax system.
301 See Section III.A.
302 As previously indicated, this Article does not evaluate nonwelfarist considerations.
See note 74 and accompanying text.
303 For instance, if a judge or administrative agency is adjusting a legal rule, one might
argue that the judge or agency should look to the tax system as a guide for the implicit
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might in some cases be worth considering whether attempting to re-
form the structure of the tax system so as to reduce tax gaming distor-
tions might be a superior alternative to designing legal rules in light of
the porousness of the existing tax system.30 4 Nevertheless, the capa-
bility to even roughly approximate the optimal extent to which spe-
cific legal rules should be used to promote distributional equity, even
as a baseline, should begin to suggest the advantages of this Article's
framework as compared the approaches in the prior literature.
Moreover, there are numerous line-drawing problems in the design
of legal rules for which it is unclear which of multiple possible discrete
settings for the rules would be most efficient. Applying this Article's
framework suggests that it may be optimal to resolve these line-draw-
ing problems by considering distributional implications, at least for
those problems where the choice amongst possible settings for the le-
gal rules has significant and predictable distributional implications and
unclear or insignificant efficiency implications.
In a sense, when the quantitative empirical information needed to
make more precise prescriptions is unavailable, this Article's frame-
work suggests that we should return to the traditional tax policy ap-
proach of attempting to balance the potentially competing goals of
equity, efficiency, and administrability.30 5 In these settings, the key
implication of this Article's framework is that equity-especially dis-
tributional equity306-should indeed be a goal in the design of legal
social welfare function underlying congressional decisions regarding the trade-off among
distribution and efficiency. To the extent so, this might suggest that the legal rule should
be set so that the relative marginal efficiency cost of promoting distribution through the
rule equals that of the tax system--as this Article's framework prescribes. But there may
be other institutional concerns suggesting that the judge or agency should take a different
approach to balancing distribution against efficiency, such as if Congress has provided ex-
plicit instructions that the distributional calculus should be based on something other than
the social welfare function implied by the design of the tax system.
304 But note that, in most policy contexts, reforming the structure of the existing tax
system is likely to be more of a complement (rather than substitute) to designing legal
rules to promote marginal amounts of distribution. The more that the tax system can be
reformed so as to reduce its porousness, the smaller the advantages there are likely to be to
designing legal rules to promote marginal amounts of distribution. But, under the plausi-
ble assumption that no conceivable amount of reform could completely eliminate all sin-
gle-instrument distortions induced by the tax system, it should probably remain optimal to
design at least some legal rules to promote marginal amounts of distribution.
305 For discussion, see, e.g., Gov't Accountability Office, GAO-05-1009SP, Understand-
ing the Tax Reform Debate: Background, Criteria & Questions 26-53 (2005), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d051009sp.pdf.
306 Within the traditional tax policy approach, "equity" typically was thought to include
both horizontal equity (treating similarly situated taxpayers similarly) and vertical equity
(that is, distributional equity). Some modern scholarship has argued against horizontal
equity being a separate criterion, which effectively collapses equity to just being distribu-
tional equity. For further discussion, see, e.g., Matthew D. Adler & Chris William Sanchir-
ico, Inequality and Uncertainty: Theory and Legal Applications, 155 U. Pa. L. Rev. 279,
DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE
rules, contrary to the implications of double-distortion arguments. In
some policy contexts, the empirical literature may facilitate making
precise quantitative estimates of the optimal extent to which specific
legal rules should be calibrated to promote distributional equity. But
even in contexts where this is not currently possible, it may be that
lawyerly training enables a balancing of nonquantifiable concerns-in
light of the empirical information that is available and inductive infer-
ences about the plausible settings of the other key empirical parame-
ters-based on the exercise of lawyerly "practical wisdom".307
Nevertheless, the conclusion that it is probably optimal to adjust
some legal rules so as to promote marginal amounts of distributional
equity does not imply that all legal rules defended as promoting distri-
butional equity are justified. Some proposals for how legal rules
might be adjusted to promote distributional equity may be dominated
by alternative proposals that better optimize the trade-off between
distributional equity and efficiency.30 8 There are undoubtedly better
and worse ways to design legal rules so as to promote marginal
amounts of distributional equity, and nothing in this Section's analysis
supports using legal rules to promote distributional equity in ways that
are dominated by superior alternative approaches. In more colloquial
terms, this Section's analysis only supports designing legal rules to
promote distributional equity in "smart" ways; "stupid" ways of pro-
moting distributional equity remain "stupid."
Moreover, Louis Kaplow has argued that an advantage of the
double-distortion argument that all distributional equity should be
promoted through the tax system is that this approach facilitates a
productive division of labor between tax and other legal scholars.30 9
Determining the efficiency-maximizing setting of the duration of pat-
ent protections and of other legal rules is a difficult task in its own
right. The analyst's task is made even more difficult by prescribing
362 (2006); Thomas D. Griffith, Should "Tax Norms" Be Abandoned? Rethinking Tax Pol-
icy Analysis and the Taxation of Personal Injury Recoveries, 1993 Wis. L. Rev. 1115, 1155
(1993). But see Brian Galle, Tax Fairness, 65 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1323, 1324 (2008)
(arguing for a "new" justification for horizontal equity).
307 See, e.g., Anthony T. Kronman, The Lost Lawyer: Failing Ideals of the Legal Profes-
sion 109-62 (1993) (advocating for the notion of lawyerly "practical wisdom"). But note
that a danger of relying on "practical wisdom" is that analysts may be influenced by "moti-
vated reasoning." See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, Foreword: Neutral Principles, Motivated Cog-
nition, and Some Problems for Constitutional Law, 125 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 19-28 (2011)
(discussing the problem of motivated reasoning). For a related discussion, see Cass R.
Sunstein, The Limits of Quantification (Harvard Law School, Pub. Law Working Paper
No. 14-13, 2014), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2424878.
308 In terms of distortionary costs, an approach for promoting distribution dominates
another alternative approach if and only if the first approach does not generate any single-
instrument responses or instrument-shifting responses with respect to the second approach.
309 See Kaplow, note 16, at 3-4.
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that legal rules should depart from their efficiency-maximizing settings
so as to promote incremental distributional equity up to the point
where the marginal efficiency costs of doing so equal the costs of in-
stead promoting that distributional equity through the tax system.
In light of tax-gaming responses and the tax-smoothing principle,
however, economic theory provides no justification for prioritizing ef-
ficiency over distributional equity. Were governments to prioritize ef-
ficiency maximization over distributional equity, all revenues should
be raised through lump sum taxes. That governments instead rely on
less efficient alternatives like income and consumption taxes is gener-
ally thought to imply that governments prioritize distributional equity
over pure efficiency maximization. If this is so for tax-system design,
then should it not also be so for the design of legal rules? 310
Certainly, not all legal rules are capable of being adjusted to pro-
mote significant amounts of distributional equity. And, many (per-
haps most) other legal rules might be so inefficient at promoting
distributional equity so as to make it not worth analysts' time and ef-
fort to determine how to adjust these legal rules. Also, it is important
to remember that, for many other legal rules, adjusting the rules to
promote distributional equity might be dominated by superior alter-
native approaches for promoting distributional equity through the de-
sign of different legal rules. Nevertheless, the literature suggests that
at least some legal rules might be designed to promote significant
amounts of distributional equity.311 Given that governments are al-
310 For further argument related to this point, see Hendren, note 98, at 46-47 (arguing
for a new method of resolving the equity v. efficiency trade-off with respect to
redistribution).
311 For example, a sizeable literature on environmental regulation has argued that
strengthening certain environmental protections can significantly promote distributional
equity. See, e.g., Nick Johnstone & Ys6 Serret, Introduction, in The Distributional Effects
of Environmental Policy 1-2 (Ys6 Serret & Nick Johnstone eds., 2006) ("what is clear is
that environmental policies have the potential to raise significant distributional concerns");
Michael A. Livermore & Jennifer S. Rosenberg, The Shape of Distributional Analysis, in
The Globalization of Cost-Benefit Analysis in Environmental Policy 69-84 (Michael A.
Livermore & Richard L. Revesz eds., 2013); see also, e.g., Logue & Avraham, note 228, at
181 ("[I]t is wrong to assert that redistribution through contract-based legal rules is impos-
sible or infeasible."). Further, note that tax-base-calculation rules are a form of legal rule
that might be adjusted so as to promote distributional equity. Double-distortion argu-
ments imply that tax-base-calculation rules should be designed solely based on efficiency,
leaving distributional concerns to the setting of tax rates. See note 274. But this Article's
analysis implies that distribution should be a factor in determining the setting of at least
some tax-base-calculation rules, which (for instance) potentially supports strengthening
anti-abuse rules targeting high-income taxpayers and loosening anti-abuse rules that pri-
marily affect low-income taxpayers.
Ultimately, the task of measuring the distributional impact (or incidence) of policy re-
forms can be difficult both when analyzing legal rules and when analyzing tax policies. See
Don Fullerton & Gilbert Metcalf, Tax Incidence, in 4 Handbook of Public Economics
1787-872 (Alan J. Auerbach & Martin Feldstein eds., 2002). One of the most elementary
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ready incurring the fixed overhead costs needed to establish many of
these legal rules in order to achieve the rules' regulatory purposes,
why should governments not also take advantage of these legal rules
so as to better optimize the trade-off between efficiency and distribu-
tional equity?312
Based on the dominant double-distortion approach, the prior litera-
ture often estimates the efficiency costs of promoting distribution by
modeling the responsiveness to the income tax as though it entirely
consists of labor-to-leisure distortions or similar tax-reduction tech-
niques that are assumed to operate as multi-instrument distortions
with respect to all potential tax instruments. 31 3 This Article's frame-
work demonstrates the importance of instead evaluating the extent to
which this responsiveness might operate as single-instrument distor-
tions with respect to possible supplementary tax instruments, and then
analyzing that responsiveness in light of the tax-smoothing principle.
Through this analysis, this Article's framework reveals that govern-
ments may have greater capacity to raise revenues and to promote
distributional equity at lower efficiency costs than sometimes is recog-
lessons of public finance economics is that the economic incidence (or distributional im-
pact) of tax policies may differ from the statutory incidence, and there are vigorous de-
bates about the distributional incidence of, for instance, property taxes and corporate
income taxes. Id. at 1789. Nevertheless, that measuring distributional incidence is often
difficult does not make it any less important to do so. There is a vast literature through
which economists have refined techniques for measuring distributional incidence, and this
literature can readily be applied to measure the distributional incidence of legal rules as
well as for tax policies-indeed, there are numerous studies in the prior literature that have
already analyzed the distributional incidence of a variety of different legal rules and regu-
lations. See, e.g., Dallaw Burtraw, Richard Sweeney & Margaret Walls, The Incidence of
U.S. Climate Policy: Alternative Uses of Revenues from a Cap-and-Trade Auction, 62
Nat'l Tax. J. 497 (2009); Ron Cheung, Keith Ihlanfeldt & Tom Maycock, The Incidence of
Land Use Regulatory Tax, 37 Real Estate Economics 675 (2009); Paul L. Joskow & Nancy
L. Rose, The Effects of Economic Regulation, in 2 Handbook of Industrial Organization
1450-506 (Richard Schmalensee & Robert Willig eds., 1989); Johnstone & Serret, supra.
312 Note that this conclusion potentially also extends to a number of other important tax
policy debates. For example, it is often argued in the literature on corporate tax integra-
tion that a corporate-level withholding tax is needed to prevent high-income taxpayers
from sheltering their income within the corporate form, but that this corporate-level with-
holding tax should be integrated with the individual-level income tax so as to completely
eliminate the double taxation of capital invested in the corporate form. See, e.g., Mark P.
Keightley & Molly F. Sherlock, Cong. Research Serv., R42726, The Corporate Income Tax
System: Overview and Options for Reform 25 (2014), available at http://fas.org/sgp/crs/
misc/R42726.pdf. But, extending the logic above, once a government incurs the overhead
costs associated with levying a corporate-level withholding tax, shouldn't the government
also further adjust that corporate-level tax in order to promote at least some incremental
amount of distributional equity?
313 More precisely, the prior literature sometimes notes the implications of instrument-
shifting distortions, but typically does not consider the possibility of single-instrument dis-
tortions. For an example of this in the prior literature, see Gov't Accountability Office,
note 305, at 40.
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nized. We should not leave this potential "money on the table"
merely to simplify the scholarly division of labor.314
IV. CONCLUSION
To conclude, it is worth emphasizing that nothing in this Article
should be viewed as attacking double-distortion models. Quite the
contrary, this Article builds on and generalizes the double-distortion
framework. Double-distortion models analyze "idealized" versions of
tax systems-such as by assuming that labor-to-leisure distortions are
the sole technique taxpayers can use to reduce their labor income tax
liabilities. 315 Many scholars advocating double-distortion arguments
recognize the importance of incorporating what they sometimes label
314 Moreover, this Article's framework does suggest a productive division of labor
among tax and other legal scholars. Tax scholars can study the nature of the porousness of
the tax system and can present to other legal scholars estimates for the relative marginal
efficiency costs of promoting various forms of distribution through the tax system. Note
that the relative marginal efficiency cost of promoting a form of distribution depends both
on whom the resources are transferred from and to whom the resources are transferred.
Legal scholars can then study the optimal design of legal rules to determine the settings for
these rules that promote distributional equity to the point where the relative marginal effi-
ciency costs of doing so equals that of the tax system. Granted, the legal analyst's task is
more difficult under this Article's framework than under the double-distortion approach.
But ease of analysis should not be the primary consideration in making policy prescrip-
tions. Scholarship should at least explore the possibility of promoting distributional equity
through calibrating the design of patent protections and of other legal rules that may have
substantial capacity to promote distributional equity.
I might expect that the legal rules that are most likely to have substantial capacity to
promote distributional equity are those that affect the macro structure of the economy
(such as intellectual property rules, financial regulation rules, antitrust rules, land use rules,
and the like). In contrast, I might expect that legal rules that primarily mediate interac-
tions amongst small numbers of individuals may be less likely to have substantial capacity
to promote distributional equity (such as most contract law rules). But analysts who spe-
cialize in these various legal regimes should be better suited than I am to evaluating the
extent to which any of these legal rules might actually be capable of being calibrated so as
to substantially promote distributional equity.
On a different note, the "money on the table" expression above is meant in the prover-
bial sense.
315 See, e.g., Bankman & Weisbach, note 169, at 1414-15 ("We will generally compare
only the ideal forms of income and consumption taxation. The actual choice of a tax sys-
tem has to be based on how the system would be implemented, focusing on administrative
and compliance costs.").
Note that I use the term "idealized" here, rather than the term "ideal," so as to indicate
that I am referring to how analysts choose to model abstract versions of tax systems. That
analysts choose to conceive of tax systems in certain ways for purposes of abstract policy
modeling does not imply that these idealized conceptions necessarily represent the Pla-
tonic forms of real world tax systems (or any other nonsubjective notions of ideal forms of
real world tax systems). In other words, there are many different ways in which analysts
might conceive of the idealized versions of tax systems, and none of these idealizations are
necessarily correct or incorrect. Rather, the question should be what lessons can be
learned from different idealizations.
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as "administrative" or "implementation" concerns into the analysis. 31 6
Yet there are at least two reasons why these scholars have neverthe-
less based their analyses on idealized versions of tax systems. The first
is that, as Joel Slemrod explains, due to methodological limitations,
"traditionally, economists have focused on the behavioral responses of
labor supply, saving, and investment-sometimes called 'real re-
sponses' ";317 only in recent years have economists started to incorpo-
rate a wider variety of tax-reduction techniques into core optimal-tax
models,318 and this recent work has simply not yet been fully inte-
grated into the double-distortion framework.319 The second reason is
that tax-reduction techniques that are more contingent on the details
of the tax system can potentially be thwarted by improving the design
of the tax system. 320 The advantage of analyzing idealized versions of
tax systems, then, is that the lessons learned potentially can be applied
more generally rather than being dependent on how tax systems are
implemented. 321
This Article's framework is thus easiest to apply when analyzing in-
cremental reforms to existing tax systems (such as when calibrating
legal rules to promote marginal amounts of distributional equity,
while holding the structure of the tax system constant). When analyz-
ing incremental reforms, it is typically more useful to evaluate the im-
plications of how taxpayers respond to the existing tax system, rather
than how taxpayers might respond to an idealized tax system. Cer-
tainly, it is important to consider the possibility of improving the ex-
isting income tax as a potential alternative (or complement) to
designing other policy instruments so as to make up for the flaws of
316 See, e.g., Bankman & Weisbach, note 169, at 1414-15; Kaplow, note 16, at 90-94.
317 Joel Slemrod, The Consequences of Taxation, Social Philosophy and Pol'y, Summer
2006, at 73, 73 (2006).
318 Id.
319 In particular, to my knowledge, this Article is the first to generalize the double-dis-
tortion framework to incorporate the insights from the taxpayer-responsiveness litera-
ture-as discussed in Chetty, note 23, at 467-73; Gamage, note 13, at 19-24.
320 But note that all tax-reduction techniques are somewhat contingent on the details of
the tax system-including labor-to-leisure distortions. Taxpayers' proclivity to engage in
labor-to-leisure distortions (for example) depends on the government's financing and regu-
lation of both work and leisure opportunities, on social norms that might partially be influ-
enced by tax policy decisions, and on numerous other factors that might be influenced by
government policy choices. Certainly, some tax-reduction responses are likely to be more
contingent on government policy choices than are others, and labor-to-leisure distortions
are likely to be less contingent than are many tax avoidance and evasion responses. But all
taxpayer responses are at least somewhat contingent.
321 Conversely, the disadvantage of analyzing idealized versions of tax systems is that
the lessons learned may have limited applicability to any real world tax policy problems.
There is thus a tension between designing a model to yield generalizable insights and de-
signing a model to yield relevantly applicable insights. The former goal is often facilitated
by greater abstraction and the latter goal by lesser abstraction.
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the existing income tax.322 But when evaluating incremental reforms,
analyzing the existing tax system should usually be a better starting
point than analyzing an idealized version.
It is more difficult to meaningfully analyze proposals for fundamen-
tal tax reforms. To repeat a quote from Bankman and Schler: "The
biggest dangers of a [fundamental tax reform] are the flaws not yet
identified, or even existing until the specific statutory language is in
place. '323 Thus, although we can conclude with reasonable confidence
that any conceivable real world tax system will be subject to consider-
able gaming, it is difficult to predict the nature and magnitude of pos-
sible tax gaming responses when evaluating hypothetical tax systems
that exist only in the minds of reform advocates. Nevertheless, there
is potential insight to be gained about fundamental tax reform propos-
als by triangulating between considering how taxpayers might respond
to idealized versions of tax systems and considering how taxpayers
actually respond to the closest real world equivalents of these tax
systems.324
Double-distortion models operate at a high level of abstraction, by
analyzing highly "idealized" tax systems. This Article's framework is
aimed at more of a medium level of abstraction. 325 Although it is
more difficult to analyze how tax gaming responses might operate
with respect to fundamental tax reform proposals than with respect to
incremental reforms, it is still crucial to evaluate the implications of
tax gaming.32 6 In particular, this Article has argued for the impor-
tance of evaluating the implications of tax gaming responses through a
framework informed by the tax-smoothing principle. The forthcoming
companion article discusses further how this Article's framework can
be used to analyze proposals for fundamental tax reforms.
Critics of abstract policy models sometimes invoke the fable of the
drunk who lost his keys in the bushes and yet searches for them under
322 But see note 304 (arguing that there is a limit to the degree to which the existing
income tax system can be improved).
323 Bankman & Schler, note 269, at 247.
324 Any one model or framework can only offer a partial understanding of the allegori-
cal "elephant" of real world policy problems. See, e.g., John Godfrey Saxe, The Blind Men
and the Elephant, in The Poems of John Godfrey Saxe 135, 135-36 (1873). By integrating
the insights offered by different modeling approaches, an academic literature potentially
can evolve to offer greater insight than can be generated by any one model. See Chetty,
note 22, at 454 ("The structural and sufficient-statistics approaches to welfare analysis
should be viewed as complements rather than substitutes because each approach has cer-
tain advantages.").
325 Not coincidentally, as compared to economists, academic lawyers probably have a
comparative advantage at analyzing policy problems at more medium levels of abstraction.
326 Slemrod & Yitzhaki, note 121, at 1427 ("[Wle believe that consideration of evasion,
avoidance, and administration is essential to the positive and normative analysis of
taxation.").
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the street lamp, "because that is where the light iS."'327 Abstract policy
modeling has great potential to yield powerful insights.328 But, as the
fable implies, if the keys were lost in the bushes, there is only so much
relevant insight that can be gained by searching under the street-
lamp.329 The empirical literature suggests that much of the respon-
siveness to real world tax systems takes the form of gaming, rather
than labor-to-leisure or saving-to-spending distortions. 330 There is
thus great need to analyze the implications of tax gaming. By employ-
ing a sufficient-statistics methodology, this Article's framework sacri-
fices some amount of precision in order to meaningfully analyze
aggregate categories of gaming responses.331 In the terms of the fable,
if the light from the streetlamp does not reach to where the keys were
lost, it may be that the best we can do is to use a flashlight. Although
a flashlight may be less illuminating than a streetlamp, a flashlight can
at least be aimed at the area we need to search, and using a flashlight
should often be better than searching in the dark.
327 E.g., Russell Korobkin, What Comes After Victory for Behavioral Law and Econom-
ics?, 2011 U. I11. L. Rev. 1653, 1655 (2011).
328 For a discussion of modeling tax policy problems, see generally Lawsky, note 176.
329 See id. at 1679-92 (discussing the usefulness and limitations of "credible worlds" ap-
proaches to tax policy modeling).
330 See notes 17-21 and accompanying text.
331 See Chetty, note 22, at 454-56 (discussing the relative advantages and disadvantages
of sufficient-statistics and structural approaches and concluding that these two approaches
"can be combined to address the shortcomings of each strategy"). Also, on this point, it
should be understood that this Article's approach relies as much on inductive reasoning as
on deductive reasoning.
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